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We ran four experiments inspired on an integrative approach between the 
subjective group dynamics model developed by Marques and colleagues (e.g. Marques, 
Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) and the group socialization model proposed by Levine 
and colleagues (e.g. Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). In the first experiment, 
participants had to judge two target members (either from the participants’ in-group or 
out-group), one that adopted a likeable and another that supported an unlikeable 
opinion. Furthermore, half of the participants believed that the likeable opinion 
consisted in a prescriptive group norm (these participants assumed a full member 
status), whereas the other half had no such information (these participants assumed a 
new member status). Full member participants engaged in a black sheep effect (e.g. 
Marques, 1990); namely, they upgraded the normative in-group member and derogated 
the deviant in-group member comparatively to similar out-group targets. Furthermore, 
they expressed commitment toward the violated norm. In turn, new member participants 
upgraded in-group targets as compared to out-group targets and showed more tolerance 
towards the unlikeable opinion. 
 In the other three experiments, participants had to judge two in-group or out-
group members that descriptively had different status within the group (new member, 
full-member, marginal member or ex-member) and were prescriptively normative and 
deviant targets. Results showed that participants engaged in a black sheep effect 
strategy only when these members were described as full members. We also found that 
when judging deviant full-members of the in-group, the more participants perceived 
these targets as threatening to the in-group the more they derogated these targets. 
Moreover, whereas participants prefered hostile reactions to deal with deviant full-
members of the in-group, they reacted consistently with socialization strategies  to deal 
with deviant new members (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005).  
 
Résumé  
 
 
On a réalisé quatre expérimentes inspirés à une approche intégratif du modèle de 
la Dynamique des Groupes Subjective (e.g. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) et 
le modèle de la socialisation groupale proposée par Levine et collègues (e.g. Moreland, 
Levine & Cini, 1993). Dans la première étude, les participants devraient juger deux 
membres-cible (de l’endogroupe ou de l’exogroupe par rapport au participant), un 
membre adoptant une opinion agréable et l’autre soutenant une opinion désagréable. En 
outre, la moitié des participants pensaient que l’opinion agréable faisait partie d’une 
norme prescriptive du groupe (ces participants a adopté un statut de membre nouveau), 
tandis que l’autre moitié n’avait pas cette information (ces participants a adopté un 
statut de membre de plein droit). Les membres de plein droit ont présenté l’effet brebis 
galeuse (e.g. Marques, 1990); nommément, ils ont surévalué le membre normatif de 
l’endogroupe et dérogé le membre déviant de l’endogroupe comparativement aux 
membres similaires de l’exogroupe. En plus, ils ont exprimé engagement á la norme 
violée. A son tour, les membres nouveaux ont surévalué cibles endogroupaux 
relativement aux cibles exogroupaux et ont présenté tolérance sur la opinion 
désagréable.  
En trois autres expérimentes, les participants devraient juger deux membres 
endogroupaux et exogroupaux qui descriptivement avaient statuts différents dans le 
groupe (membre nouveau, membre de plein droit, membre marginal ou ex-membre) et 
étaient des cibles prescriptivement normatives et déviantes, respectivement. Les 
résultats ont montré que les participants ont usé la stratégie de l’effet brebis galeuse 
seulement quand ces membres étaient décrits comme membres de plein droit. On a aussi 
découvrait que, quand les participants jugeaient membres de plein droit déviants, le plus 
ils trouvaient ces cibles menaçantes pour l’endogroupe, le plus ils les dérogeaient. En 
outre, tandis que les participants réagissaient hostilement face aux déviants membres de 
plein droit de l’endogroupe, ils réagissaient avec des stratégies de socialisation face aux 
déviants nouveaux membres (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005).  
Resumo 
 
 
Realizámos quatro estudos inspirados numa abordagem integrativa do modelo da 
dinâmica de grupos subjectiva desenvolvido por Marques e colegas (e.g. Marques, 
Abrams, Páez e Hogg, 2001) com o modelo de socialização grupal proposto por Levine 
e colegas (e.g. Moreland, Levine e Cini, 1993). No primeiro estudo, os participantes 
julgaram dois membros (do endogrupo ou do exogrupo), um que adoptava uma opinião 
desejável e outro que adoptava uma opinião indesejável. Metade dos participantes foi 
informada de que a opinião desejável correspondia a uma norma do grupo (estes 
participantes assumiram o estatuto de membros de pleno direito), enquanto que a outra 
metade não tinha acesso a essa informação (estes participantes assumiram o estatuto de 
membros noviços). As avaliações dos membros de pleno direito reflectiram um efeito 
da ovelha negra (e.g. Marques, 1990); nomeadamente, enalteceram o membro 
normativo do endogrupo e derrogaram o membro desviante do endogrupo, 
comparativamente com membros semelhantes do exogrupo. Para além disso, 
manifestaram o seu envolvimento em restabelecer o valor da norma violada. Por seu 
lado, os membros noviços avaliaram mais positivamente os membros do endogrupo do 
que do exogrupo e evidenciaram mais tolerância relativamente à opinião indesejável.  
 Nos outros três estudos, os participantes julgaram dois membros (do endogrupo 
ou do exogrupo) que descritivamente assumiam diferentes estatutos (membros noviços, 
de pleno direito, marginais ou ex-membros). Em termos prescritivos, um alvo era 
normativo e o outro desviante. Os participantes evidenciaram um efeito da ovelha negra 
apenas quando julgaram membros de pleno direito. Os resultados mostram ainda, que 
ao julgar membros desviantes de pleno direito do endogrupo, quanto mais os 
participantes os consideram como uma ameaça ao endogrupo, mais derrogam estes 
alvos. Para além disso, enquanto que os participantes preferiram utilizar reacções hostis 
relativamente aos membros desviantes de pleno direito do endogrupo, preferiram 
reacções consistentes com estratégias de socialização (para lidar com desviantes noviços 
Levine, Moreland e Hausmann, 2005).  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
We begin this work by claiming that social deviance is a normal phenomenon. 
This claim may seem paradoxical from a common-sense perspective. However, this 
assumption is a well-established issue of agreement, among social scientists, ever since 
classical sociologist Émile Durkheim showed that deviance is not only the infraction of 
these groups’ and societies’ norms, but, more importantly, it is the very mechanism 
through which norms are created and reinforced (Durkheim, 1897, 1915; 1930/1998; 
cf. also Mead, 1918 and Marques, in preparation). A similar idea has been later 
recovered by traditional work in social psychology, with the small group dynamics 
approach (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1968, for instance). However, this approach 
traditionally views deviance, more directly focused on deviance’s disruptive potential, 
than as a source of group cohesiveness. In the present thesis, we attempt to articulate 
two models that have important theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of 
reaction of normative individuals to deviance, in small face-to-face groups, and in 
large social categories: Levine and colleagues’ group socialization model (e.g. Levine 
& Moreland, 1994) and Marques and colleagues’ subjective group dynamics model 
(e.g. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). 
As Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg (2001) pointed out, social groups, and the 
large society, devote great amounts of energy to the control, in formal as well as in 
informal ways, of social deviance. The mentally-hill are taken care of so as to be 
“cured”, delinquents are "re-socialized", sexual deviants are often object of scorn or 
even physical punishment, army defectors may be brought to trial and sentenced for 
treason, individuals who disagree with the consensual position of their group are 
 12 
downgraded or even expelled from the group, and group members who adopt 
unlikeable opinions are the focus of hostile reactions on the part of other members (cf., 
for example, Archer, 1985; DeLamater, 1968; Duyckaerts, 1966; Erikson, 1964, 1966; 
Foucault, 1975; Levine, 1980; Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998). 
However, regardless of how it is defined, as crime, or as pathology, or as 
dissidence, for example, deviance is present in all societies and groups. In addition, as 
Durkheim (1930/1998; Durkheim, 1897) has noticed, all societies report stable, or 
even increasing, rates of deviance across time. In fact, rather than being a menace to 
social cohesiveness, deviance may play a functional role in societies. For instance, it 
may help to clarify societies’ and groups’ boundaries and to reinforce their normative 
system (Erikson, 1966, 1964; Mead, 1918). Deviance also serves as an example to new 
members (Durkheim, 1915). It enables them to learn the important norms to respect. 
 
Intra-Group and Inter-Group Aspects of Deviance 
 
In this work, we argue that different conditions confer different meanings to 
deviant behaviour. For this particular purpose, we define deviant behaviour as the 
adoption of socially undesirable positions that run counter the norms that are generally 
adopted by a group or by the society, and that are viewed as prescriptions, or principles 
to which individuals “ought” to adhere (cf. Forsyth, 1990). We argue that such 
behaviour may have different implications in the eyes of normative individuals, 
depending on those who enact it and, more specifically, on their inter-group and intra-
group statuses. That is, normative members of large social categories, as well as 
members of face-to-face groups may adopt a more or less prescriptive focus towards 
 13 
deviants, depending on whether these deviants are construed as members of their group 
or as out-group members. Concomitantly, such prescriptive focus may depend on 
whether the deviants’ status place them more to the centre or more to the periphery of 
their group. Thus, normative and deviant behaviour can be studied only in light of the 
group context in which it occurs, and the reactions evoked by normative and deviant 
group members will become meaningful only in light of their positions within the 
group. 
 
Small Groups and Large Social Categories 
 
The distinction between small, dynamic, interactive groups and large social 
categories has implications to the processes that are supposed to underlie the social and 
psychological structural properties of these groups. Face-to-face groups have been 
viewed as collections of individuals that are structured in terms of their direct 
interactions and interdependence, that ultimately lead to role differentiations (e.g. 
Shaw, 1976). However, even within such role differentiated structure, group members 
will attempt to establish uniformity of beliefs, as an important source of social 
validation of their view of relevant aspects of reality (Festinger, 1950; Kruglanski, 
Shah, Pierro & Mannetti, 2002; Levine, 1980). Group members thus view dissent as a 
potential jeopardy to the subjective validity of their beliefs. Group reactions to these 
kinds of situation include the use of inclusive or exclusive strategies (see Levine, 1980, 
for a review). Inclusive strategies consist in attempts to influence and pressure deviant 
members to conform to normative expectations (Festinger, 1950; Orcutt, 1973; 
Schachter, 1968). Such reactions are essentially related to socialization (e.g. Festinger, 
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1950; Levine, 1980; Levine & Moreland, 1994). Exclusive reactions (Orcutt, 1973) 
may lead to the expulsion of deviant members from the group, and are applied only 
when inclusive reactions are not effective (Abrams, Randsley de Moura,  Hutchison & 
Viki, 2005; Festinger, 1950; Israel, 1956). 
In turn, large social categories have been viewed as cognitive representations 
that affect behaviour to the extent that there is a common identification to the same 
category by a number of individuals, that ultimately lead to the strong assimilation of 
individuals to their group’s prototype, thus, perceived similarity and interchangeability 
among members (e.g. Miller, Prentice & Lightdale, 1994; cf. also Hamilton, Sherman 
& Lickel, 1998; Wilder & Simon 1998). In this vein, intra-group deviance would be 
counterproductive in light of individuals’ motivation to hold a positive, and distinctive 
social identity. 
The parallel between processes occurring in face-to-face groups and process 
that ensue from individuals’ social identification is interesting to our work, because we 
propose that reactions to deviance in large social categories are, to a large extent, the 
psychological equivalent of individuals’ reactions to dissent in face-to-face groups (cf. 
Marques & Páez, 1994). 
 
 Structure of the Thesis 
 
We have divided this thesis into six chapters, besides this Introduction. 
Chapters I and II deal with the theoretical framework underlying this thesis. Chapters 
III-V deal with four experiments in support of predictions issued from that framework. 
Chapter VI presents our conclusions. 
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Face-to-Face Groups and Social Categories: What are their Differences? 
In Chapter I, we compare the small group approach and the social identity 
approach to group processes. In light of these approaches, we discuss the processes 
according to which groups form and maintain themselves. According to the small 
group perspective, a group results from a regular interaction between two or more 
individuals that develop affective ties in such a way that they become interdependent 
(Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & Moreland, 1994, 1998; Shaw, 1976). In such an 
interdependent interaction, intra-group uniformity is determinant of groups life. As a 
result, groups create mechanisms that tend to ensure cohesiveness between their 
members and conformity to beliefs and behaviour that help achieving group goals and 
uniformity with group members’ consensual beliefs and expectations (Cartwright & 
Zander, 1968; Festinger, 1950). 
As opposed to the above perspective, the social identity approach assumes that 
intra-group cohesion is mediated by the identification of each individual to the 
cognitive representation of the group (Hogg, 1992). Groups have a psychological 
existence that, to a large extent, determines the actions of their members in relevant 
social context (Tajfel, 1978). As a result, individuals should be highly motivated to 
generate and to maintain inter-group distinctiveness as a way to get a clear-cut 
representation of their social identity (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Haslam & Wetherell, 
1987). Concomitantly, and equally important, individuals would attempt to achieve 
and to maintain a positive difference between their group and relevant out-groups in 
relevant social comparison situations (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
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An Integrative Approach to Reactions to Deviants 
The theoretical framework for our research is directly located at the confluence 
between the two above mentioned approaches. In Chapter II, we present the group 
socialization model and the subjective group dynamics model. We attempt to compare 
important assumptions of the two models and to draw implications of those 
assumptions in light of our empirical work. Our research deals with individuals’ 
judgments of in-group or out-group members who adopt normative and deviant 
opinions, and is at the confluence of the classical Small Group approach, and the 
Social Identity approach. Concretely, we attempt to articulate between the 
Socialization Model proposed by Levine, Moreland, and colleagues (e.g., Levine & 
Moreland, 1994, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 1982) and the Subjective Group Dynamics 
Model proposed by Marques and colleagues (e.g. Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, 
Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). 
According to Levine and colleagues’ socialization model, intra-group status 
depends on reciprocal commitment between the group and individuals. According to 
the model, socialization processes should always be approached taking the point of 
view of both parties implied in the relationship: the member and the group as a whole 
and the kind of behaviour group members adopt towards each other will depend on 
their respective statuses in the group. According to Marques and colleagues’ (Marques, 
Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques & Páez, 1994) subjective group dynamics model, 
group members depends on salient contextual cues and cognitively accessible 
categories that lead individuals to identify with a given social category. Following this 
process, individuals will perceive likeable in-group members as instances that 
reinforce their beliefs on a positive social identity, and unlikeable in-group members as 
instances that jeopardize the validity, or perceived legitimacy, of such beliefs. As a 
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result, individuals will derogate the deviants, as part of a psychological process aimed 
to legitimize, although subjectively, the positivity of social identity (Marques, Abrams, 
Páez & Hogg, 2001). Our central empirical argument ensues from these two 
perspectives. We argue that reactions to deviants depend on three factors. 
The first factor is whether these deviants are in-group or out-group members. 
Because deviant in-group members should have a major impact on the in-group’s 
identity, individuals should derogate these deviants as compared to similar others who 
belong to an out-group, and thus, whose impact on social identity is irrelevant. The 
second factor is individuals’ status in their group. Individuals who occupy a more 
central status in their group should, on the one hand, be more committed to the group 
and, on the other hand, have better knowledge of the standards required by the group to 
uphold a positive social identity, than individuals who occupy other statuses. 
Therefore, the former should be more sensitive, i.e. more prescriptive, regarding 
emerging in-group deviance and, hence, should more strongly derogate in-group 
deviants. The third factor is the status of the deviants. Individuals who occupy less 
central status in the group may be more expected to deviate, either because they are not 
yet fully socialized within the group, or because they are already dissenting. In turn, 
members who occupy a more central status should be expected to behave in 
accordance with the group’s demands. Therefore, their deviance should have a stronger 
negative impact on other members’ subjective validity of the in-group’s positively 
differentiated position from the out-group and, hence, they should be more strongly 
derogated than the former members. 
Because we are mainly interested in the theoretical implications of reactions to 
deviance in groups, and based on the part of Chapter I dedicated to the role that norms 
play in groups, in Chapter II, we devoted significant attention to the prescriptive, as 
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opposed to descriptive functions of group norms. This is an important assumption of 
the subjective group dynamics model according to which, in reacting to deviance, 
group members simultaneously adopt a descriptive focus and a prescriptive focus. The 
former would allow them to differentiate between in-group and out-group, thus making 
social identity salient. The latter would lead them to judge salient in-group members in 
terms of their contribution to positive in-group differentiation. Further, the distinction 
between descriptive and prescriptive norms may be helpful in understanding 
commitment, that we interpret as being, to a large extent, associated with a norm of 
loyalty towards the group (Zdaniuk & Levine, 1996). 
 
Effects of Individuals’ Socialization Status on Evaluations of Likeable and Unlikeable 
In-Group or Out-Group Members 
In Chapter III, we report an experiment (Experiment 1) on the effects of 
participants’ intra-group status on their evaluations of normative (likeable) and deviant 
(unlikeable) in-group and out-group members. In this experiment, we used a procedure 
inspired from the minimal group paradigm (e.g. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 
1971), in which we manipulated participants’ intra-group status (new member, full 
member), targets’ membership (in-group, out-group), and targets’ normative position 
(likeable, unlikeable). The main dependent measure was the evaluation of the target 
members. The major result of this experiment is that participants who had been 
assigned a full member status upgraded normative in-group targets and derogated 
deviant in-group targets more than similar out-group targets. In turn, participants who 
were assigned with the status of new member favoured both in-group members (likable 
and unlikable members) relative to out-group members. Furthermore, participants with 
 19 
full member status tended to reinforce the in-group norm, whereas participants with 
new member status showed more tolerance towards the unlikeable opinion. 
 
Effects of Targets’ Socialization Status, Group Membership, and Likeability on their 
Evaluation 
In Chapter IV, we report two experiments (Experiments 2 and 3), in which we 
investigated how group members react towards normative and deviant members that 
hold a differentiated intra-group status (new member, full member, and marginal 
member, or ex-member). In experiments 2 and 3, we tested the effects of group 
membership and socialization status on the reaction to the deviant opinion. Participants 
judged a normative and a deviant member, either from the in-group or from the out-
group, with one of the statuses referred above. The main results were consistent across 
the two experiments. Among other things, participants judged more extremely both 
normative and deviant in-group full members than they judged all other members 
(either members with other statuses, or members of the out-group). The in-group 
normative full member was the most positively evaluated, whereas the deviant in-
group full member was the most negatively evaluated member of all. 
 
Effects of Targets’ Socialization Status on Perceptions of Threat and Strategies to 
Deal with In-Group Deviants 
In Chapter V, we report one experiment (Experiment 4) aimed to check for two 
ideas, besides the general hypothesis according to which participants would upgrade 
normative in-group full members and derogate deviant in-group full members as 
compared to all other members. One such idea, is that derogation of deviant in-group 
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full members is mediated by the perceived threat of these members to the group as a 
whole. Our results partially supported this idea. The other idea is that participants will 
adopt different reactions towards in-group deviants, depending on these deviants’ 
intra-group status. We found that participants’ generally advocated teaching strategies, 
aimed at informing deviants or persuading them to join the likeable opinion, when 
these deviants held new member status. However, when the deviants had a full 
member status, participants advocated punishment strategies, such as downgrading the 
deviants in terms of their responsibilities in the group, and threatening these members 
with personal negative consequences for their deviance. 
 
Implications of Deviance in Groups and in Society 
Chapter VI concludes this work. In that chapter, we attempt an integration of 
the results we obtained in our studies in light of the group socialization and the 
subjective group dynamics models. We attempt to draw some implications for 
processes occurring in small groups, in large social categories, and in the society at 
large.
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CHAPTER I 
FACE-TO-FACE GROUPS AND LARGE SOCIAL CATEGORIES: WHAT ARE 
THEIR DIFFERENCES? 
 
The study of groups in social psychology has traditionally evolved along two 
general theoretical and empirical orientations, which, only more recently, have been 
subject to integrative attempts (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Marques 
& Páez, 1994). One such orientation is the small group approach (e.g. Cartwright & 
Zander, 1968; Shaw, 1976; Thibaut & Kelley 1959/1986; cf. also Forsyth, 1990). The 
other orientation was initiated with Tajfel’s (1978) seminal work on social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), The typical object of study of the small 
group approach is the so-called dynamic, interactive group, that is a group structured in 
terms of inter-individual interaction and interdependence among its members (e.g. 
Shaw, 1976). In turn, the typical object of study of the social identity approach is the 
large social category that is a group whose existence is primarily located at the level of 
individuals’ cognitive representations of society and of their location within such 
representation as members of social groups (Turner, 1975). The present chapter is 
intended to outline these two perspectives about social groups.  
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Face-to-Face Groups 
 
Group Formation 
 
According to the small group approach, the basic condition for the existence of 
a group is the interaction and interdependence between individuals (Shaw, 1976). In 
this vein, groups are sustained by the positive interpersonal orientations among their 
members, that are reflected by their interactions, and these orientations are functional 
for the maintenance of the group as a social unit, and for the accomplishment of goals 
that could not be achieved by the individuals alone (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1968). 
Group affiliation would ensue from individuals’ intentions to initiate and to 
preserve positive interpersonal interactions (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959/1986). Such interpersonal interactions can involve attraction, control, 
and/or interdependence (cf. Forsyth, 1990). Some individuals tend to affiliate because 
they feel similar and attracted to each other (Newcomb, 1963, 1956), or because they 
need to feel power over other people, or to be controlled by other people (Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959/1986). In any case, when there is harmony between individuals’ 
motivations, social interaction in the group will be rewarding, and individuals will 
increase their commitment to the group’s life. 
However, individuals’ common group membership co-exists with interpersonal 
differences (Asch, 1987). Indeed, even among individuals who have positive 
interpersonal orientations and common goals, there is enough interpersonal variability 
of beliefs, motivations, and behaviour to allow for emerging conflict. In the absence of 
any form of social regulation, interpersonal differences would rapidly generate group 
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dissent and, ultimately, group dissolution (Asch, 1987; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). 
As a result, groups must mobilise part of their energy to the implementation of social 
regulation mechanisms aimed to prevent, or to resolve, internal conflict (Levine, 
1980). 
Social regulation mechanisms require an internal structuring of the group. 
Group structuring, in spite of conditioning and restraining individuals’ behaviour, 
allows group members to know both what to expect from other members, and what 
these members expect from them (Asch, 1987; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Sherif, 1936). Group structuring thus involves the formation of social 
norms and group roles that help, not only to establish group uniformity and 
cohesiveness, but also to accomplish group goals (Forsyth, 1990; Levine & Moreland, 
1994). 
 
Social Reality and Group Locomotion 
One important consequence of the above process is that individuals often exert 
mutual influence in the construction and sustenance of shared beliefs. In other words, 
group uniformity allows for the construction of consensus on relevant issues, i.e. the 
construction of the group’s social reality (Festinger, 1950). Concomitantly, it allows 
individuals to attain goals that they could not successfully achieve in isolation, i.e. 
group locomotion (Festinger, 1950). When the group members have to reach a certain 
goal, group uniformity can be desired or even demanded. This uniformity will be more 
determinant, the more it is perceived to facilitate the achievement of the group goal. 
Consensus and behaviour similarity concerning the group goal is determinant 
to validate the chosen means to attain the goal and to reach effective coordination 
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within the group in view of required actions for success (cf. also Cartwright & Zander, 
1968). In other words, group members need to validate group values that emerge in the 
form of personal beliefs. Uniformity entails perception of consensus, and this 
perception contributes to the reduction of uncertainty regarding relevant aspects of 
group members’ lives. 
 
The Importance of Group Norms 
 
Obviously, group norms fulfil an important role in the establishment of intra-
group uniformity. Because norms regulate social interaction and define the proper 
behaviour to adopt, norms promote interdependence, similarity, and cohesion between 
group members (e.g. Forsyth, 1990). Some norms that may not even be effective 
guides for behaviour are, nevertheless, maintained by groups only because they 
contribute to members’ cohesiveness. Such norms function as rituals that contribute to 
improving members’ loyalty towards the group (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). 
We may find different definitions of social norms in the literature, most often 
in the form of typologies, whose wide array clearly reflects their impact in all instances 
of social behaviour (cf. Gibbs, 1992; Morris, 1956). TPF1FPT A more process-oriented 
definition is that norms are socially constructed propositions that bring regularity and 
control to interpersonal relationships within similar situations (e.g. Gibbs, 1965, 1977; 
Morris, 1956; Sherif, 1936; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). The most general functions 
of norms include the prescription of which behaviour is desirable or tolerated, 
                                                 
1 For example, Sorokin (cited by Morris, 1956) distinguishes between “law”, “technical norms”, “norms 
of etiquette”, and “fashion”, whereas Williams (also cited by Morris, 1956), distinguishes between 
“technical”, “conventional”, “aesthetical”, “moral”, and “institutional” norms. Gibbs (1965) 
distinguishes between nineteen types of norms, but, as he recognizes, some of these types are irrelevant 
or even inexistent.  
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reduction of potential interpersonal conflicts or misunderstandings, and decreasing the 
possible costs associated with exceeding communication. Once a norm is established 
and group members internalize it, there is no need for controversy concerning 
behaviours associated to this norm (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). 
 
Descriptive and Prescriptive Norms 
Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno (1991; Cialdini, 1996; Cialdini & Trost, 1998) 
distinguish between two types of norms depending on their moral character value. 
According to these authors, norms can be inducted from the frequency of commonly 
displayed behaviour by the majority of the members of a social group. Such modal 
norms are purely informative. They allow individuals to reach quick decisions 
concerning how to behave in specific situations based on the observation of what most 
of the other individuals do. Consequently, individuals assume that frequent behaviours 
and opinions are usually the most appropriate and adapted to the situation (Cialdini, 
Kallgren and Reno, 1991; Cialdini, 1996). Cialdini and colleagues designated these as 
descriptive norms (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, 1996; Cialdini & Trost, 
1998). Descriptive norms should operate as context-dependent criteria, or local 
standards, which help individuals adjusting their behaviour and predicting events in, 
specific situations, (Miller & Prentice, 1996).TPF2FPT 
                                                 
2 Miller and Prentice’s (1996) idea is based on previous work by Kahneman and Miller (1986). These 
latter authors argued that comparison standards are not given a priori but rather, are computed on-line 
from present contextual cues that are compared to past relevant contexts. This process of “backward 
thinking” (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) activates a frame of reference that corresponds to the individuals’ 
relevant expectations, ideals, goals and beliefs in the situation. Each new stimulus is compared to 
alternative cognitively salient stimuli. There are two types of alternative stimuli: “could be” and “should 
be” stimuli. Could be stimuli consist of cognitively salient expectations for the current context, whereas 
should be stimuli refer to cognitive representations of what is considered as being the right things to 
occur in the situation 
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However, social norms can also refer to behaviours that are socially approved 
regardless of their frequency or distribution across individuals. Such norms inform of 
what individuals ought to do, rather than what individuals actually do, and therefore, 
are associated to the notion of social morality (cf. also Marques, Páez & Abrams, 
1998). These would correspond to global norms (Miller & Prentice, 1996), or generic 
norms (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, 1996; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). This 
kind of norms should correspond to pre-established, context-independent, stipulations 
that, once activated should lead individuals to anticipate rewards for their observance 
and sanctions for non-compliance (Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno, 1991; Cialdini, 1996; 
cf. also Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). 
Thus, whereas descriptive norms call upon individuals’ motivation to behave in 
a way similar to relevant others, generic norms would have an injunctive character, and 
they should appeal to individuals’ sense of oughtness and motivation for social 
approval (Cialdini, 1996; Forsyth, 1990; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001; 
Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). 
Although the distinction between descriptive, or local, norms, on the one hand, 
and prescriptive, global, or generic norms, on the other hand, is debatable,TP F3FPT Cialdini 
and colleagues (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991) found support to this assumption. 
For example, these authors found that participants littered less when facing a clean 
environment, than when the environment was dirty. In addition, participants’ littering 
behaviour was more frequent when they could witness littering by other individuals. In 
                                                 
3 Notice that this idea is debatable. As Miller and Prentice (1996) put it, “a social norm is an attribute of 
a group that is considered to be both descriptive of and prescriptive for its members” (Miller & Prentice, 
1996, p.800). Miller and Prentice (1996) consider that every norm is context-dependent and contains 
both descriptive and prescriptive attributes, because it simultaneously specifies the most frequent and 
the most correct behaviour. In a similar vein, Thibaut and Kelley (1959/1986) argue that the regularity 
of behaviour indicates that it is consistent with some norm. Thus, the occurrence of similar behaviour 
patterns among individuals should indicate that these individuals are attuning to a group norm that 
stipulates group members’ expectations about behaviour and, as such, not only describes, but also 
prescribes behaviour. 
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other experiment, Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno (1991) showed that the observation of 
other people’s violation of a prescriptive norm made this norm salient to participants 
and reinforced their commitment to the norm. In addition, when the prescriptive norm 
was made salient by a message stating that no garbage should be thrown on the 
ground, participants who watched other individuals’ littering avoided littering more 
than when littering behaviour was not salient. An implication of this finding is that the 
salience of injunctive norms may have a stronger impact on individuals’ behaviour 
than the salience of descriptive norms. 
In brief, some norms seem to have a stronger prescriptive character than others, 
and this character seems to be, to a large extent, independent of the frequency with 
which the norms emerge in individuals’ behaviour. This assumption is in line with the 
common observation that there is not necessarily a strong correlation between what 
individuals do (or perceive others to do), and what individuals think they ought to do 
(or think that others ought to do) (cf. Marques, in preparation). For example, risking 
one’s life to save the life of a stranger in a fire is certainly less frequent than 
withdrawing. Nevertheless, the former act may be socially praised as an act of courage, 
or heroism, whereas the latter may be socially perceived as an act of cowardice. 
Therefore, although we may assume that, in general, there may be a consistence 
between prescriptive norms and the frequency of behaviour, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that such consistence is not total. The operation of prescriptive norms involves 
a deduction process, from what ought to be to what is observed. Conversely, there 
should be a much stronger consistency between observed behaviour and descriptive 
norms, because, by definition, these norms are inductively constructed from the 
observation of actual behaviour. Prescriptive norms should be anchored on a sense of 
morality which by no means indicates behaviour consistency with the norm, but which 
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certainly means agreement with the moral principle that it represents (cf. Durkheim, 
1930/1998; cf. also Marques, in preparation). 
If the above ideas are accepted, then, we may propose that prescriptive norms 
correspond to the operational stipulation of social values. Indeed, as Sherif (1936) 
pointed out, values refer to general expectations that material or, more often, symbolic 
objects, satisfy social and personal needs, hence allowing individuals to derive 
attachments and loyalties towards these objects. However, values operate as general 
principles that apply to very general situations (Becker, 1963), and therefore are poor 
guides for action. Prescriptive norms should thus operate at the intermediate level 
between social values and individuals’ behaviour (Becker, 1963; Erikson, 1964; 
Forsyth, 1990; Sherif, 1936). 
Interestingly, the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive norms 
coincides with the two kinds of influence that have been traditionally recognized as 
occurring in face-to-face groups. We are referring to what Deutsch and Gerard (1955) 
designated, respectively, as informational influence and normative influence 
. 
Informal and Normative Influences 
As we noted above, one important function of group life is that it allows 
individuals to validate their beliefs and to achieve their common goals. As a result, 
groups will seek to establish consensus regarding the common beliefs, attitudes, and 
goals of their members (Festinger, 1950, 1954). Therefore, they establish influence 
mechanisms aimed to ensure such consensus. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished 
between informational influence and normative influence to refer such mechanisms.  
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Informational influence depends on individuals’ motivation to hold 
subjectively valid beliefs about relevant aspects of life, when they cannot validate their 
beliefs based on objective tests of reality (Festinger, 1950). In this case, social 
consensus, and, specifically, consensus with relevant others, would become the 
criterion of validity. As Festinger (1950/1989, p. 119) pointed out, “an opinion, a 
belief, an attitude is ‘correct’, ‘valid’, and ‘proper’ to the extent that it is anchored in a 
group of people with similar beliefs, opinions, and attitudes”. The more the relevant 
individuals who share an opinion are, the more this opinion will be viewed as valid and 
accurate. We may think that subjective certainty about an opinion or behaviour would 
be a direct function of the degree of observed consensus among other people, namely 
relevant people, about that opinion or behaviour. 
Whereas informational influence involves the private acceptance of influence 
by the target of influence, normative influence involves overt compliance with other 
people’s expectations. According to Deutsch and Gerard (1955), normative influence 
depends on individuals’ motivation to get social approval by behaving in accordance 
with the expectations of relevant others. (e.g. Asch, 1955, 1951). Thus, normative 
influence seems to be associated with the injunctive character of social norms. 
Whereas informational influence will be the most effective in situation that generate 
informational uncertainty, normative influence will be effective in situations in which 
there is certainty that others have the ability to prescribe the individual’s behaviour, to 
detect lack of compliance, and to act in consequence (cf. also Jones & Gerard, 1967). 
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Group Roles  
 
In group contexts, social norms, descriptive or prescriptive, thus define the 
adequate beliefs and behaviour that group members should adopt either privately, or 
overtly. A related function of group norms is that they prescribe group roles (Thibaut 
& Kelley, 1959/1986). Groups define goals, values, beliefs, skills and behaviour 
standards that are expected to be met by every group member (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959/1986).Often, these normative expectations may lead group members to sacrifice 
their personal goals in order to contribute to the successful achievement of the 
collective goals (Zander, 1985, in Forsyth, 1990). In such circumstances, individuals 
will choose to behave consistently with the role they assume within the group. For 
example, in struggling for a collective goal, workers may go on a strike, thus 
sacrificing part of their salary (which is important for the satisfaction of some personal 
needs).TPF4FPT  
If internal differentiation occurs in terms of defined group roles, groups may 
not only accept such differentiation, but also encourage it. According to Sherif (1936) 
and, more recently, Bormann and Bormann (1988, in Levine & Moreland, 1994), the 
definition of roles within small groups thus reflects group’s preference for behaviour 
that allows to accomplish its goals. Group members who adopt such behaviour are 
viewed as reliable, and are rewarded by the group (cf. Levine, 1980; Levine & 
Moreland, 1998, 1994; see Chapter II). Thus, individuals seem to adopt group roles on 
the basis of their contribution to the group’s needs, rather than on the basis of their 
personal characteristics (Levine & Moreland, 1984; Sherif, 1936). An outcome of this 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, this idea is akin with Social Identity Theory’s distinction between social mobility 
strategies and social change strategies (see below). In adopting social mobility strategies, individuals 
favour their own personal goals over collective goals, whereas, in adopting social change strategies 
individuals will not differentiate between personal and collective goals. 
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process is that, in the same way individuals commit themselves to personally 
rewarding groups, groups also recruit members and commit themselves to members 
who contribute to the social validation of collective beliefs and the achievement of 
collective goals (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). 
In brief, uniformity is achieved through mutual influence, involving both a 
motivation to influence, and a predisposition to accept influence from other members 
(Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Even the process of recruiting new members is largely 
guided by appraisals of such individuals’ potential to help maintaining group 
uniformity, and hence, to contribute to the groups continued existence. These 
processes are based on the group’s ability to establish normative expectations, 
susceptible of generating respect for group beliefs, and similarity among group 
members (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Because group members need to validate 
group values and norms, and to evaluate group skills and opinions, intra-group 
uniformity is a reflection of intra-group consensus about these issues. One importance 
implication of this fact is that groups are systematically forced to deal with the 
potential dangers of emerging deviance.  
 
Group Cohesion and Social Integration 
 
However, individuals’ motivation to share a group’s social reality and to 
contribute to group locomotion varies with the importance they assign to group 
membership. Some groups may become a reference whereas others do not. Referent 
groups affect individuals’ perceptions of reality and behaviour (Cartwright & Zander, 
1968). The more individuals are motivated to become members of a group and the 
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more strongly and frequently they adopt behaviour that is consistent with that 
motivation, the stronger will be the referent significance of the group. In brief, 
individuals will attempt to become more similar to the other members in those 
attributes that define the group (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). 
An inherent quality of group life is thus group cohesiveness. Group 
cohesiveness has been defined as the set of forces acting upon individual group 
members in order to keep their allegiance to the group (Cartwright, 1968; Forsyth, 
1990). More cohesive groups can also more easily ensure their continued existence, 
through the reciprocal positive affective ties of their members and, consequently, 
through their increased involvement with the group (Levine & Moreland, 1998). 
Cohesiveness seems to ensue from two operating forces upon group members. Internal 
forces enhance intra-group attraction, whereas external forces act to decrease the 
attraction felt towards alternative groups (Cartwright, 1968). Group cohesiveness 
emerges as individuals’ willingness to remain members in the group (Cartwright, 
1968). 
Another inherent quality of groups is social integration (Levine & Moreland, 
1998). Social integration may be defined as the extent to which members think and 
behave according to the group’s normative expectations. The higher is the degree of 
social integration, the more the personal needs of group members will match the 
group’s needs. Thus, the longer individuals are members of a group, and the more they 
participate as members in the group’s life, the more they are expected to feel high 
levels of social integration (Levine & Moreland, 1998). 
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Inclusive and Exclusive Reactions to Deviance in Small Groups 
 
The small group approach conceived deviance as a statement of differentiation 
from intra-group uniformity (Levine, 1980, for a review). It traditionally refers to “an 
opinion expressed by one (or a minority of) group member(s) that differs from the 
modal opinion of a physically present (or realistically simulated) majority of group 
members” (Levine, 1980, pp375-376). According to Festinger (1950), discrepancies 
within groups can be solved in three ways. Deviant members may change their 
opinions towards the majority opinion (conformity), the majority can change its 
opinions towards deviant opinion (innovation), or the group may expel deviant 
members and redefine its boundaries. 
Reactions of majority members to group deviants may emerge in the form of 
inclusive or exclusive reactions (cf. Levine, 1980). An inclusive reaction stands for 
normative members’ attempts to make the deviants join the group’s modal opinion. An 
exclusive reaction stands for the group’s definition of its boundaries, namely, by 
expelling the deviant. According to Orcutt (1973), the adoption of an inclusive or an 
exclusive reaction depends on the type of attributions group members make about 
deviant members. Deviance is generally associated with an attribution of dispositional 
characteristics to deviants. Such an attribution is fundamental to anticipate the future 
contribution of the deviant members to the group's goal attainment (Levine, 1980; cf. 
also Zander, 1976, in Forsyth, 1990). Dispositional attributions would trigger exclusive 
reactions, whereas external attributions would trigger inclusive reactions. 
Three forms of inclusive reaction to deviance are Tacceptance, communication, 
and hostility.T Acceptance emerges in groups in which lenience towards deviance is 
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socially valued (Coser, 1962). Moreover, some groups may tolerate deviance from 
members who hold some roles, but not from members who hold other roles. For 
example, leaders may be ascribed idiosyncrasy credit (Hollander, 1964) that allows 
them to dissent from some group norms while being accepted by the group. 
Communication is the typical occurrence of informational influence, which occurs 
when group members direct a high amount of communication towards deviant 
members (Festinger, 1950). Finally, hostility emerges when group members refers to 
more punitive reactions, or the expression of negative judgments towards the deviants 
(Israel, 1956), and might correspond to the exertion of normative influence in that the 
goal is less to persuade the deviants than to force them to adopt the group’s majority 
opinion. 
On their side, exclusive reactions to deviance may emerge in three different 
ways: stigmatization, avoidance, or expulsion. Stigmatization consists in a response, 
based on social consensus about the targets of stigmatization and is usually 
accompanied by a moral justification or ideology that supports their exclusion from the 
group. Frequently, stigmatization serves some functions such as relief of discomfort, 
system justification and preservation of other members' statuses within the group 
(Major & Eccleston, 2005). Avoidance consists of isolating the deviant member from 
the group’s activities (Israel 1956). To some extent, it is similar to ostracism 
(Williams, 2001). In this context, deviants receive lower amounts of communication, 
information about the group, and their participation on group’s activities is hindered. 
Finally, expulsionT stands for casting the deviant out of the group, and is the Tmost 
intense exclusive strategy (Israel, 1956). Expulsion emerges with the perception that 
the deviant is an unrecoverable member (Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). 
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In brief, deviance corresponds to a breach in the group’s consensus about social 
reality, or to a withdrawal of group members from a common effort to achieve group 
goals. As a result, normative members typically engage in informational influence and, 
if this fails, in normative influence mechanisms in order to re-establish group 
consensus. If these mechanisms fail, the group may expel the deviant (Festinger, 1950; 
Levine, 1980). 
One can find illustrations of the above mentioned strategies in the literature. 
For example, Festinger and Thibaut (1951, cited by Levine, 1980) ran an experiment in 
which they measured the amount of communication (informational influence) that 
group members directed toward a deviant member. Participants were members of 
groups that supposedly had to discuss an issue, and were subject to one of three 
experimental conditions as a function of the high, medium or low external pressures 
towards intra-group uniformity. Moreover, participants believed that they were similar 
to, or different from, the other group members. The results showed that, in general, 
participants directed more communication at the deviant than at other group members. 
However, this effect was stronger when participants felt high pressure for intra-group 
uniformity. Communication decreased over time only when groups were 
heterogeneous and pressure for uniformity was low. In this condition, participants 
decreased communication and redefined group boundaries through the formation of 
sub-groups. 
In another experiment, Sampson and Brandon (1964, cited by Levine, 1980), 
also tested this idea. These authors formed group discussions about a black juvenile 
delinquent. In each group, a confederate adopted either a deviant position by showing 
racist beliefs, or a normative, non-racist, position. Furthermore, the confederate either 
behaved consistently with the group’s opinion about the juvenile case, or disagreed 
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with the majority. Results indicated that the non-racist confederate who disagreed with 
the majority opinion received more communication (inclusive reaction), whereas the 
racist confederate who disagreed with the majority opinion was practically ostracized 
by the other members (exclusive reaction).TPF5FPT The authors propose that when group 
members perceive a possibility of persuading dissident members to adopt the group’s 
opinion, they will attempt to influence these members. On the contrary, when they 
perceive that the dissidence is based on personal dispositions (racist beliefs), they 
abandon their persuasion efforts. 
Reactions of majority members to in-group deviants also depend on the 
relevance of the issue in terms of which dissidence emerged for group locomotion 
(Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Festinger, 1950; Schachter, 1968). The impact of 
deviants would be a direct function of the existing interdependence in the group for the 
accomplishment of collective goals. In support of this idea, Schachter (1968) had 
participants clubs to discuss a case. Four confederates and three uninformed 
participants composed each club. Three of the confederates behaved in consistent 
normative manner, whereas the fourth adopted a deviant opinion. According to 
conditions, the deviant confederate either maintained the deviant opinion throughout 
the discussion (extreme deviant condition), or conformed to the majority’s opinion 
(slider deviant condition), or conformed to the majority opinion (control condition). In 
addition, the issue under discussion was either relevant or irrelevant to the club’s goals 
(Schachter, 1968). At the end of the discussion, participants had to assign group 
members to several types of committees within the club. Among other results, 
Schachter (1968) found that participants downgraded the deviant confederate, 
                                                 
5 In discussing this experiment, Marques and Páez (1994) suggest that the racist-non-racist manipulation 
actually corresponds to an inter-group situation, in which the non-racist confederate would be viewed as 
an in-group member whereas the racist confederate would be viewed as an out-group member. 
Therefore, these authors speculated, Sampson and Brandon’s (1964) results would indicate a major 
concern from participants’ with in-group than out-group deviance. 
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especially when this deviance was extreme and the issue was relevant to the club 
(Schachter, 1968). 
To summarize, the small group approach views interpersonal attraction, similar 
beliefs and goals, and social interaction as the basic elements of group formation. In 
affiliating with a group, individuals would attain a sense of validity of their opinions 
and increase the likelihood to achieve goals they could not attain in isolation. As a 
result, internal uniformity is decisive for group’s life. As a result, groups develop 
social influence mechanisms to ensure members’ conformity to standards that are 
important to the accomplishment of group goals (Festinger, 1950; Turner et al., 1987; 
Hogg, 1993), as well as strategies to deal with emergence of deviance. Two such 
mechanisms are informational influence and normative influence. Informational and 
normative influence can be viewed as the operation of descriptive criteria that lead 
individuals to feel certain about their opinions, as well as of prescriptive criteria that 
stipulate the way group members ought to behave. Both should contribute to generate 
intra-group uniformity of beliefs and goals, as well as to stipulate group members’ 
behaviour depending on the position they occupy in the group. When, influence is not 
strong enough to ensure intra-group uniformity, normative (or the majority of) group 
members may adopt strategies towards deviants that range from persuasive attempts to 
their ultimate expulsion from the group. 
As we wrote in the Introduction, the small group approach is founded on quite 
different assumptions as those of the social identity approach. Indeed, the social 
identity approach presents quite different implications for the understanding of group 
processes, either in terms of group formation, or in terms of group uniformity, or in 
terms of group members’ reactions to deviance. We devote the next section to an 
overview of this approach. 
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Social Categories 
 
Social Identification 
 
According to the social identity approach (e.g. Tajfel, 1978), a group has 
essentially a psychological existence. In identifying with a social category, individuals’ 
self-concept as group members becomes cognitively salient, and thus the group 
assumes a cognitive existence through their members (Tajfel, 1978). In this vein, as 
Tajfel (1978) pointed out, 
“A psychological group is being defined as a collection of people 
that share the same social identification or define themselves in terms of 
the same social category membership” (Turner, 1984, p.530).  
 
A basic condition for the existence of a social category is that it is defined by 
internal and by external criteria (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978), that is, individuals 
categorize themselves and are categorized by others as members of a social group. The 
external criterion of social categorization thus corresponds to an existing consensus on 
the part of non-group members, about designating a collection of individuals as a 
group. The internal criterion refers to social identification, that is, to the fact that 
individuals believe that they are, indeed, members of that group. This is often 
motivated by their external categorization (Tajfel, 1978).TPF6FPT 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, this idea is not exclusive to the social identification approach. Cartwright and Zander 
(1968), for instance, argue that two necessary conditions for members of face-to-face groups to define 
themselves as a group are, first, that they see themselves as a unity, and that there exists consensus on 
the part of non-members about the existence of that unit. However, as far as we know, the small group 
dynamics approach has not traditionally explored this assumption. 
 39 
Social identification leads individuals to feel psychologically attached to their 
membership, to share emotions, beliefs, attitudes with other group members, and to 
behave in a uniform manner as result of their shared identity (Turner, 1984). As a 
result, interpersonal similarity is not sufficient (and, in fact, it is unnecessary), to 
explain group behaviour. Perhaps the two empirical cornerstones of the social identity 
approach are the well-know perceptual accentuation (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Wilkes, 
1963) and the in-group bias phenomena, as observed in the classical minimal group 
paradigm studies (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament (1971). 
T he Perceptual Accentuation Process.T  
The term perceptual accentuation is used to account for the cognitive 
construction of continuous stimulus dimensions in terms of dichotomies of opposed 
categories (Tajfel, 1969). The implication of this process to social perception is that, in 
perceiving individuals as members of opposite categories, perceivers will tend to 
disregard differences between members of the same category, while emphasizing 
differences between members of opposite categories (Tajfel, 1969). 
In their well-known studies about the perceptual accentuation process, Tajfel 
and Wilkes (1963) had participants to make judgements of the lengths of eight 
different lines that were randomly presented to them several times. These lines differed 
from each other by a constant ratio of 5% length, between a shortest 16,2 cm and a 
longest 22,9 cm. To one third of participants, the four smaller lines were systematically 
presented in association with the label “A”, and the four longer lines were 
systematically presented in association with the label “B”. To another third of 
participants, the association of lines and labels was made completely at random. The 
final third of participants could not see labels associated to the lines. The participants’ 
task was to estimate the lines’ lengths. The results showed that when the association of 
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lines and labels was correlated with the line lengths, participants’ estimates reflected 
an over-estimation of differences between the lengths of lines associated with different 
labels and, to a lesser but still significant extent, the underestimation of differences 
between lines associated with the same label. This did not occur in other conditions. 
Doise, Deschamps and Meyer (1978) found a similar process with judgments 
of individuals. They showed that participants who had to judge, either several boys or 
several girls on a series of personality traits differentiated significantly more between 
the target boys, or among the target girls than did participants who judged both boys 
and girls. In addition, the latter participants differentiated significantly more between 
the traits assigned to boys and those assigned to girls than did the former. This process 
of perceptual accentuation became central to self-categorization theory, in which it has 
been formalized in terms of the meta-contrast principle (cf. below). 
 
TIn-Group Bias and the Minimal Group ParadigmT. 
The second basic notion for the social identity approach is in-group bias. In-
group bias is an expression of in-group favouritism, defined as “any tendency to favour 
in-group over out-group members on perceptual, attitudinal or behavioural 
dimensions” (Turner, 1984, p. 66) in individuals’ evaluations of in-group and out-
group as whole, or their members, or when they assign goods (e.g. money, points, etc.) 
to in-group and out-group members. 
In one of their seminal “minimal group” experiments, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and 
Flament (1971) present 12 slides of paintings by Klee and Kandinsky to the 
participants, and asked them to express their preference for each of these paintings. In 
a second phase of the experiment, the authors randomly divided the participants into 
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two categories (“Klee” vs. “Kandinsky”), purportedly based on their preferences for 
paintings, and asked them to fill in some matrices. Each matrix included several 
options that corresponded to the comparative assignment of two amounts of money, 
one to each of two other individuals. These individuals, either were members of the 
same category, or were members of different categories. The most relevant situation 
involved inter-group comparison whereby, one target individual was an in-group 
member, and the other was an out-group member. 
Each matrix allowed participants to choose among several possibilities. For 
example, participants could assign the highest possible amounts of money to both 
target individuals, regardless of the groups to which they belonged (maximum joint 
profit). Alternatively, they could assign the highest possible amount of money to the 
in-group target, regardless of the money assigned to the out-group member (maximum 
in-group profit). Another possibility was to generate the maximum positive difference 
between the amount of money assigned to the in-group target and the amount of 
money assigned to the out-group target. However, by doing this, participants should 
necessarily assign an absolute lower amount of money to the in-group target than they 
would if they chose any other alternative (maximum in-group difference) 
Among other results, Tajfel and colleagues (1971) found that the most 
consistently chosen option corresponded to the maximum in-group difference 
alternative. Participants preferred to establish the highest possible positive difference 
between the money assigned to the in-group members and that assigned to the out-
group members, even though by assigning less money to the former than if they chose 
any other alternative. This process was later shown to be independent from 
individuals’ interpersonal similarity. Billig and Tajfel (1973) divided participants in 
four experimental conditions, according to which they were interpersonally similar or 
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different from in-group or out-group members. These authors found that participants 
showed a more favourable attitude towards interpersonally similar than interpersonally 
different individuals. Nevertheless, their attitude was still more favourable towards in-
group members than towards out-group members, regardless of whether these 
members were interpersonally similar to, or different from, the participants. 
The commonly accepted explanation for in-group bias (e.g. Tajfel, 1978, 1982; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brewer, 1979) is that, in generating a positive differentiation 
between the in-group and the out-group, individuals will be enhancing their social 
identity, i.e., “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of the social group (or groups) together with the value 
and emotional significance attached to that membership.” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63)” 
 
Social Identity and Social Comparison 
 
Social identity seems to be a powerful determinant of inter-group behaviour. 
According to Tajfel (1978), it involves the joint operation of cognitive, evaluative, and 
emotional components. The cognitive component corresponds to the individuals’ 
knowledge that they belong to a category. The evaluative component relates to the 
positive or negative value that is socially attributed to that category. The emotional 
component corresponds to the affective outcome of the previous two components. 
Individuals will feel satisfied or unsatisfied with their social identity, depending on 
whether the group in which they categorize themselves endowed with positive or 
negative social value, respectively. For example, when a group is perceived as holding 
an inferior social status in comparison with other groups, this fact brings negative 
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consequences for members’ self-esteem (Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986). In turn, when the group is perceived as having a superior social 
status, individuals assume a positive value for their self-concept (Tajfel, 1978; Turner 
& Brown, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) TPF7FPT. 
However, the cognitive, as well as the evaluative, definition of the group is 
always necessarily comparative in nature. According to Tajfel (1978), social 
identification always occurs in a context in which other groups are salient, so that 
individuals are able to distinguish between in-group and out-group. Thus, 
psychological groups are not simple representations of aggregates of individuals. Their 
definition is intertwined with value, and this value is defined only by reference to the 
inter-group comparison context (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, & Turner, 1986). 
According to Tajfel (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), social 
situations can be positioned along an interpersonal - inter-group continuum. Although 
a “pure” interpersonal situation would be very unlikely, because individuals’ 
membership to social categories are always involved to a certain extent in social 
interactions (Tajfel, 1978), interpersonal situations would correspond to interactions 
between two or more people that are largely based on their respective personal 
characteristics. In turn, inter-group situations, which may occur in the pure form, are 
those in which the interaction between two or more people is exclusively based on 
their category membership(s). Inter-group situations thus involve the individuals’ 
                                                 
7  When the in-group has a comparatively low status and its members consider this status as unjust, the 
group starts to question the existing social structure (Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). In turn, members of high status groups will attempt to secure the social structure when 
they perceive a risk of status loss (Turner & Brown, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). These strategies 
depend on the availability of perceived cognitive alternatives to that social structure as well as on the 
perceived justice and correctness concerning the status that groups hold within society (Tajfel, 1978; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978). Perceived group status, perceived illegitimate status, 
and perceived instable status are, therefore, decisive to whether cognitive alternatives of the social 
structure are made salient and to whether individuals will or will not collectively engage in social 
change (Tajfel, 1978, 1982). 
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depersonalization, because their behaviour is based on their self-definition as group 
members rather than as unique individuals (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, & Turner, 1986). 
Thus, the more cognitively salient is individuals’ group membership, the closer to the 
inter-group extreme will be their behaviour. As a result, individuals who, in that 
situation, perceive themselves as members of the same group will behave uniformly, 
and will differentiate their behaviour from the out-group’s (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, & 
Turner, 1986; cf. also Hogg & Abrams, 1988). 
Social Mobility and Social Change Strategies 
The interpersonal – inter-group behaviour continuum is associated with another 
continuum proposed by Tajfel (1978) to account for the strategies used by individuals 
to reach or to maintain a positive value within the social structure (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 
1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Such strategies may range from social mobility to social 
change, and are associated with individuals’ beliefs concerning the social structure. 
Beliefs in social mobility correspond to a view of a flexible society, in which 
individuals can easily move from group that endow them with an unsatisfactory 
identity to more satisfying groups. In this context, individuals would dis-identify with 
their group to, objectively or subjectively, join another one. This phenomenon has 
been shown to occur when individuals think they have the individual skills or 
characteristics required to be members of a higher status group (e.g. Ellemers, Van 
Knippenberg, De Vries & Wilke, 1988). In turn, beliefs in social change are based on 
the perception of a stratified social structure together with the notion that group 
boundaries are impermeable, so that individual mobility is seen as difficult or 
impossible (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  
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TSocial competition and social creativity. In a context defined by social change 
beliefs, Tsatisfactory social identity can be achieved in terms of either social creativity 
or social competition (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). By applying 
to social creativity, individuals redefine core elements of the social comparison 
situation (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For example, individuals 
may refer themselves to in-group favouring dimensions of social comparison to the 
detriment of less favourable ones. By applying to social competition, individuals will 
engage in effective collective action, in which groups engage in direct confrontation in 
order to obtain a higher relative position within the social structure, and hence a 
positive value for the in-group. Obviously, social creativity and social competition are 
not mutually exclusive (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Lemaine, Kastersztein and Personnaz (1978) describe experiments that 
illustrate the use of social creativity. In these experiments, two groups of children 
competed for a unique reward. However, one of the groups had more resources 
available for the successful achievement of the experimental task, and thus was better 
equipped to receive that reward. Despite its scarce resources, groups who lacked 
resources for equitable competition generally engaged in compensatory strategies in 
order to attain favourable comparisons with the more resourceful groups. For example, 
in one such experiment, Lemaine and colleagues (cf. Lemaine, Kastersztein & 
Personnaz, 1978) had children to build a hut. Children were divided in two groups, one 
of which possessed more resources (high status group) to build the hut than the other 
(low status group). In order to compensate for their possibly poorer hut, the low status 
group also built a little garden and used it as an argument to claim the prize. 
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Self-Categorization Theory 
 
Based on Social Identity Theory, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell 
(1987) proposed a theory directly aimed to explore cognitive antecedents and 
consequences of social identification: Self-Categorization Theory. Turner et al (1987) 
assume that the self-concept is a multi-faceted cognitive structure, so that the particular 
dimension through which it is represented in each given situation depends on the 
structural properties of that situation. As a result, individuals’ behaviour as group 
members will depend on the particular groups that become salient in specific social 
contexts. 
 
The Prototype Model of Categorization 
Self-categorization theory is also partly inspired on Rosch’s (1978) prototype 
model of categorization. Rosch (1978) proposed that categorization occurs along a 
vertical and a horizontal dimension (cf. also Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 
The vertical dimension stands for the taxonomic organization of information in 
memory, ranging from more abstract (e.g. “furniture”, “living beings”) to more 
subordinate (e.g. “rocking-chair”, “Pointer”), through basic (e.g. “chair”, “dog”) level 
categories. The horizontal dimension is organized in terms of the sharing of attributes 
by members of the same or of distinctive categories. The vertical dimension would be 
tributary to a principle of cognitive economy according to which attributes that 
describe represented objects are always stored at the highest possible level of 
abstraction. This fact implies that categories positioned at the superordinate levels 
would be quite abstract, because the attributes that equally apply to all of their 
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subordinate levels should be quite reduced in number. Conversely, categories 
positioned at the subordinate level would be very specific, because they would require 
a large number of attributes to be distinguished from other categories at the same 
subordinate level. Therefore, the principle of cognitive economy would lead 
individuals to function at the intermediate, or basic level of categorization, at which the 
ratio between the informative character of the category’s attributes and the amount of 
cognitive effort required to process that information should be ideal (Rosch, 1978). A 
basic level category would 
“...be the most inclusive categories for which a concrete image of 
the category as a whole can be formed, to be the first categorizations 
made during perception of the environment, to be the earliest categories 
sorted and the earliest named by children, and to be the categories most 
codable, most coded, and most necessary in language.” (Rosch, 1978, p. 
382). 
 
In the horizontal dimension, categories would be primarily defined in terms of 
the attributes that are shared by most of their members and that are, simultaneously, 
absent from most members of other categories existing at the same level of abstraction. 
In each category, these attributes would correspond to that category’s prototype. 
Prototypical attributes are thus attributes that better allow to decide about an objects’ 
membership to a category. For example, the attribute “to breath” is highly prototypical 
of the category of “living beings”. Such attributes thus have high cue-validity (Rosch, 
Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Brahem, 1976). A categorical attribute’s cue-validity 
will thus increase as the frequency with which it appears in association with the 
members of the category increases and the corresponding association with members of 
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contrasting categories decreases. Therefore, a prototype is defined as the set of 
attributes of a category that have the highest cue-validity. For the same reason, an 
object will be prototypical of a category as a direct function of the sum of the cue-
validities of its attributes (Rosch, 1978). 
According to Rosch (1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) prototypes would reflect 
the properties of the physical world (cf. also Garner, 1974). Self-categorization theory 
proposes a more plastic view of categorisation, namely by strongly emphasising its 
dependence on the immediate context in which social behaviour occurs. 
 
TDimensions of Social and Self-Categorization.T  
Based on Rosch’s (1978) idea that cognitive categories are organized along a 
vertical dimension, Turner et al. (1987) propose that self-categorization may occur at 
different levels of inclusion, which become relevant for the definition of the self-
concept. From these levels, the “group level” should be the most informative in social 
situations, thus corresponding to Rosch’s (1978) notion of basic level. At this level of 
social categorization, individuals would focus on perceived intra-group similarities and 
inter-group differences, rather than differentiating between individuals. It should be at 
the intermediate level, between the most abstract level of “Humans” and the most 
specific level of the individual self, that the concept of psychological group takes 
place. 
 
TComparative Fit and Normative Fit.T  
The self-categorization theory’s equivalent of Rosch’s (1978) horizontal 
dimension bears to the meta-contrast principle. According to Turner et al (1987), the 
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salience of a social category depends on an interaction between the accessibility of that 
category in the cognitive structure, and the stimuli that are present in a perceptual 
setting (Bruner, 1957, cf. Turner et al, 1987). Category accessibility corresponds to the 
readiness with which that category will be evoked. The more accessible is a category, 
the less stimulus information will be required for the activation of that category. 
However, even a very accessible category will not be activated unless its specifications 
fit the particular stimuli that are present in a situation. 
Fit thus corresponds to the perceived match between the stimuli present in the 
situation and a cognitively represented social category (Turner et al, 1987). Turner and 
colleagues (Turner et al, 1987) distinguish between comparative fit and normative fit. 
Comparative fit refers to the adjustment between differences and similarities 
among group members, and a cognitive classification of social categories. Categories 
become salient to the extent that they classify individuals based on a perception of 
maximized inter-group differentiation and intra-group similarity. Normative fit, refers 
to the contents of the categories once they have been activated. A collection of 
individuals is classified in the same category to the extent that their behaviour and 
characteristics match the behaviour and characteristics represented by their group’s 
prototype (Oakes, 1987, cf. Turner et al, 1987). 
 
T he Meta-Contrast Principle and the Self-Stereotyping ProcessT.  
The idea underlying the meta-contrast principle is that individuals are 
categorized within the same group to the extent that, on average, the perceived 
differences between these individuals are smaller than their perceived differences with 
other individuals (Turner et al., 1987). According to Turner et al (1987), the meta-
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contrast principle is a formalization of the process according to which individuals 
make sense of social situations in terms of opposite categories. The meta-contrast 
process defines the positions within each category, that are, simultaneously, the most 
similar to the positions held by the other members of the same category, and the most 
different from the positions held by the members of the opposite category (Turner et 
al., 1987). Each category may, thus, be represented by a prototype that corresponds to 
the attributes that best summarize and represent the group and differentiate it from a 
contrasting group (Turner et al., 1987; cf. also Rosch, 1978). 
T he meta-contrast principle would provide individuals with the criteria that 
define their social identity. This would be mediated by a self-stereotyping process. 
TWhen individuals categorize themselves as members of a group, they depersonalise 
themselves and assume for themselves the attributes that represent their group. In this 
vein, individuals become to perceive themselves based on the in-group prototype. 
Depersonalisation thus consists of a process whereby individuals come to perceive 
themselves and other in-group members as interchangeable in-group members who are 
highly differentiated from the out-group. The operation of the meta-contrast principle, 
and the consequent depersonalisation process would thus underlie inter-group 
behaviour, as defined by Tajfel (1978; cf. also Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner et al, 
1987). 
According to Turner and colleagues (1987), there should be a functional 
antagonism between different abstraction levels of self-categorization. In a specific 
situation, individuals make salient only one level of abstraction for self-definition. For 
example, individuals would not be able to perceive themselves simultaneously as 
unique individuals and as undifferentiated members of their group. The salience of a 
level of abstraction leads to the perception of accentuated similarity within categories 
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and accentuated differentiation between categories. A higher level of abstraction would 
imply that differentiation between categories should disappear. In turn, in a lower level 
of abstraction, the perception of similarities among individuals should also disappear.  
 
Uniformity and Cohesiveness in Psychological Groups 
 
From what we stated above, we may deduce that, in light of self-categorization 
theory, intra-group structure in terms of differentiated intra-group roles (but see Hogg, 
2004, 2000) is not a relevant property of psychological groups. However, this does not 
mean that self-categorization is unrelated to normative behaviour. On the contrary, 
group uniformity is an important property of behaviour defined in terms of individuals’ 
membership to psychological groups (Hogg, 1992; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 
2001). 
First, by definition, behaviour framed by membership in a psychological group 
depends on the cognitive construction of the situation in terms of an almost absolute 
uniformity among members of contrasting social categories, in that individuals should 
simply emphasize inter-group differences to the detriment of intra-group differences. 
Second, individuals would expect members of the categories in presence to match the 
specifications of their respective categories’ prototypes (e.g. Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 
1994). In other words, group uniformity would emerge from self-depersonalization in 
terms of opposed group prototypes (Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1996). 
The above cognitive processes would be assisted by a more affectively-laden 
process. Indeed, following the process of depersonalization, the in-group prototype 
would function as a mediator between the positive feelings that individuals experience 
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about the self, and a positive orientation towards the other members of the group, not 
as unique individuals but rather as depersonalized instances of the in-group (Hogg, 
2000, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990). Instead of corresponding to the whole set of 
interpersonal orientations between group members as proposed by the small group 
approach, group cohesiveness would correspond to the positive orientation between in-
group members as mediated by their common attraction to the in-group prototype 
(Hogg, 1992). 
In support of the above idea, Hogg and Turner (1985) ran an experiment in 
which they manipulated the salience of participants’ category membership (salient 
categorization vs. non-salient categorization), attractiveness of target group members 
(attractive vs. non-attractive) and in-group distinctiveness (positive vs. negative). After 
being categorized in two groups, participants’ task was to form an impression of four 
target in-group members and of five out-group members. The targets were described in 
a favourable (attractive) or unfavourable (non-attractive) way. According to 
experimental conditions, either a positive trait was shared by all in-group members and 
a negative trait was shared by all out-group members (positive in-group 
distinctiveness), or vice versa (negative in-group distinctiveness). Participants filled 
matrices similar to those used in the minimal groups’ paradigm (cf. above) and 
indicated their attitudes (similarity, attraction, preference) towards the in-group and the 
out-group as a whole, and about the individual members. Results showed that attitudes 
about individual targets were influenced by these targets’ characteristics. However, 
when the in-group was positively distinctive from the out-group, participants favoured 
the in-group as a whole, regardless of the personal attractiveness of the target 
members. Personal attractiveness influenced interpersonal judgments but did not affect 
on group level-judgments. 
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The above results support the idea that group membership has an effect on 
group cohesion that is not based on interpersonal attraction. Instead, it is based on 
individuals’ attraction to group as a whole. This is consistent with evidence showing a 
strong correlation between in-group members’ prototypicality and attractiveness 
(Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; see Hogg, 1992 for a review). In brief, 
group cohesion is a function of the prototypicallity associated to members in 
dimensions considered important to describe the in-group, in order to achieve a 
positive value for their social identity (Turner et al, 1987; Hogg & McGarty, 1990). 
 
Social Influence in Social Categories: Referent Informational Influence 
 
Terry and Hogg (1996; Terry, Hogg & White, 2000) propose that, depending 
on which social category is salient in the context, individuals will construct group 
norms that result from the process of social comparison and are primarily aimed to 
establish inter-group distinctiveness. According to these authors, group prototypes are 
normative constructs in that they describe and prescribe members’ beliefs, opinions 
and behaviours. Because social norms are a constituent part of the group’s prototype 
(and hence, of the self-concept), individuals assume group norms as a guide of their 
behaviour (Terry & Hogg, 2001, 1996; Terry, Hogg & White, 2000). 
Based on the above ideas, Terry and Hogg (1996) conducted two experiments 
aimed to demonstrate that individuals’ attitudes and behaviour vary depending on the 
contextual factors that make specific social categorizations salient. In one such 
experiment (Terry & Hogg, 1996, Experiment 1), they measured the attitudes and 
intentions of university pupils’ to perform physical exercise three times a week for a 
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fortnight. Furthermore, experimenters asked participants to indicate the extent to which 
they thought that their friends and partners had attitudes similar to theirs concerning 
physical exercise. Finally, they measured participants’ social identification with that 
group of friends. At the end of the two weeks, participants reported how much exercise 
they had done. Results showed that the more individuals identified with the group and 
the more they though their attitudes were similar to the groups’ attitudes, the more 
consistent was their exercise rate with the group’s attitude. Thus, when social identity 
is salient, individuals seem to guide their behaviour based on their representation of the 
in-group’s prototypical specifications, or norms. 
In brief, self-definition as group members makes individuals become 
normative, and perceive other members as normative to the extent they hold the 
attributes of their groups’ prototypes. For the same reason, the more prototypical is an 
in-group member, the more this member will be recognized as a valid source of 
influence. Identification with the source influences target’s beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviours. (Terry & Hogg, 2001; Turner, 1991). This idea was tested in a series of 
experiments conducted by Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg and Turner (1990). In 
one of their experiments (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990, 
Experiment 1) the authors employed the Sherif's auto-kinetic illusion procedure. 
Groups of six participants had to estimate the range of movement of a point of light in 
a dark room. Among the six participants, the estimates given by three confederates 
were consistently about 5 cm above the uninformed participants’ estimations. 
Participants were divided in three experimental conditions. In the random 
categorization condition, confederate participants and uninformed participants were 
categorized at random. In the control condition, uninformed participants and 
confederates were not categorized at all. Finally, in the group condition, uninformed 
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participants were assigned to an “H” category, and confederates were assigned to a “J” 
category. According to the classical Sherif’s (1936) hypothesis, one should expect 
uninformed participants to converge to the confederates’ estimates in all conditions. 
However, no such convergence was observed. In the group condition, uninformed 
participants’ estimates converged toward each other while showing a tendency to 
polarize themselves in the direction opposite to the confederates’ estimates. 
In another experiment, Abrams et al. (1990, Experiment 2) employed the 
Asch’s conformity paradigm. Participants were introduced to three confederates, that 
were described either as in-group members or as out-group members, and who were 
instructed to give erroneous judgments. Results showed that disagreement with in-
group confederates generated higher uncertainty on the part of participants than did 
disagreement with out-group confederates, and that participants complied more with 
in-group than out-group confederates. In the whole, these results suggest that in-group 
members are a powerful source of influence - a referent source (Abrams et al., 1990; 
Turner, 1991), and that this depends on individuals expectations of intra-group 
consensus and inter-group disagreement in matters relevant for the distinctiveness of 
their social identity (Turner, 1991; cf. also Abrams, 1990; 1994). 
 
Deviance as a Departure from a Group’s Prototype 
 
Based on self-categorization theory’s assumptions, the only way deviance can 
be conceived of is as a departure from the deviant’s group prototype (cf. Hogg, 1992). 
In this vein, deviant group members would be members whose characteristics obscure 
inter-group distinctiveness (Abrams & Hogg, 2004). As a result, deviants may be 
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positive or negative (Hogg, 2001; Hogg, Fielding & Darley, 2005). Positive deviant 
members are those that contribute for group polarization, that is, they assume an 
atypical position but in the opposite direction of the other group’s prototype. In turn, 
negative deviants would deviate in the direction of the other group, thus blurring inter-
group distinctiveness. 
Considering individuals’ basic motivation to establish clear-cut inter-group 
differentiation, individuals would thus prefer those in-group and out-group members 
who contribute to such distinctiveness. As a result, individuals should prefer 
prototypical in-group and prototypical out-group members, to atypical in-group 
members and atypical out-group members. However, this process is debatable under 
the meta-contrast principle (cf. above). As suggested by Abrams, Randsley de Moura, 
Hutchison & Viki (2005) a departure of group members from their respective groups’ 
prototypes should lead to their re-categorization, if the comparative fit principle 
applied, or the re-interpretation of the judgmental context according to an alternative 
inter-group dimension, if the normative fit principle applied. This idea has major 
theoretical and empirical implications to the present work, and shall be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter II in light of the subjective group dynamics model. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The small group approach assumes that groups are formed on the basis of 
social interactions between individuals and that these interactions provide the basis for 
group affiliation (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Members of small groups also 
acquire positive emotions through their membership, but these emotions emerge from 
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their interpersonal positive ties (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Forsyth, 1990). 
Conversely, the social identity approach considers that groups exist as cognitive 
representations whose construction is relatively independent from previous social 
interaction or individuals’ characteristics, but that, once they are in operation, 
determine individuals’ behaviour and the characteristics that become socially 
meaningful in their eyes (Hogg, 1990; Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1991). Following social 
categorization, group members perceive themselves and are perceived by others as 
interchangeable representatives of their respective groups on attributes that define the 
group by opposition to other groups (e.g. Hogg, 1993, Turner et al., 1987). Group 
membership thus becomes a powerful component of the individuals’ self-concept (e.g. 
Turner et al., 1987). Individuals develop positive or negative emotions by defining 
themselves as group members, because the value the group is endowed with following 
social comparisons is projected onto the social-self (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). 
The small group approach conceives groups as entities which are affected by 
context changes, but whose existence does not directly depend on that context. In turn, 
to the social identity approach, groups cannot be conceived in the absence of an inter-
group context and cannot exist outside such a context (e.g. Tajfel, 1978). A group 
comes to psychological existence because a specific situation becomes to be conceived 
as an inter-group contrast, and the only way one can analyse a group process is by 
placing that process in the context of the group’s relationship with another relevant 
group (Turner et al, 1987). 
In spite of their possibly different nature, both types of groups serve similar 
functions. Psychological groups are viewed as the outcome of individuals’ attempt to 
provide meaning to the social context. Face-to-face groups should allow individuals to 
achieve a sense of validity of their opinions. In both cases, being a group member help 
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provides criteria for establishing a consistency between beliefs, values, goals, and 
behaviour. In addition, in both types of groups individuals benefit from intra-group 
uniformity. 
The processes postulated by the two approaches about the construction of 
group uniformity are substantively different. To the small group approach, uniformity 
ensues from interplay between personal and group motivations. To the social identity 
approach, intra-group uniformity is the outcome of social categorization and self-
stereotyping. However, to both approaches, the motivation for the generation of intra-
group uniformity is a central factor of the group’s dynamics. In the context of 
interdependence between members within small groups, internal uniformity is decisive 
for group’s life. Groups develop mechanisms to ensure members’ conformity to 
standards that are important to the accomplishment of group goals (Festinger, 1950; 
Hogg, 1993; Turner et al., 1987). Within psychological groups, perceived intra-group 
similarity is important for the individuals’ well-being, because it produces a sense of 
consistency between expectations concerning the existence of clear differences 
between social groups and a distinctive social identity (Hogg, 1993). 
 
Face-to-Face Groups and Psychological Groups: Are They Different? 
At the end of this chapter, we are in position to clarify our standpoint about 
the distinction between face-to-face groups and psychological groups. The notions of 
face-to-face group and psychological group seem to appeal to different social 
psychological realities. As Wilder and Simon (1998) pointed out, in face-to-face 
groups the criterion for membership is defined in terms of interpersonal interaction. In 
turn, membership to a psychological group is defined in terms of characteristics shared 
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among members. This idea has clear implications for the way each perspective 
accounts for intra-group uniformity and differentiation. Still according to Wilder and 
Simon (1998 cf. also Hamilton, Sherman & Lickel, 1998; Miller, Prentice & Lightdale, 
1994), whereas psychological groups would be constructs in which, by definition, all 
members are similar and interchangeable, in small groups 
 
“the goodness-of-fit of a specific member is determined by how well that 
person fits into the structure of the group, much as the fit of a puzzle piece is 
determined by how well it locks into place with other pieces. Thus, similarity among 
members is not necessary (...). The individual is not a replication of the group (...) How 
alike the individuals are in terms of appearance, beliefs, and behavior is not critical”. 
(p. 36) 
 
There would be little doubt that many contexts allow one to observe 
interactions among individuals whom obviously are members of the same group. These 
include player teams, groups of friends, neighbours, etc. However, there are many 
other situations in which behaviour of large groups of people who are not in immediate 
interaction with each other could be hardly explained without reference to their 
common group membership. These include sports fans, crowds, people belonging to 
the same race, sex, or nationality, etc. 
Therefore, it would be reasonable to disagree with Wilder and Simon’s (1998) 
observation that face-to-face “exist out there” (Wilder & Simon, 1998, p. 35), whereas 
psychological groups simply have a psychological existence with very few, if any, 
implications for individuals’ behaviour. We believe that both kinds of group have 
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equally important impacts on individuals’ behaviour, if only because no group 
behaviour would exist if individuals did not construe themselves as members of that 
group (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). As Turner and Bourhis (1996, p. 39) 
pointed out, group behaviour requires that individuals share a group-level fate in 
reality and a common belief on their group belongingness, prior to any development of 
collective goals and intra-group interdependence. 
Notwithstanding, it seems clear that, traditionally, small group research and 
social identity research directed themselves, and uncovered, different aspects of group 
life. Small group research has deeply explored the processes according to which 
groups achieve uniformity, and deal with internal deviance and the functions of such 
processes. In turn, social identity research has deeply explored the processes according 
to which individuals achieve a positive and clear-cut representation of their group and 
of themselves as group members, and how this affects their behaviour towards in-
group and out-group members. 
These two perspectives have separately grown to large bodies of research, 
respectively, on inter-group and intra-group processes. Only relatively more recently 
have researchers attempted to integrate the two bodies of research (e.g. Hains, Hogg, & 
Duck, 1997; Hogg, 1992). In the next chapter, we deal with the group socialization 
model of Levine and colleague, and the subjective group dynamics model of Marques 
and colleagues, that we consider to be valuable contributions to such an integration. 
These models underlie the rationale of our studies. Therefore, we will attempt to detail 
them as much as possible. 
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CHAPTER II 
SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE GROUP SOCIALIZATION 
MODEL: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO REACTIONS TO 
DEVIANCE 
 
 In this chapter, we attempt to outline the theoretical background that 
contextualizes our research issue. For this matter, we attempt to integrate the 
socialization model, proposed by Levine, Moreland and colleagues (Levine e 
Moreland, 1994, 1998; Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993) and the subjective group 
dynamics model proposed by Marques and colleagues (Marques & Páez, 1994; 
Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). The former 
model is more akin to the small group dynamics tradition, although it may encompass 
principles of the social identity approach (cf. Levine & Moreland, 1994). The latter 
model draws from the social identity approach but is directed at the explanation of 
processes that have been typically studied in the realm of the small group approach. 
 As far as we know, the socialization model (Levine & Moreland, 1994; 
Moreland & Levine, 1982)offers the most complete account to be found in social 
psychological literature of the full range of intra-group processes that define 
individuals’ life as group members and, simultaneously, of the impact that members 
have on the group’s life. The subjective group dynamics model (Marques & Páez, 
1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) accounts for the interplay between intra-
group processes and inter-group processes. We propose that, together, these models 
offer a heuristic account of social control mechanisms in social groups, mainly in what 
refers to normative members’ reactions to deviance. 
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The Socialization Model 
 
As we pointed out in Chapter I, according to the traditional perspective of small 
group dynamics, a group exists when its members interact regularly, develop positive 
affective ties and are interdependent on each other (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine 
& Moreland, 1994, 1998). Within this context of interdependence, group members 
develop mechanisms to ensure intra-group uniformity and members’ conformity to 
patterns of beliefs and behaviour susceptible of ensuring the attainment of group goals 
and a subjectively valid notion of reality (e.g., Festinger, 1950). 
Levine, Moreland and colleagues (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine, 
Moreland & Ryan, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988; 
Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993) developed a model essentially within this theoretical 
tradition. These authors examine the reciprocal relationships between individual group 
members and the group. Such relationships depend on three major processes: 
evaluation, commitment and role transition (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine, 
Moreland & Ryan, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988). 
 
Evaluation  
 
The process of evaluation involves the reciprocal appraisal, by the group and 
by the individual of their mutual outcomes in social interaction. In this process, both 
parties define and monitor behaviour in light of their mutual expectations, that is, the 
ideal behaviours they should accomplish (Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
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TGroup’s expectations for the individual. T Because the attainment of group goals 
is a fundamental value for groups, the contribution of each individual to this attainment 
(that is, the conformity to normative expectations defined by the group) is determinant 
to the process of evaluation. For each individual, the group develops normative 
expectations consistent with goal attainment, and rewards the normative behaviours 
accomplished by that individual (Moreland & Levine, 1988, Levine & Moreland, 
1994). The more important the norm is for the group, the more positively the group 
will evaluate those members who meet the group’s normative expectations, and the 
more negatively it will evaluate members who diverge from these expectations 
(Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
 
TIndividuals’ expectations for the group.T According to this model, the entrance 
of an individual to a group is the result of a voluntary decision taken by both the 
individual and the group. Individuals become members of a group when they consider 
that membership fulfils their personal needs (Shaw, 1981 cf. Moreland & Levine, 
1982). Individuals consider their entrance in the group based on the evaluation of the 
benefits and costs compared to the non-entrance. Thus, individuals develop 
expectations with respect to the group’s behaviour. If the group falls below the 
individuals’ expectations, three consequences may occur: (1) individuals attempt to 
change the group’s behaviour in the direction of their expectations, (2) individuals alter 
their expectations in the direction of group behaviour; or (3) individuals abandon the 
group (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1982). The former two responses occur when 
individuals evaluate the group in a positive manner and perceive a potential 
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satisfaction of their needs by staying in the group, whereas the latter consequence 
ensues from a negative evaluation of the group.  
Commitment 
 
The second process that contributes for the definition of reciprocal relationship 
of individuals and the group is commitment. Commitment between the individual and 
the group results from the evaluation process and is mainly an affective process 
(Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1988). The more rewarding is the 
relationship between the individual and the group, the more committed both parts feel 
for each other.  
Feelings of commitment result in a motivational link between the group and the 
individual and can become stronger or weaker as time passes by (Levine, Moreland & 
Choi, 2001; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988, Moreland, Levine 
& Cini, 1993). If the group and the individual attain their respective goals, they feel 
their relationship is rewarding and their reciprocal levels of commitment will rise. 
Commitment is also determined by the comparison of the rewards provided by the 
relationship and the rewards that would be potentially obtained from alternative 
relationships (other groups or individuals). 
Commitment has direct implications for the group’s life (Levine & Moreland, 
1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). A high level of commitment determines a stronger 
allegiance to the group goals and values by individuals, it grants positive affective ties 
between group members, and, therefore, strong intra-group cohesion. Concomitantly, 
commitment influences members’ willingness to exert pressures upon the rest of the 
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group in order to fulfil group expectations (Levine & Moreland, 1994). Thus, 
commitment favours individuals’ engagement in pro-group behaviour.  
 
T he norm of loyalty. TA concept that is intimately connected with commitment 
is the norm of loyalty. Zdaniuk and Levine (2001) propose the term “loyalty” to 
characterize intentional pro-group behaviour. The more a given behaviour requires 
personal sacrifice in the service of group needs, the more loyal this behaviour will be 
considered to be. According to these authors, there is a generic norm, which is 
common to all groups, that posits that members should not abandon their group. 
Abandoning the group is disloyal because it forces the group to undertake new tasks 
such as recruiting replacement members, and simultaneously, it displays a negative 
public image of the group. Abandoning the group is a sign that the group cannot retain 
its members (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001; Levine & Thompson, 1996). 
 
Role Transition 
 
The group’s commitment to an individual may rise above, or falls below, a 
given threshold (group decision criterion), so that the individual tends to be perceived 
by the group as deserving a different role. In this case, the group will re-define the 
individual in accordance with the new role (Levine and Moreland, 1994; Moreland & 
Levine, 1988). The group will then apply a transition on the individual’s role, 
reflecting the perception of their new status within the group. The corresponding 
process occurs for the individual’s level of commitment to the group. However, in this 
case, the individual may decide to adopt a new role. In both cases, the group and 
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individual are led to elaborate new reciprocal expectations, and a new evaluation 
process is initiated (Levine and Moreland, 1994; Moreland, & Levine, 1982; Moreland 
& Levine, 1988).  
According to Moreland & Levine (1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988), roles 
range within three regions in relation to the group. A non-member region refers to 
members that have not yet joined the group, or to members that have left the group. A 
quasi-member region refers to members that have just entered the group and have not 
yet attained full membership status, as well as to members that have lost full 
membership status. Finally, a full member region refers to those members that are most 
closely identified with the group and that have all the privileges and responsibilities 
associated with group membership (Moreland & Levine, 1982). 
 
Group Socialization Phases and Status 
 
Clearly, commitment is the central factor in status changes in the group (Levine 
& Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Most often, these changes follow a 
definite pattern. Figure 1 displays the several statuses that individuals can assume at 
different phases of their life as group members, depending on that factor (Levine and 
Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1988). Although there is a chronological 
sequence along statuses and phases, individuals may neither assume all statuses nor 
pass through all phases (Levine, Moreland & Choi, 2001; Levine & Moreland, 1994; 
Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993; Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
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Figure 1. Group Socialization Model. In Levine & Moreland (1994, p.310) 
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& Zdaniuk, 1996; Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
INVESTIGATION SOCIALIZATION MAINTENANCE RESOCIALIZATION REMEMBRANCE 
ENTRY ACCEPTATION DIVERGENCE EXIT 
Recruitment Accommodation Role Accommodation Tradition 
Reconnaissance Assimilation Negotiation Assimilation Reminiscence 
Prospective Member New Member Full Member Marginal Member Ex-Member 
C
om
m
itm
en
t 
Time
AC 
DC 
EC 
XC 
² 
² 
² 
² 
 68 
In this investigation phase, individuals assume the status of prospective 
members (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). The more positively 
evaluated prospective members are, the higher the probability of being admitted as 
group members. Simultaneously, and before entering the group, individuals engage in 
a reconnaissance process, whereby they identify different groups that might contribute 
to the fulfilment of their personal needs, and choose the most advantageous group 
(Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996). As time passes by, the attraction between the 
individual and the group leads to an increase in reciprocal commitment. When 
commitment achieves the entrance decision criterion, the individual becomes a 
member of the group (Figure 1). 
 
Entry 
When entrance occurs, individuals move to a socialization phase, and are given 
the new member status (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Often, 
entrance in the group implies some sort of initiation rituals that signify the 
establishment of a new relationship between the individual and the group and, at the 
same time, discontinuance in previous relationships between the individual and 
alternative group memberships. The goal of these rituals is to enhance commitment 
between individual and group, to ease the individuals’ adjustment to their new status, 
the assimilation of the group’s spirit, and the learning of the group’s normative 
expectations (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). 
In general, new members feel highly motivated to learn group norms (Levine, 
Moreland & Ryan, 1998). This motivation generates feelings of loyalty toward the 
other members, and particularly towards full members because these are the most 
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representative members of the group (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). In expressing their 
loyalty towards these highly representative group members, new members would thus 
reify loyalty to the group as a unit (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001).  
Socialization 
The socialization phase takes place immediately after the individual’s entrance 
in the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). In this phase, 
both the individual and the group engage in a mutual adaptation process. The group 
contributes with knowledge, skills, motivations and normative expectations to which 
new members are expected to conform, so they can obtain full member status (Levine 
& Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
The more new members attune with the group’s normative expectations, the 
more positively they will be evaluated and the higher will be the group’s commitment 
to the individual. When commitment achieves the acceptance decision criterion, the 
individual assumes full member status and a new phase is initiated (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Again, a new evaluation process and new 
feelings of commitment occur. In contrast, the more the individual fails to meet the 
group’s expectations, the lower will be the group’s commitment to the individual. If, in 
this case, commitment falls to the level of the exit decision criterion, the individual 
leaves the group without ever being a full member (Moreland & Levine, 1982). 
Simultaneously to this socialization process, the new member will also exert 
some pressure upon the group so that the group meets their personal needs (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). In this case, too, the more the group 
meets the individual’s expectations, the more positively it will be evaluated and the 
higher will be the level of commitment of the individual toward the group. As the 
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group matches the individual’s needs, the more accommodation it will show (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). When the individual’s commitment to the 
group rises to the acceptance decision criterion, the individual becomes a full member. 
In contrast, if the group does not correspond to the individual’s needs, it will trigger a 
negative evaluation, and the individual’s commitment to the group will decrease. If 
commitment falls to the exit decision criterion, then the individual voluntarily leaves 
the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). 
 
Acceptance 
Once the individual and the group’s commitment levels achieve the acceptance 
criterion, the individual’s status changes from new member to full member (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Some rituals of acceptance that identify 
the individual’s new status can mark this passage (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 
2005; Moreland & Levine, 1982). According to Levine and colleagues (Levine, Bogart 
& Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005; 
Moreland & Levine, 1982), the group stops paying so much attention to the individual 
and starts relaxing in teaching strategies and behaviour control. Intense vigilance is no 
longer needed. The group shares valuable information with, and assigns more 
responsibilities to the individual (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
From the individual’s standpoint, feelings of pride by being a group member 
and solidarity with other group members are, at this stage, very intense. In this stage, 
individuals are likely to engage in pro-group behaviour, to sacrifice themselves for the 
group if required, to perceive themselves as group members across a wide array of 
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situations, or to adopt group norms and values as a frame of reference for their 
behaviour (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
 
Maintenance 
Once individuals assume the full member status, a maintenance phase takes 
place. During this phase, feelings of commitment between the individual and group are 
at their maximum level, and so both parties are interested in maintaining the 
relationship (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & 
Levine, 1982). The group becomes a crucial component of the individual’s life, while 
considering the individual as one of its representative members (Levine & Moreland, 
1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
In this process, the group attempts to assign each full member a specific role, 
so that their contributions to group goals will be maximized with the least effort from 
the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). It is in this phase 
that group members mostly differentiate their roles within group (Levine, Bogart & 
Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). However, if 
commitment decreases to a divergence decision criterion the individual will go through 
a new role transition, and assumes the status of marginal member (Levine, Bogart & 
Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). 
From the individuals’ point of view, the less rewarding is the role the group 
assigns them with, the lower will be their commitment to the group. In this case, 
individuals invest in searching for less demanding roles so that they can still fulfil their 
personal needs without much personal effort (Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
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Divergence 
Marginal member status may or may not be the result of a natural course of 
group membership (Moreland & Levine, 1982). If it follows its natural course, this 
status will be expected. In this case, the group and the individual will engage in a 
process of dissociation and preparation for the individual’s forthcoming exit. However, 
when the marginal member status is not expected, the relationship between the 
individual and the group becomes problematic, because it reflects that one of the 
parties did not correspond to the other part’s expectations (Levine & Moreland, 1994; 
Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
Considering the individuals’ point of view, when they assign a marginal 
member status to themselves, they may feel a need to differentiate from the group. In 
other words, a marginal status allows the individual to feel free from the group’s 
normative expectations. Another reason why individuals may assign a marginal 
member status to themselves is the fact that individuals consider that their membership 
does no longer satisfy their personal needs, and simultaneously are not willing to 
contribute to the achievement of group goals (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & 
Levine, 1982).  
 
Re-socialization 
Once divergence occurs, both the group and the individual evolve to a re-
socialization phase (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Usually, 
the re-socialization phase aims to restore full member status to marginal members 
(Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). During this phase, 
commitment can rise once again to divergence decision criterion. In this case, the 
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individual undergoes another role transition (convergence) and recovers full member 
status (Moreland & Levine, 1982; Levine & Moreland, 1994). The individual once 
again enters the maintenance phase and is expected to converge to the group’s 
normative expectations. If divergence persists and the full member status is no longer 
an option, the re-socialization phase functions as a time interval that is used as a 
preparation to the eventual exit of individual (Moreland & Levine, 1982). The 
individual will abandon the group and assume an ex-member status (Moreland & 
Levine, 1982). 
 
Exit 
Exit is a role transition that can occur in almost every phase, if group members 
decide to exclude a member because this member does not correspond to normative 
expectations and the group does not anticipate a positive contribution by the individual 
to group goals (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). In many 
situations, an individuals’ departure from the group may help the group display a more 
positive for the surrounding community, because by excluding the individual, the 
group may express its intolerance for internal deviance (Levine & Moreland, 1994; 
Moreland & Levine, 1982). However, when individuals decide to leave on their own, 
the group’s public image may be negatively affected. Indeed, the members’ departure 
may reflect an absence of group skills to maintain its members (e.g. Moreland & 
Levine, 1982). If a member’s departure implies recruiting a new member to replace the 
one who left, group members will have to involve themselves in a new socialization 
process (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Thus, ex-members 
who decide to abandon the group are frequently considered as “traitors” who attempted 
against the norm of loyalty toward the group (Levine & Thompson, 1996). From the 
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individuals’ point of view, exit is associated to the fact that the group has no skills to 
satisfy their personal needs (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
Remembrance 
Remembrance corresponds to the period in which reciprocal commitment 
between group and individual is declining until no commitment remains (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). During this phase, both the group and the 
individual involve themselves in retrospective evaluation about each party’s role in the 
relationship (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & 
Levine, 1982). The outcome of such evaluation becomes a part of the group’s history 
(Levine & Moreland, 1994). 
Ex-members frequently serve as models to new members. If an ex-member 
contributed positively to group goals’ achievement, then this member will be 
remembered as a model to follow. On the contrary, if an ex-member did not contribute 
to fulfil group goals, then the group can use this member as a model for unaccepted 
behaviour (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). From the 
individual’s point of view, the corresponding phase to remembrance is reminiscence 
(Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 
1982). In this phase, the individual evaluates the group’s contribution to the 
satisfaction of personal needs (Moreland & Levine, 1982).  
As we can see, even as ex-members, individuals contribute in some way to the 
success or failure of group goals, especially in what concerns the public image that 
group wants to affirm and the strengthening of group standards by using ex-members 
as normative models. The results of the comparison between ideal and actual public 
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image represent the success or failure of this specific group goal (Moreland & Levine, 
1982).  
From the above idea, it ensues that one important function of ex-members for 
the group is to define the group's demands for the effective members, and even for the 
prospective members. Depending on whether the ex-member did or did not meet the 
group’s normative expectations, the group can adjust more or less demanding 
expectations for the new members (Moreland & Levine, 1982). 
 
Subjective Group Dynamics 
 
Marques and colleagues (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 
1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) propose the term subjective group 
dynamics to refer the set of cognitive-emotional processes involved in the 
representation of intra-group uniformity and deviance occurring in the larger inter-
group context. The basic assumptions of the subjective group dynamics model are 
inspired by social identity theory and by self-categorization theory (Chapter I). 
 According to the subjective group dynamics model, individuals are capable of 
achieving a positive social identity only to the extent they hold a subjectively validated 
representation of the group’s normative standards that sustain positive in-group 
distinctiveness. Deviance of salient in-group norms will jeopardize such subjective 
validity, thus endangering the positive value ascribed to the in-group. As a result, 
deviant in-group members will be strongly derogated (Marques & Páez, 1994; 
Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). The general model is represented in Figure 2. 
 
 76 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Subjective Group Dynamics Model. In Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg,  
(2001, p. 414). 
 
Self-Categorization and Intra-Group Consensus 
 
As we saw in Chapter I, in categorizing themselves as group members, 
individuals adopt the characteristics that define in-group prototype (Abrams & Hogg, 
1990; Hogg, 1992; Turner et al., 1987). Consequently, the individual and the in-group 
become psychologically interchangeable (Hogg, 1992; Turner, 1981). In this sense, a 
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positive attitude toward the self is equivalent to a positive attitude toward the in-group 
prototype, and vice-versa (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In addition, self-
categorization theorists assume that group prototypes encompass the normative 
characteristics and behaviour that group members are normatively expected to adopt as 
a means to maintain in-group distinctiveness (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg, Cooper-
Shaw & Holzworth, 1993). As a result, individuals’ opinions and behaviour are 
conforming to the specifications of this prototype. The major implication of this above 
process is that, in inter-group situations, the only possible way in which individuals 
may establish a positive identity is by emitting preference to the in-group. 
According to the small group dynamics tradition (e.g. Festinger, 1950), intra-
group consensus is crucial to validate individuals’ beliefs about reality and about 
appropriate social behaviour. Intra-group consensus thus reinforces members’ 
commitment towards group beliefs and normative expectations, and helps reinforcing 
group cohesiveness (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Festinger, 1950; Forsyth, 1990). 
In line with this idea, the subjective group dynamics model proposes that clear-cut in-
group distinctiveness is necessary to afford individuals with a sense of positive social 
identity. However, once such distinctiveness is established, individuals may need to 
subjective validate the standards that underlie their beliefs in a positive social identity 
(Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). 
 
Social Validation of Positive Social Identity 
 
According to Marques and colleagues (cf. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; 
Marques & Páez, 1994), the above process is akin to the social reality and group 
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locomotion functions of groups as defined by Festinger (1950). On the one hand, they 
suggest, self-categorization turns the social-self into the only relevant aspect of social 
reality. On the other hand, the only relevant psychological goal in such a context is the 
maintenance, or enhancement, of social identity. In most circumstances, individuals 
automatically assume existing in-group uniformity in the characteristics that positively 
differentiate the in-group from the out-group as a whole. This is due to the operation of 
the meta-contrast process and associated attitude of in-group favouritism (Marques, 
Páez & Abrams, 1998). However, in other circumstances, salient in-group members 
may present characteristics that run counter such positive differentiation. Similarly to 
what happens in face-to-face groups, these members will negatively contribute to the 
group’s social reality. But, in the present case, their presence disrupts the most relevant 
component of such reality, the social-self, and the ultimate goal of subjectively 
validating positive social identity (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). As a result, 
individuals will strongly derogate in-group members who jeopardize these two 
psychological goals, while strongly valuing those who contribute to their attainment 
(Marques & Páez, 1994). 
 
Descriptive and Prescriptive Norms 
 
According to Marques and colleagues (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 
1998; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1994), the above process involves the operation of 
descriptive focus and prescriptive norms. According to Marques and colleagues, 
descriptive norms are associated to prototype construction through the meta-contrast 
process, whereas prescriptive focus has an intra-group moral value. 
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Descriptive norms correspond to dimensions in terms of which individuals 
attempt to generate inter-group distinctiveness in social comparison situations and 
assimilate themselves to the in-group category (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg, Cooper-
Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; Turner et al., 1987; see Chapter I). In light of these 
dimensions, normative individuals should be those that bear resemblance to their 
respective groups’ prototype. Deviant individuals would be those who bear enough 
resemblance to that prototype to still be considered members of the group, but also 
present some level of resemblance to the opposite group’s prototype. Therefore, 
descriptive norms would have a denotative nature in that they allow to identify, or to 
appose labels, on individuals depending on their category inclusion (Marques, Páez & 
Abrams, 1998). 
In turn, prescriptive norms should correspond to general moral principles that 
are not group-specific, and thus do not allow straightforward inferences about 
normative or deviant individuals’ group memberships (Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 
2001). However, such norms would allow individuals to appraise others in terms of 
general social desirability criteria, regardless of their group membership. In this vein, 
prescriptive norms have a connotative nature in that they allow to one make value-
laden judgments about individuals, irrespective of these individuals membership 
categories (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). 
As Marques and colleagues (2001) recognize, there should always be, to some 
extent, a correlation between the descriptive and the prescriptive components of social 
categories, because individuals should expect members of their groups to uphold 
prescriptive norms that sustain a positive social identity. In other terms, prescriptive 
norms should present an injunctive, generic character (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 
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1991, see also Chapter I), but would not be sufficient, or necessary, by themselves, to 
define a person’s group membership. 
In brief, according to the subjective group dynamics model, descriptive norms 
help individuals define other people and themselves in terms of category memberships. 
Prescriptive norms operate within these definitions and help individuals to appraise the 
moral quality of group members. 
 
The Role of Prescriptive Norms in Social Identity 
From the standpoint of Marques and colleagues (Marques, Abrams, Páez & 
Hogg, 2001) there should be a direct relationship between the perception of deviance 
and the salience of prescriptive norms. To some extent, this perspective is similar to 
that proposed by Kahneman and Miller (1986), according to which norms are made 
salient through backward processing (see Chapter I). Just as the accessibility x fit 
process (cf. Chapter I) makes specific social categories salient in specific contexts, so 
the presence of in-group prescriptive deviants will make individuals adopt a 
prescriptive focus in the judgmental situation. This prescriptive focus will lead 
individuals to appraise the consequences of such prescriptive deviance to the 
subjective validity of the criteria that, in their eyes, legitimate their beliefs on a 
positive social identity (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 2001). 
Indeed, following self-categorization and the consequent depersonalization and 
assimilation of the self to the in-group prototype, individuals should perceive 
themselves and other in-group members as fully interchangeable, and thus, fully 
interdependent as regards the maintenance of a positive social identity. Such perceived 
full interdependence would project the value assigned to any in-group member onto 
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the social self. As a result, perception of intra-group uniform consistency with the 
values that sustain positive social identity would increase, and, conversely, the 
emergence of in-group prescriptive deviance would decrease, the subjective validity of 
that positive social identity.  
 
Reaction to Deviance 
 
In the psychological context that we outlined above, a relevant violation of 
prescriptive in-group normative expectations should be perceived as an offence to the 
social self. Indeed, the social self in psychological groups is a particularly relevant 
component of the group’s reality (Marques & Páez, 1994). As a result, in-group 
deviants should trigger strongly negative reactions on the part of other members, 
because, in disavowing the group’s standards, deviants would simultaneously decrease 
the individuals’ group-mediated social reality, and, more importantly, the value of the 
social self. 
In brief, when no prescriptively deviant members are salient, self-
categorization elicits judgments of in-group members aimed to generate positive in-
group differentiation (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998). Consequently, in-
group members are judged more favourably than out-group members are, and, 
possibly, prototypical members of both categories will be judged more favourably than 
non-prototypical members (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990). These judgments 
thus operate at the inter-group level exclusively (see Figure 2). However, the salience 
of prescriptive in-group deviants should elicit derogatory reactions on the part of other 
in-group members, as an attempt to restore the validity of beliefs on a positive social 
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identity. As Marques and Páez (1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998) suggested, an 
important theoretical implication of this idea is that there is a parallel between 
reactions to deviance in small groups and reactions to deviance in psychological 
groups. Intra-group differentiation, in the form of derogation of in-group deviants, 
would be crucial to validate the group’s social reality. But, in psychological groups, 
such reality ultimately amounts to the group’s identity. Therefore, in such 
circumstances, rather than being mutually exclusive (cf. for example Oakes, Haslam & 
Turner, 1994; Turner et al, 1987) intra-group differentiation and inter-group 
differentiation would operate together as a means to establish positive inter-group 
distinctiveness (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998; Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 
1998) TPF8FPT.  
 
TBlack sheep effect.T Although they were not driven by the subjective group 
dynamics model (actually, they inspired this model; cf. Marques & Páez, 1994), 
previous studies on the black sheep effect illustrate the above reasoning. The black 
sheep effect corresponds to a reaction to deviance that reflects the simultaneous 
operation of inter-group and intra-group differentiation processes (Marques & Páez, 
1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). 
As an illustration, Marques and Yzerbyt (1988, Experiments 1-2) had Law 
pupils judge a good and poor speakers, issuing either from their course (in-group 
condition) or from the rival Philosophy course. In one experiment, participants judged 
either two good speakers or two poor speakers, each one issuing from a different 
                                                 
8 According to Marques and colleagues (Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & 
Hogg, 2001), derogation of the deviant in-group members is a similar process to the public norm 
enforcement described, for instance, by Erikson (1964, 1966), but in a psychological way. Deviance 
highlights a prescriptive (violated) norm, and the consequent derogation of deviant individuals may 
function as a process of norm reinforcement (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). Thus, in society 
at large, deviance is determinant in informing what the group norms are (cf. also Durkheim, 1915). 
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school. In the other experiment, participants judged one good and one poor speaker 
issuing, either from the same in-group school, or from the same out-group school. 
Thus, whereas in the former experiment, participants were in inter-group comparison 
situations, in the latter, participants were in intra-group comparison situations. The 
results showed that, regardless of the kind of social comparison condition, and, 
although speech quality was experimentally controlled in both cases, participants 
always judged the good in-group speaker more favourably than the good out-group 
speaker and the poor in-group speaker more unfavourably than they judged the poor 
out-group speaker. Moreover, participants always considered that the in-group was 
superior to the out-group in terms of speech quality. 
In a similar vein, Marques, Robalo and Rocha (1992, Experiment 2) had pupils 
of one high-schools evaluating the pupils of their school and the pupils of a rival high-
school as a whole, as well as likable and unlikable pupils of each school on exactly the 
same judgmental dimensions. Participants again upgraded likable in-group members 
and derogated unlikable in-group members as compared to out-group members and, at 
the same time, judged the in-group as a whole more favourably than the out-group as a 
whole. 
In brief, the black sheep effect suggests that individuals react in more extreme 
ways toward likable and unlikable in-group members than toward similar out-group 
members. Specifically, individuals evaluate likable in-group members more positively 
than similar members of the out-group, and simultaneously, evaluate unlikable in-
group members more negatively than similarly unlikable out-group members (Marques 
& Páez, 1994; Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992; Marques, 1990; Marques, Yzerbyt & 
Leyens, 1988). In addition, inter-group differentiation and intra-group differentiation 
may occur simultaneously, a result that supports the idea that the latter kind of 
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differentiation is associated with concerns about the former. According to Marques, 
Yzerbyt and Leyens (1988),  
“commitment to certain group values and reward outcomes have a 
functional status similar to the enhancement of self-esteem through 
membership of a group (…), because of their relevance to the subjects, 
unlikeable in-group members may be judged more negatively than 
unlikeable out-group members (…). The black sheep effect is thus in 
accordance with Social Identity Theory. The under-evaluation of 
dislikeable in-group members may be an acceptable psychological strategy 
for preserving the group’s overall positivity.” (pp. 4-5, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
Functions of Reaction to In-Group Deviants 
 
TInter-group and intra-group differentiations.T The subjective group dynamics 
model (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001) 
posits that derogation of in-group deviant members is an inclusive reaction (cf. Levine, 
1980; see Chapter I). Indeed, by definition, it is difficult to expel a deviant member 
from a cognitive category except by reframing the inter-group context. If such 
reframing occurred, that is, if a re-categorization was made that redefined a deviant 
individual as an out-group member, the subsequent evaluation of this individual would 
no longer occur at the intra-group level (cf. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). 
The above process would be consistent with the idea that there is a functional 
antagonism between the simultaneous emergence of intra-group and inter-group 
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differentiation, as stated by self-categorization theory (cf. above). However, it would 
be inconsistent with the basic assumption of the subjective group dynamics model 
according to which intra-group differentiation sustains a positive differentiation of the 
in-group from the out-group as a whole (cf. Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & 
Abrams, 1998). 
In brief, the subjective group dynamics model postulates that derogation of 
deviant in-group members is a manifestation of group members’ hostility towards 
these deviants and, by the same token, and perhaps more importantly, of the 
endorsement of the violated norm on the part of normative members (Marques, 
Abrams & Serôdio, 2001; Serôdio, 2006). Whereas inter-group differentiation, and the 
principle of functional antagonism between subordinate and super-ordinate levels of 
categorization applies to descriptive norms, intra-group differentiation depends on the 
operation of prescriptive norms that prompt hostile reactions towards the in-group 
deviants. 
As a case point, Marques, Abrams, Páez and Taboada, (1998, Experiment 3) 
had participants to evaluate five targets that were presented either as in-group or out-
group members. These targets had supposedly ordered, several characters involved in a 
murder story in terms of their responsibilities for the murder. Four targets presented an 
ordering identical to that made by the participants, whereas one target presented an 
ordering that was similar with, though not identical to, the orderings made by the 
majority of members of the opposite group. Half of the participants were informed that 
their ordering corresponded to an in-group norm (prescriptive norm condition), 
whereas the other half were given no information and were simply to notice that a 
majority of group members adopted the same ordering as they had done (modal norm 
condition). The results indicated that, participants who judged the targets only in light 
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of a modal norm, consistently upgraded in-group targets more than out-group targets, 
irrespective of their orderings of characters. However, participants who judged the 
targets in light of the prescriptive norm upgraded the four in-group targets and the out-
group target who adopted the in-group norm, and derogated the in-group target and the 
four out-group targets who adopted the out-group norm. However, and most 
importantly, participants also upgraded the in-group relative to the out-group as a 
whole, irrespectively of the norm condition in which they were.  
According to the authors, the above results reflect individuals’ motivation to 
obtain a positive social identity through the legitimization of the violated in-group 
norm (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998; Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998). 
Thus, the perception of an internal threat to a group’s prescriptive norm evoked 
negative attitudes towards those members that do not legitimize group standards and 
positive attitudes towards those who legitimize these standards (Marques, Abrams, 
Páez & Taboada, 1998). 
 
Conclusions: An Integration of the Socialization Model and the Subjective Group 
Dynamics Model 
 
The socialization model and the subjective group dynamics model have 
different and common aspects, regarding how they conceive of group structure, of the 
process through which groups establish internal uniformity and its function, and of the 
role of deviance in this process. In this conclusion, we attempt to outline mainly the 
complementary aspects of both models. 
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Levine and colleagues’ conceptualisation of the stages individuals go through 
as group members, how individuals are evaluated by the group and evaluate the group, 
how role transitions operate, and so on, clearly applies to the life of small groups. Not 
surprisingly, then, the model offers a detailed account of group roles, of the processes 
involved in role transitions within the group, and the collective and individual 
functions fulfilled by these processes. 
In contrast, the subjective group dynamics model is more directly focused on 
psychological groups or social categories, as conceived by social identity theory and 
self-categorization theory (e.g. Tajfel, 1978; Turner et al., 1987; Chapter I). 
Consequently, the model offers weak assumptions about the internal structure of 
groups. In this vein, group structure is grounded on members’ similarity with their 
group’s prototype and consistency with, or deviation from, standards that endow a 
positive comparative value to that prototype (cf. Marques & Páez, 1994). 
There are, nonetheless, important aspects that encourage attempts to articulate 
between the two models. For instance, with the subjective group dynamics model, 
Marques and colleagues (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 
2001) assume that intra-group differentiation may work for the benefit of the group 
rather than decreasing its distinctiveness. On its side, the socialization model may 
accommodate to processes occurring in the realm of large social categories and inter-
group context. For instance, the prototypicality level of group members might increase 
or decrease a groups’ attraction towards these members (cf. Levine & Moreland, 
1994). Because full members are expected to be the best group representatives, and are 
supposed to best contribute to the attainment of group goals, we may expect 
commitment toward these members to attain its highest level (Levine & Moreland, 
1994). 
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In addition to their consistent view of the functions of uniformity in groups, 
there are important common aspects between the two models as regards the way group 
members ensure and reinforce intra-group uniformity. The kind of group goals 
assumed by each model involve distinct mechanisms of group influence In small 
groups, the collective goals essentially concern group locomotion and social reality. 
We believe that this applies to the socialization model, as well. In psychological 
groups, the ultimate and, perhaps, unique goal is to maintain or to acquire a positive 
social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994). In both cases, group members are expected to 
contribute to the attainment of group goals and in both cases, social reality deals with a 
process of social validation of group norms, beliefs and opinions. Furthermore, such 
validation implies the recognition that group beliefs are “correct”. This common aspect 
has implications for an account of reactions to deviance by both models. 
According to the socialization model a deviant behaviour is any behaviour that 
either differentiates itself from the normative expectations defined by the group 
(Moreland & Levine, 1982), or that is associated to a personal decision of abandoning 
the group (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). According to the subjective group dynamics 
model, deviance ensues from lack of support of prescriptive in-group norms. The 
perception that other members conform to the prescriptive norms is thus essential to 
individuals’ subjective validation of group’s normative system, and this is an essential 
condition for the attainment of a positive social identity (Abrams et al., 1998; Marques, 
Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). Thus, deviance is essentially a phenomenon that 
threatens the subjective legitimization of individuals' positive social identity (Marques, 
Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) but, at the same time that renders subjective validation 
possible (Marques, 2004). 
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Levine and colleagues (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005) propose that 
divergence and exit are role transitions that indicate that individuals withdrew from 
full membership. Such role transitions reflect a growing exclusion of the deviant 
individuals from the group (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). Hence, these 
authors propose that reaction to deviance is based on exclusive strategies. This idea 
can hardly apply to the subjective group dynamics model. Indeed, role transition 
includes moments in which individuals actually enter or exit the group. The basic 
assumption of subjective group dynamics is that reactions to in-group deviants ensue 
from the fact that these deviants cannot be re-conceptualized as out-group members 
(cf. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & 
Abrams, 1998). It is true that, according to the group socialization model, groups do 
not necessarily expel their deviants, and may adopt less radical strategies, including 
removal of individual responsibilities, convincing individuals to accept dismissal, 
allowing a period before the exit, or promoting individuals’ entrance in another group 
(Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). However, this remains a group option. In turn, 
in the context of subjective group dynamics deviance is an inherent property of the in-
group and is psychologically dealt with as such. Therefore, the subjective group 
dynamics model implicitly assumes that derogation of deviants is an inclusive strategy 
towards the in-group deviant member.  
 
The Research Problem 
 
In our attempt to integrate the subjective group dynamics model and the group 
socialization model, we propose that reactions to deviants depend on these deviants’ 
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status within the group. Our problem for investigation concerns this general issue. We 
propose that the socialization status within the group is associated with different 
perceptions of, and different contributions for, the positive value that individuals can 
obtain for their social membership. 
Our broad hypotheses concern the effects of group members’ status on their 
judgments of other members who comply with or who deviate from relevant group 
standards, and the effects of the latter members’ status on their impact on judgments 
made by the former. First, group members whose status within the group is well 
established, will be in the possession of clear-cut criteria to judge whether a given 
behaviour or characteristic match the group’s prescriptions. In addition, because they 
are more strongly committed to the group, full members will more strongly inherit 
from the contribution of normative and deviant members to the group’s value. Second, 
the impact of deviant, as well as normative, positions on the group’s value should have 
a different impact on the group, depending on the status of these members within that 
group. 
In our first experiment, we focus on how individuals who assume different 
status in the group react to deviant members. We may suppose that the potentially 
disruptive character of an emergent deviant opinion on the subjective validation of in-
group norms would be stronger if this opinion was perceived as contradicting core 
prescriptive in-group norms. However, new members, because of their lack of 
normative knowledge do not completely identify with the group’s normative system, 
and hence, should not interpret some deviant positions as a threat to this system. Full 
members, on the contrary, are aware of the normative system of the group (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Consequently, they should interpret intra-
group differences directly in light of the group’s norms. Thus, when faced with a 
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member who does not contribute to intra-group uniformity, full members should react 
in a more negative way than new members should. 
The second set of studies (Experiments 2, 3) refers to the effects of deviant 
members’ status on how other members react to their deviance. We may assume that 
the group can more easily reject a deviant if this deviant is new or marginal members, 
than a full member. However, as we argued above, in a social categorization context, 
such rejection would amount to the redefinition of the group. We propose that when 
such re-definition is out of question, prescriptive deviants whose status is less central 
to the group should be less threatening to the subjective validation of the group’s 
normative system than more central deviant (full) members. Therefore, deviant 
members who assume a full member status should be the most derogated of all 
members. 
Our fourth experiment aimed directly to test the idea that representative 
members that adopt a deviant opinion are perceived as a threat to the group. Moreover, 
we attempted to find which types of strategies group members were willing to engage 
towards deviant members. Depending on the deviant members’ status, we should 
observe reaction to deviant in-group new members consistent with the socialization 
strategies and reaction to deviant in-group full members consistent with re-
socialization strategies (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine, Moreland & 
Hausmann, 2005). 
These three sets of studies will be presented, respectively, in chapters III, IV 
and V of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER III 
EFFECT OF INDIVIDUALS’ SOCIALIZATION STATUS ON EVALUATIONS OF 
LIKEABLE AND UNLIKEABLE IN-GROUP OR OUT-GROUP MEMBERS 
 
 According to subjective group dynamics (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, 
Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001), the presence of deviance within the group makes salient 
the prescriptive character of the violated norm (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 
2001). Such violation is perceived as a menace to individuals’ beliefs on a positive 
social identity (Abrams et al, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001; Chapter 
II). The black sheep effect represents a strategy used by group members when they 
face deviance within their group (Chapter II). Derogation of in-group deviant members 
would contribute to restore the subjective validity of the in-group’s standards, and 
hence, to legitimize individuals’ beliefs on a positive social identity (Abrams et al, 
1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). 
However, if we take Levine and colleagues’ (Levine & Moreland, 1994; 
Moreland & Levine, 1988) group socialization model into account, we should expect 
that the extent to which normative members are upgraded and deviant members are 
derogated, depends on the level of expertise of perceivers about the group’s norms in 
light of which these members are judged. Indeed, although new members should 
behave in accordance with their strong commitment to the group, they still lack 
information about group norms. On the contrary, full members should be aware of 
which behaviours are consistent or inconsistent with group norms (e.g. Levine & 
Moreland, 1994).  
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Overview and Hypotheses 
 
In the present experiment, participants were categorized in two groups and 
gave their opinions about two statements: a likeable and an unlikeable statement. 
Participants then evaluated two target-members (a likeable, or normative, and an 
unlikeable, or deviant, member) and reported their agreement with the opinions held 
by target-members. Participants were divided in two conditions, according to which 
target individuals were in-group or out-group members. Participants were divided in 
two further conditions according to which they either believed that the likable 
statement was a consensual group norm, or did not receive any kind of information 
about the position held by the majority members of their group. With this 
manipulation, we attempted to reproduce conditions representative of the different 
knowledge held, respectively, by full members and by new members, about the 
group’s normative system. 
The design was a 2 (Group: In-group vs. Out-group) x 2 (Status: Full Member 
vs. New Member) x 2 (Likeability: Likeable vs. Unlikeable Target). Group and Status 
were between-participants factors, whereas Likeability was a within-participants 
factor.  
We expected participants to derogate unlikable in-group members and to 
upgrade likeable in-group members more than unlikeable and likeable out-group 
members when these members were judged in light of a known consensual in-group 
norm. Conversely, participants who do not have information about the normative or 
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deviant character of target individuals’ opinions should show a positive bias (in-group 
bias) concerning both in-group targets as compared to out-group targets.  
In addition, in confronting opinions given by full members, while ignoring the 
normative implications of these opinions, and because they are committed to their 
group membership, new members should heuristically base their judgments on the 
sources’ credibility (e.g., Böhner & Wänke, 2002). In line with this idea, we expected 
that participants in the New Member condition would show lower rejection of the 
unlikeable target’s position than would participants in the Full Member condition, who 
were informed about the deviant character of the deviant’s opinion. Concomitantly, 
participants in the Full Member condition should reinforce their allegiance to the 
normative opinion. 
 
Pilot Study 
 
In order to choose two statements to use in the manipulation of normative 
(likeable) and deviant (unlikeable) members in the main study, we asked seven male 
and 34 female college pupils (N = 41), aged from 20 to 23 years old (M = 20.49; SD = 
0.71) to report their agreement or disagreement (1= I totally disagree; 7= I totally 
agree) with several statements. 
Because we ran our experiments at a time when high-school pupils were 
involved in strikes regarding educational system changes, we chose this issue to 
construct our manipulation. The statements ranged from total support to total 
opposition to the high-school movement. These statements were: “I think pupils of my 
age have no right to fight for a better educational system”; “I think pupils of my age 
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should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational 
system”; “I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for 
them”; “I think pupils of my age cannot fight for a better educational system because 
everything is all right just as it is”; “I think pupils of my age should only have the 
opportunity to show their agreement/ disagreement with the educational system”; “I 
think pupils of my age should make a statement about their rights, even if they had to 
do that individually”; and “I think pupils of my age should dedicate themselves to their 
own course of learning because this is the best way to achieve a better educational 
system”. 
Results show that the statement that best represents a likeable opinion was “I 
think pupils of my age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a 
better educational system”. This statement generated the highest agreement (M = 6.15, 
SD = 0.79) and obtained significantly more agreement among participants than all the 
other statements (t40 > 5.06, p <.001, in all paired comparisons). 
To choose a statement that would be as unlikeable as the former statement was 
likeable, we recoded statements that obtained means significantly below the middle 
point of the scale (4), and conducted similar analyses of the resulting means. Results 
show that the only statement that achieved a similar score to likeable statement was “I 
think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for them” 
Participants consistently disagreed with this opinion (M = 6.15; SD = 0.99) and they 
disagreed as much with this statement as they agreed with the previous one (t40 = 
1.86, ns). 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 Fifty-three high school pupils participated in this experiment. Thirty-three were 
male, and 20 were female. Their age ranged from 15 to 19 years old (M = 16.83; SD = 
1.00). There were no differences between participants’ sex (χP2 P <1, N = 53, d.f. = 3) or 
age (F3,49 < 1) across experimental conditions and between age. Eleven participants 
who did not correctly answered manipulation check questions are not part of this 
sample. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants attended two sessions. In the first session, following a procedure 
similar to that employed by Marques, Abrams and Serôdio (2001, Experiment 2), we 
categorized participants in two groups (Abstract vs. Pictoric), supposedly on the basis 
of their responses to a bogus test of “social perception”. Participants then gave their 
opinion about the two statements that we chose from the pilot-study (“I think pupils of 
my age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational 
system”, and “I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for 
them”. 
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Group membership manipulation. In the second session, participants received 
(bogus) feedback about the type of social perception to which they belonged. We then 
informed participants that we were going to organize debates between individuals who 
belong to the two types of social perception. Finally, we asked participants to help us 
choosing the members that should represent each type in the forthcoming debates. We 
informed participants that other pupils had already taken part in previous meetings 
under the theme “to fight for a better educational system”, and asked them to give their 
opinion about two such pupils, who had been supposedly “chosen at random from 
those who had participated in these meetings since the first session, who felt very well 
integrated in those meetings, and who reported to be strongly willing to participate in 
the forthcoming debates”. This was intended to provide participants with the strong 
sense that these targets corresponded to the defining features of full members. 
 
TStatus manipulationT. We informed half of the participants that the majority of 
pupils who participated in the previous meetings held the likeable position, and only a 
minority stood up for the unlikeable position (full member condition). The other half 
of the participants (new member condition) did not receive any information about an 
existing consensus among pupils present in the meetings. All participants were fully 
debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 
 TSocial identification.T Before eigth presented with information about target 
members, participants answered four questions aimed to tap social identification: 
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“How well do you think you will get along with Abstract (vs. Pictoric) individuals?”, 
“How far do you consider yourself as similar to other Abstract (vs. Pictoric) 
individuals?”, “How far do you think you will get a good understanding with Abstract 
(vs. Pictoric) individuals?”, and “How far do you identify yourself with Abstract (vs. 
Pictoric) individuals?”. These questions were answered on 7 point scales (1 = nothing 
at all; 7 = very much). We averaged these items to an in-group identification 
(Chronbach’s α = 0.77) and an out-group identification (Chronbach’s α = 0.81) score. 
 
TEvaluation of target members T. Participants had to evaluate target members on 
seven evaluative bi-polar traits: (1) good-bad colleague, (2) good-bad example to other 
pupils, (3) with-without good moral principles, (4) with-without good sense, (5) 
generous-self-centered, (6) interesting-uninteresting person; and (7) loyal-disloyal. 
Ratings were given on 7 point scales (1 = negative evaluation; 7= positive evaluation). 
We averaged these ratings to a likable member (Chronbach’s α = 0.81) and an 
unlikeable member (Chronbach’s α = 0.82) score. 
 
TOpinion toleranceT. In the first session, participants stated their agreement with 
the likeable and with the unlikeable opinion. In the second session, participants stated 
their agreement with the opinions of the likeable and the unlikeable targets: “How 
much do you agree with the position held by this pupil about the issue ‘fighting for a 
better educational system?” (1= I totally disagree; 7= I totally agree). We computed 
participants’ opinion change by subtracting their scores of agreement with the likeable 
and unlikeable opinions in the first session from their agreement with the opinions of  
the likeable target (agreement with likeable position) and the unlikable target 
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(agreement with unlikeable position) in the second session. We computed a Likeable 
Opinion Change score by subtracting agreement with the position of the likeable target 
in the second session from agreement with the likeable opinion in the first session. 
Concomitantly, we computed an Unlikeable Opinion Change score by subtracting 
agreement with the position of the unlikeable target in the second session from 
agreement with the unlikeable opinion in the first session. The Likeable Opinion 
Change and Unlikeable Opinion Change scores reflect the extent to which participants’ 
opinion changed in the direction of the target opinion from the first to the second 
session of the study. A score of 0 indicates no change, and negative and positive scores 
reflect, respectively, decreases or increases in agreement with the target opinion.TPF9FPT 
 
TManipulation-checksT. Finally, participants answered to questions aimed to 
ensure that they knew what were their membership category and the membership 
category of targets (“To which type of perception do you belong?”, “To which type of 
perception does Pupil A (Pupil B) belong?”), as well as whether they recalled the 
target pupils’ opinions (“What are the opinions of Pupil A (Pupil B) about the issue at 
stake?”, and “What is the general opinion of pupils who participated on the debates?” 
Opinion A / Opinion B / I have no information about that”). Participants also indicated 
their willingness to continue participating in forthcoming studies (“How willing are 
you to participate in the forthcoming debates?”, “How willing are you to be a 
representative member of your school in the debate?”). 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 In the second session, we chose not to directly ask participants’ opinion for a second time, in order to 
prevent participants’ likely attempts to show consistency in their opinions. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
Social Identification 
We ran a Group x Status ANOVA on in-group and out-group identification 
scores. The results show that participants identified more with the in-group (M = 6.10; 
SD = 0.57) than with the out-group (M = 4.62; SD = 0.94), as indicated by the 
significant difference between the in-group and out-group identification scores, 
F(1,49) = 101.62, p<.001, η2 = 0.675. The remaining effects were non-significant (all 
F1,49 < 3.06, ns). In brief, participants identified more with the in-group than with the 
out-group and this effect was similar across experimental conditions. This result 
showed that our minimal group’s procedure was effective. 
 
Evaluation of Target Members as a Function of Group and Status 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of evaluations of likeable and 
unlikeable targets in the four experimental conditions. To test our hypotheses about 
evaluations of target members, we ran a Group x Status x Likeability ANOVA on 
targets’ evaluations. We found a significant effect of Likeability (F1,49 = 156.28, 
p<.001, η2 = 0.761). This effect indicates that participants evaluated likeable targets 
(M = 5.64; SD = 0.59) more positively than unlikeable targets (M = 4.15; SD = 0.86).  
We also found a significant Group x Likeability interaction (F1,49 = 4.28, 
p=.044, η2 = 0.080). Participants evaluated the likeable in-group target (M = 5.91, SD 
= 0.49) more positively than the likeable out-group target (M = 5.36, SD = 4.13), t(51) 
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= 3.88, p<.001. However, participants did not differentiate between the unlikable in-
group and out-group targets (respectively, M = 4.18, SD = 0.92, and M = 4.13, SD = 
0.80; t(51) < 1). 
 
 Group 
 In-group Out-group 
Status Likeability M SD M SD 
Likeable 6.13 0.38 5.49 0.59 
New Member 
Unlikeable 4.70 0.91 3.90 0.79 
Likeable 5.68 0.50 5.24 0.51 
Full Member 
Unlikeable 3.62 0.55 4.33 0.79 
Table 1. Evaluations of Likeable and Unlikeable Members as a Function of Group and Status 
(Experiment 1). 
 
Our hypothesis is tested by the Group x Status x Likeability interaction. This 
interaction was significant (F1,49 = 7.39, p=.009, η2 = 0.131). 
 Our hypothesis states that participants should upgrade likable in-group targets 
and derogate unlikable in-group targets relative to their out-group counterparts more 
when they are in a position equivalent to full members’ status than when they are in a 
position equivalent to new members’ status. To test this hypothesis, we broke down 
this interaction in terms of the Status factor. In support of our hypothesis, and 
consistent with previous research on the black sheep effect, we found a significant 
Group x Likeability interaction in the full member condition (F1,50 = 11.97, p=.001, 
η2 = .192). As can be seen in Table 1, participants evaluated likeable in-group 
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members more positively (M = 5.68) than likeable out-group members (M = 5.24; t25 
= 2.23, p=.035). Simultaneously, participants evaluated unlikeable in-group members 
more negatively (M = 3.62,) than unlikeable out-group members (M = 4.33; t25 = 2.71, 
p=.012; see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Evaluation of likeable and unlikeable members as a function of Group and 
Status (Experiment 1) 
 
In turn, as expected, participants who were in the equivalent of the new 
member status disregarded the targets’ normative or deviant positions evaluated them 
only according to their group membership. Indeed, in the new member condition, the 
Group x Likeability interaction was not significant (F1,50 < 1), but Group was 
significant (F1,50 = 14.29, p=.001, η2 = .149). Participants evaluated both in-group 
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members (M = 5.42, SD = 0.47) more positively than both out-group members (M = 
4.69, SD = 0.51; see Figure 3).TPF10FPT 
 
In brief, the results are consistent with our hypotheses. In the full member 
condition, we found a pattern of evaluations that matches the black sheep effect, 
whereas in the new member condition, the pattern corresponds to a simple in-group 
bias. Apparently, thus, when participants have information about their group’s norm, 
they use this information as a basis for derogating individuals who hold undesirable 
positions, but they do not do so when these undesirable positions are not matched 
against their knowledge of the group’s norm. 
These results are consistent with the subjective group dynamics’ claim that 
reactions to deviants are moderated by the deviants’ group membership. But, more 
importantly in light of our present concerns, the results also show that, even, in-group 
deviants are derogated only to the extent that individuals are able to match the 
deviants’ opinions against an existing in-group consensus. Therefore, we may suggest 
that, not only is the group a powerful mediator of reactions to deviant individuals, but 
also that the degree of normative expertise of individuals within the in-group (in the 
present case, their full member status) is crucial in generating negative reaction 
towards deviant members. In this vein, the present results seem to illustrate the validity 
                                                 
10 To check for the relationship between upgrading and derogation of likable and unlikable targets and 
in-group identification, we computed an Intra-Group Differentiation score as the difference between the 
evaluation scores of likeable and unlikable targets, and a Differential Identification score as the 
difference between the In-Group Identification score and the Out-Group Identification score. We then 
correlated these scores. We should expect the correlation between the two measures to be stronger and 
more positive in the in-group/full member status condition than in all other conditions. That is, in this 
condition, the more participants differentially identified with the in-group, the more they would upgrade 
the likeable in-group member and derogate the unlikeable in-group member. However, the results were 
largely inconclusive. For one thing, in the in-group/full member condition, the correlation was not 
significant (r = .16, ns). Interestingly, the correlation was negative (r = -.28, ns) in the in-group/new 
member condition, indicating that, in this condition, the more participants differentially identified with 
the in-group, the less they differentiated between likeable and unlikeable in-group targets. The 
correlations in the out-group condition were, respectively, r = .24, and r = -.02). 
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of our theoretical articulation between the group socialization and the subjective group 
dynamics models. 
 
Commitment to the Norm 
 Our second hypothesis stated that new members would be more influenced than 
full members would, by the deviant opinions of unlikable in-group members, whereas 
full members would reinforce their normative position. To test this hypothesis, we 
compared the scores of opinion change towards the likeable and unlikeable positions 
with a value of 0 (indicating no change) within conditions. The results only showed 
that participants in the in-group full member condition marginally increased their 
agreement with the likeable position (M = 0.31, SD = 0.63; t12 = 1.76, p=.10, 
remaining differences were not significant; t always <1.47, ns). Although, this result is 
inconclusive, this marginal effect is in line with our hypothesis. Participants tended 
reinforce their agreement with an opinion they considered to be normative in the 
second session of the study. 
 We followed a similar procedure with respect to changes towards the unlikable 
position. In this case, the results were more conclusive and consistent with our 
hypothesis. Indeed, participants in the in-group/new member condition showed a more 
marked tendency towards the unlikeable opinion between the first and the second 
session (t13 = 2.88, p=.013) than did participants in all other conditions (t always < 
1.29, ns; see Table 2 and Figure 4). 
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 Group 
 In-group Out-group 
Status M SD M SD 
New Member 0.93 1.21 -0.58 1.56 
Full Member -0.15 1.07 0.14 1.56 
Table 2. Change towards Unlikeable Position as a function of Group and Status (Experiment 1) 
 
 Finally, we attempted to check for whether there would be reinforcement of the 
group norm following evaluations of target members. We thus correlated the scores of 
evaluations of the likeable and unlikeable members with agreement with the likeable 
opinion within each condition. Results were consistent with our hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 4. Change towards unlikeable position as a function of Group and Status (Experiment 1) 
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As can be seen in Table 3, we found a significant positive correlation between 
evaluation of the normative member and agreement with the normative opinion in the 
second phase (r = 0.65, p=.015), only within the in-group/high salience norm 
condition. This association was not observed in the first phase (r = 0.15, ns). 
Consistently with this result, we observed that the initial correlation between 
agreement with the unlikeable opinion and evaluation of the deviant target, become 
significant in the second session of the study. 
 
 Group 
Status In-group Out-group 
Likeable .34, ns (N=14) .35, ns (N=12) 1rst 
Session Unlikeable .23, ns (N=14) -.25, ns (N=12) 
Likeable .44, ns (N=14) .45, ns (N=12) 
New Member 
2PndP 
Session Unlikeable -.21, ns (N=14) -.52, p=.08 (N=12) 
Likeable .15, ns (N=13) .19, ns (N=14) 1rst 
Session Unlikeable -.46, ns (N=13) -.06, ns (N=14) 
Likeable .65, p=.015 (N=13) .22, ns (N=14) 
Full Member 
2PndP 
Session Unlikeable -.55, p=.05 (N=13) -.13, ns (N=14) 
Table 3. Product-Moment Correlations between Agreement with the Likeable Opinion and 
Evaluations of Likeable and Unlikeable Members in the First and Second Session of the Experiment 
(Experiment 1) 
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Although these results are not enough clear to allow one to draw strong 
conclusions, they suggest that, after being confronted with deviant in-group members, 
full members increase their commitment to the group’s normative position, i.e. they 
reinforce their allegiance to that norm, and derogate the deviants. 
 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 Our results show that participants more strongly derogate deviant in-group 
members and upgrade normative in-group members than their out-group counterparts. 
More importantly, the results show that participants who were informed of the 
consensual position of their group derogated in-group deviants, and upgraded in-group 
normative members more than participants who were not informed about the group’s 
consensus. The judgments of normative and deviant in-group members thus seem to be 
strongly due to the individuals’ allegiance to in-group norms, rather than to 
interpersonal differences of opinion within the group. In addition, we found a tendency 
for participants to increase their allegiance to their breached norm, after having judged 
normative and deviant members. This result does not allow us to establish any causal 
link between the two phenomena, but are consistent with the idea that judgments of 
normative and deviant in-group members may be part of a more general process 
according to which groups reinforce their uniformity through the reinforcement of their 
members (specifically, full members) commitment to the violated norms. 
 The present results seem consistent with Levine and Moreland’s socialization 
model (1994) and with the subjective group dynamics model. New members should be 
highly motivated to obtain reinforcement from the other group members, but they lack 
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the required knowledge to be certain about group norms. As a result, their only way to 
promote positive in-group differentiation is by engaging in in-group biased judgments, 
irrespective of the degree to which the characteristics or behaviour of group members 
fit the group’s norms. As a result, full members will be less tolerant, whereas new 
members will be more lenient, towards deviant opinions. It suggests that contrary to 
full members, new members lack sufficient knowledge to adopt a prescriptive focus in 
the presence of deviant members.  
 In the following chapter, we will attempt to examine the reverse side of this 
coin. That is, we will attempt to examine the impact that deviance shown by different 
status members may have on individuals, and how their resulting reactions may help 
them to reinforce their beliefs in a positive social identity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EFFECT OF TARGETS’ SOCIALIZATION STATUS, GROUP MEMBERSHIP, 
AND LIKEABILITY ON THEIR EVALUATION  
 
In this chapter, we present two experiments aimed to test the general idea that 
individuals will judge normative in-group members and deviant in-group members 
respectively, more positively and more negatively than normative and deviant out-
group members, but that this will be especially the case when in-group targets have a 
full member intra-group status. Among other details, in Experiment 2, the targets of 
judgment are normative and deviant full members as compared with normative and 
deviant new members, and normative and deviant marginal members. In Experiment 3, 
the targets of judgment are normative and deviant full members as compared with 
normative and deviant new members, and normative and deviant ex-members. These 
judgments are always made in an inter-group context. 
As we discussed in Chapter I, the small group approach considers that group 
members view intra-group dissidence as a threat to valued beliefs (social reality) and 
group goal attainment (group locomotion). The group will solve the tension resulting 
from the presence of deviants, either by attempting to make the deviants reintegrate the 
majority opinion or, if this effort fails, by excluding deviant member’s from the group 
(Festinger, 1950; Levine, 1980). Consistently with this idea, Levine and colleagues 
(Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982) propose that deviants may be 
ascribed a marginal member status within the group, following which full members 
engage in re-socialization strategies aimed to lead the deviants to adopt pro-group 
behaviour (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). If these strategies fail, group members may 
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decide to expel the marginal member from the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; 
Moreland & Levine, 1982). 
An important form of intra-group deviance is disloyalty (Levine & Thompson, 
1996; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). As Zdaniuk and Levine (2001) pointed out, every 
group holds a norm according to which members ought loyalty to the group and should 
involve themselves in pro-group behaviour. Individuals who decide to leave the group 
are perceived as violators of this norm. Such individuals are frequently labelled as 
traitors (Levine & Thompson, 1996). One important reason for this fact is that 
members, who decide to abandon the group, are publicizing the group’s inability to 
satisfy their personal needs and lack of skills to retain them as members. Defectors are 
thus perceived as a direct threat to the groups’ image in view of other groups (Zdaniuk 
& Levine, 2001). 
On its side, the subjective group dynamics approach views deviance as a 
menace to the normative standards that legitimize members’ beliefs in the in-group’s 
positive social differentiation (Abrams et al, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 
2001). Following self-categorization, these standards become a relevant aspect of 
social reality and have an immediate impact on individuals’ social identity. In-group 
deviance from such standards is thus an immediate wounding to the individuals’ social 
self-concept (Marques & Páez, 1994). As a result, individuals would strongly express 
their rejection of deviant in-group members, expect other in-group members to express 
similar rejection, and assume that others expect them to express rejection as well 
(Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; cf. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998, 
Experiment 2). 
Considering that group members assume different statuses within the group, 
depending on which socialization phase they are (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994), we 
 111 
can expect that members will react towards deviant behaviour in light of the intra-
group status of deviant members. The same deviant opinion may trigger different 
reactions (rejection or even acceptance) depending on the member’s status. For the 
same reason, a normative opinion should be more or less positively appraised 
depending on the intra-group status of the member that supports this opinion. 
We can think of, at least, three reasons why full members have a stronger 
impact on the legitimization of the group’s positive value. First, full members should 
be perceived as better group representatives than other members whose intra-group 
status is less central, or even marginal to the group (cf. Turner et al, 1987). Second, 
normative members are expected to define the group’s standards and to point the right 
track for the group. Full members are expected to endorse group norms, contribute to 
intra-group uniformity and cohesion, and engage in influencing strategies towards 
other members in order to reinforce conformity to group norms (Levine & Moreland, 
1994). Third, full members should be perceived as the epitome of group loyalty and, 
therefore, their behaviour should correspond to the group’s ideal to be achieved by 
other members. 
In turn, new members are not supposed to have a good grasp of the group’s 
norms, or to know the appropriate courses of action to promote group goals (e.g. 
Levine & Moreland, 1994). Similarly, marginal status ensues from group members’ 
decreased commitment to the group, and reciprocally, a decreased commitment of the 
group towards these members. To some extent, these members are not expected to 
represent the group, and the group does not feel responsible by their behaviour (cf. 
Levine & Moreland, 1994). 
It follows from the above reasoning that in-group full members whose 
behaviour diverges from the group’s standards will be perceived as a higher threat than 
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a new member or a marginal member who adopted a similar behaviour. By referring to 
the subjective group dynamics model, we may thus suggest that full members that 
deviate from group norms will be viewed as a stronger threat to social identity than 
other less central in-group members will. 
 
Overview and Hypotheses 
 
The two experiments reported in this chapter (Experiments 2 and 3), examined 
the general hypotheses that, whereas individuals generally evaluate normative in-group 
full members more favourably than less central in-group members or out-group 
members, they will more strongly derogate in-group full members who deviate from 
the group’s standards than other less central in-group members whose behaviour is 
equally deviant. Assuming that the behaviour of out-group members, irrespective of 
their status within the out-group, is irrelevant to the validation of in-group standards, 
these members will evoke less extreme reactions. 
In Experiment 2, pupils of two neighbouring schools had to judge two other 
pupils issuing either from the in-group school or from the out-group school. According 
to conditions, the targets were described as either having a new member status 
(newcomer pupils), or a full member status (elder pupils) or a marginal member status 
(elder pupils who decided to leave the school). In the three conditions, one of the 
targets adopted a likable opinion, and the other adopted an unlikable opinion.  
Experiment 3 was similar to Experiment 2, except targets had a new member, full 
member, or ex-member status. The ex-member was constructed as a pupil who had left 
the school to join another one. 
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It may be worth noticing that participants’ less extreme evaluations of in-group 
marginal members and ex-members than of in-group full members has important 
theoretical implications. As we noticed above, group defectors breach the important 
norm of loyalty, and defection may create a negative image of the group as lacking the 
ability to attract its members (Zdanyuk & Levine, 2001). In addition, deviant (i.e. 
unlikeable) in-group members should also pose a threat to the group in that they 
jeopardize the perceived legitimacy of the standards that sustain beliefs in a positive 
social identity (Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998). 
We may thus reason that normative in-group defectors, who are likely to be 
viewed as potential contributors to the group’s identity, should be more harmful to the 
group’s image than deviant in-group defectors who, in any case, are likely to 
jeopardize such identity.TPF11FPT We thus propose that, whereas defection of normative 
members may harm the group’s self-image, defection by deviant members should not 
pose such a problem. To some extent, defection of deviants would be an instance of the 
group’s “getting rid” of undesirable individuals. Therefore, in Experiment 3, we 
hypothesized, in addition to the above general hypotheses, that participants would 
make less positive evaluations of the normative in-group ex-member than of the 
normative out-group ex-member, while evaluating deviant in-group and out-group ex-
members in a similar manner. 
                                                 
11 Indeed, this is the main reason we chose to include the ex-member status, instead of the marginal 
member status, in Experiment 3. 
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Experiment 2 
Effect of Status and Group Membership on the Evaluation of Normative and Deviant 
Members 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Forty-six female and 49 male compose our sample (N = 95). Participants’ sex 
was equally distributed across experimental conditions (χ2 = 1.41, d.f. = 5, N = 95, ns). 
Participants’ age ranged from 13 to 17 years old (M = 14.45; SD = 0.73). There were 
no significant age differences across experimental conditions (F5,88 < 1). All 
participants were high school pupils. Seventeen participants who did not correctly 
answered manipulation check questions are not part of this sample. 
 
Experimental Design 
The design was a 2 (Group: In-group vs. Out-group) x 3 (Status: New Member 
vs. Full Member vs. Marginal Member) x 2 (Likeability: Normative Member vs. 
Deviant Member). Group and Status were between-participants factors, whereas 
Likeability was a within-participant factor. 
 
Procedure 
 This experiment was presented to participants as part of a larger study about the 
school environment experienced in neighbouring schools. We informed participants 
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that the experiment was composed of two sessions. In the first session, participants 
gave their opinions about the in-group school and the out-group school, as well as 
about some relevant issues. The second session was presented as an attempt to validate 
results obtained in the first session.  
 In the first session, participants responded to three sets of questions. The first 
set referred to participants’ school and to how long they have attended that school. 
These questions allowed us to introduce the experimental manipulations in the second 
session. The second set of questions aimed to measure participants’ identification with 
their school as compared to the out-group school. The third set of questions was 
composed of five continua of seven assertions each, so that the first and second 
assertions were socially undesirable (“I think pupils of my age are not mature enough 
to know what is best for them”, and “I think we should demand whatever we want 
from our friends, and they have to comply with us”); the sixth and seventh sentences 
were socially desirable (“I think pupils of my age should join together and negotiate 
the best way to fight for a better educational system”, and “I think we should respect 
our friends, and be cautious not to demand too much from them”). Each issue ended 
with a question asking participants to state how important that issue was for them 
(“How much do you think this issue is important?” 1= not at all important; 7= very 
important). These issues were used to manipulate likeability in the second session. 
 
TLikeability manipulation.T In the second session, we manipulated target 
members’ likability by means of two of the issues to which participants had responded 
in the first session. For each participant, we chose the issue that participant considered 
as the most important of all. Only two issues were used, because participants were 
unanimous about the importance of these two issues. One issue concerned the struggle 
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for better teaching conditions (herein called Issue 1). The other issue was related to 
friendship (Issue 2)TPF12FPT. Depending on the issue participants considered the most 
important, and the sentence they agreed the most with, the normative target was 
presented as a pupil who chose one of the following statements: “I think pupils of my 
age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational 
system” (Issue 1), or “I think we should respect our friends, and be cautious not to 
demand too much from them” (Issue 2). Deviant targets were presented as having 
chosen one of the following statements “I think pupils of my age are not mature 
enough to know what is best for them” (Issue 1) or “I think we should demand 
whatever we want from our friends, and they should comply” (Issue 2). 
Two weeks later, in the second session, participants received feedback relative 
to their answers in the first phase of the experiment: “The pupil attends the 
(participant’s) school, for (number of years participant has attended that school) years. 
The pupil in question is very well integrated in his/her school. Chosen Issue: (1 or 2). 
Opinion pupil agrees with the most: (transcription of the statement).” This feedback 
was based on the information collected about each participant in the first session of the 
experiment and served, mainly, for the purpose of establishing credibility of 
                                                 
12 Issue 1 included the following statements, from most socially desirable to most socially undesirable: 
“I think pupils of my age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational 
system”; “I think pupils of my age have to fight for a different educational system, even if they are not 
aware of a clear solution to adopt”; “I think pupils of my age should comply to the elder pupils' 
decisions”; “There is no need to fight for a better educational system”; “I think pupils of my age should 
comply to the actual educational system, even if they do not agree”; “I think pupils of my age have no 
right to fight for a better educational system”; and “I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to 
know what is best for them”.  
Issue 2 included the following statements, from most socially desirable to most socially undesirable: “I 
think we should respect our friends, and be cautious not to demand too much from them”; “I think we 
should be always available to our friends, even if we have to sacrifice ourselves”; “I think we should 
help our friends according to our desires and not to their needs”; “I think that there is no such thing as 
truly friendship”; “I think we may ask anything from our friends”; “I think our friends should feel 
obliged to help us whenever we need”; “I think we should demand whatever we want from our friends, 
and they should comply”. 
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information about the targets members. Participants should indicate how much they 
considered that information about them as being correct or incorrect. 
 
TGroup and status manipulationsT. Participants were then provided with 
information about two target members. According to experimental conditions, these 
target members were presented as attending either the same school as participants (in-
group condition) or a neighbouring school (out-group condition). Moreover, both 
target members were presented, either as “having attended the school for 6 months” 
and feeling “very motivated to be in that school” (new member condition), or as 
“having attended that school for about 5 years” and feeling “very integrated in their 
school” (full member condition), or as “having attended that school for about 5 years”, 
but “preferring to leave the school” (marginal member condition).  
 
TNormative and deviant members’ manipulation.T All participants were presented 
with two targets. For each participant, one target (normative member) had allegedly 
chosen the same socially desirable statement as the participant did, and the other target 
(deviant member) had allegedly chosen the opposite statement, i.e. the most socially 
undesirable one.  
 
Dependent Measures 
 
TSocial identification. TBefore participants received information about target 
members, they answered to a series of questions measuring their degree of 
identification to their school. These questions were: “I like to be a pupil of my school”; 
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“I would rather be a pupil of (neighbouring school)”; “I like to hang around with the 
other pupils of my school”; “I would rather hang around with pupils of the 
(neighbouring school)”; “I like to be sociable with the other pupils of my school”; and 
“I would rather be sociable with pupils of the (neighbouring school)”. Answers were 
given on a 7 point scale (1 = I completely disagree; 7 = I completely agree). From 
these answers, we computed an In-group Identification (Cronbach’s α = 0.73) and an 
Out-group Identification (Cronbach’s α = 0.84) score. 
 
TEvaluation of target members. TAfter reading information about both target 
members, participants evaluated these members on six traits: fun, respectful, sensitive, 
generous, correct, and loyal (1 = nothing at all; 7 = completely). The evaluation score 
for each target corresponds to the mean of these traits (Cronbach’s α = 0.59 and 
Cronbach’s α = 0.77, respectively for the normative and deviant target members). 
 
 TManipulation-checks.T At the end of the second phase of the experiment, and 
before they were debriefed, participants answered to manipulation-checks questions: 
“Which school does pupil A(B) attend?”, “For how long does pupil A(B) attend this 
school?”, “How does pupil A(B) feel about their integration in this school?, and “With 
whose opinion do you agree the most: pupil A(B)”). Participants were fully debriefed 
at the end of the experiment. 
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Results 
 
Social Identification 
A Group x Status x Social Identification ANOVA on identification with the in-
group and with the out-group revealed that participants identified more strongly to the 
in-group (M = 5.93, SD = 0.88) than with the out-group (M = 3.06, SD = 1.11), F(1,89) 
= 458.87, p<.001, η2 = .77. The remaining effects were not significant, F always 
<1.84, ns. 
 
Evaluation of Target Members 
 A Group x Status x Likeability ANOVA conducted on target evaluation scores 
showed a main effect of Likeability (F1,89 = 312.05, p<.001, η2 = .78). Participants 
evaluated the normative target (M = 5.05, SD = 0.64) more positively than the deviant 
target (M = 2.87, SD = 0.86). We found no significant effects of Group, Status, Group 
x Likeability, and Group x Status (all F2, 89 < 2.91, ns). 
The analysis also yielded a significant Status x Likeability effect (F2,89 = 5.00, 
p=.009, η2 = .101). Regardless of group membership, we observed differences 
between evaluations ascribed to normative members (F1,92 = 6.75, p=.002, η2=.128). 
Normative marginal members (M = 4.77, SD = 0.62) were less positively evaluated 
than new members (M = 5.07, SD = 0.59, t62 = 2.00, p=.05) and than full members (M 
= 5.32, SD = 0.61, t63 = 3.61, p=.001). We found no differences between evaluations 
of normative new members and normative full members (t59 = 1.63, ns). No 
differences emerged from evaluations of new, full, and marginal deviant members 
(F1,92 = 1.69, ns; Overall Mean = 2.87, SD = 0.86). 
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T Evaluations of Normative and Deviant Targets as a Function of their Status 
and Group Membership.T More relevant to our hypotheses is the interaction Group x 
Status x Likeability (F2,89 = 3.20, p=.046, η2 = .07). Table 4 shows the mean scores 
of evaluations of target members across experimental conditions. 
 
  Group 
  In-Group Out-Group 
  M SD M SD 
New Member      
Normative   5.11 0.44 5.04 0.71 
Deviant   3.02 0.83 2.88 0.61 
Full Member      
Normative   5.62 0.51 5.04 0.58 
Deviant   2.27 0.87 3.00 0.99 
Marginal Member      
Normative   4.89 0.61 4.65 0.62 
Deviant  3.12 0.94 2.91 0.71 
Table 4. Evaluation of Normative and Deviant Members by Status and Group (Experiment 2) 
 
We hypothesized that participants should evaluate the normative in-group full 
member more positively than the out-group normative full member and, 
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simultaneously, evaluate the deviant in-group full member more negatively that the 
deviant out-group full member. To test this hypothesis, we broke down the second-
order interaction according to Status. We found a significant Group x Likeability 
interaction in the full member status condition, F(1,91) = 8.01, p=.006, η2=.08 . 
Participants evaluated the deviant in-group member more negatively than the deviant 
out-group member (F1,91 = 5.64, p=.020, η2=.058), and the normative in-group full 
member more positively than the normative out-group full member (F1,91 = 6.20, 
p=.015, η2=.063). The Group x Likeability interaction was not significant, either in the 
new member status, or in the marginal member status conditions (both F1,91 < 1, see 
Table 4 and Figure 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Evaluation of normative and deviant members as a function of Group and Status 
(Experiment 2). 
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Our hypothesis also establishes that, in the out-group condition, there should be 
differences between evaluations of normative targets or between deviant targets, 
according to their socialization status. In turn, in the in-group condition, full members 
should be the most positively or the most negatively evaluated of all targets, depending 
on whether they are, respectively, normative or deviant. 
To check for this prediction, we broke down the second-order interaction 
according to the Group factor. The Status x Likeability interaction was significant in 
the in-group condition (F2,90 = 7.18, p=.001, η2=.136) but not in the out-group 
condition (F2,90 < 1).TPF13FPT  
As predicted, evaluations of the normative in-group full member were more 
positive than evaluations of the normative in-group new member and marginal member 
(F2,90 = 5.81, p=.004, η2=.109; both ts > 2.89, p always < .022), but there were no 
significant differences between evaluations of normative in-group new members and 
marginal members (t29 = 1.10, ns). Concomitantly, participants evaluated the deviant 
in-group full member more negatively than the other deviant out-group members 
(F2,90 = 4.80, p=.010, η2=.096; both ts > 2.28, p always <.030). In brief, these results 
confirm our main hypothesis about the increased impact of in-group full members’ 
normativeness or deviance on participants’ judgments.  
 
Correlation between In-Group Identification and Intra-Group Differentiation 
We propose that upgrading of normative in-group members and derogation of 
deviant in-group members should be a direct function of in-group identification, and 
that this should be more the case when normative and deviant in-group members have 
                                                 
13 Our results also show a significant effect of Likeability (F1,90 = 303.91, p<.001). The remaining 
effects were not significant (Status in the in-group condition: F2,90 < 1; Status in the out-group 
condition: F2,90 = 1.71, ns). 
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the full member status than any other status. To check for this assumption, we 
computed the product-moment correlations between the in-group identification or the 
out-group identification scores and the intra-group differentiation score (difference 
between evaluation of the normative member and the deviant member) in the Group 
and Status conditions. Table 5 shows these correlations. 
 
In-Group Condition Out-Group Condition 
r In-Group 
Identification – Intra-
Group 
Differentiation 
r Out-Group 
Identification – 
Intra-Group 
Differentiation 
r In-Group 
Identification – 
Intra-Group 
Differentiation 
r Out-Group 
Identification – 
Intra-Group 
Differentiation 
New .04, ns (N=14) .45, ns (N=14) .09, ns (N=16) -.28, ns (N=16) 
Full .45, p = .092 (N=15) .18, ns (N=15) .23, ns (N=16) -.13, ns (N=16) 
Marginal -.02, ns (N=17) -.05, ns (N=17) .27, ns (N=17) .02, ns (N=17) 
Total .35, p = .019 (N=46) .17, ns (N=46) .02, ns (N=49) -.12, ns (N=49) 
Table 5. Product-Moment Correlations between In-Group Identification or Out-Group 
Identification and Intra-Group Differentiation across Experimental Conditions, and In-Group and Out-
Group Conditions (Experiment 2). 
 
As can be seen in the “Total” row of Table 5 the only significant correlation is 
found in the in-group condition (r = .35, p=.019). This result suggests that 
identification may be a predictor of differentiation between normative and deviant 
members, only in the case of the in-group (cf. Branscombe, Wann & Noel, 1994). Also 
interesting is the fact that, within conditions, the only correlation that approached 
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significance is to be found in the in-group/full member condition.TPF14FPT In other words, the 
more participants identified with the in-group, the more they upgraded the normative 
in-group full member and derogated the deviant in-group full member, but in-group 
identification was not associated with judgments of new and marginal in-group 
members. This result is thus in line with our assumption that full members are 
especially relevant to the legitimization of individual’s social identity. 
To summarize, the present results seem to be entirely in accordance with our 
predictions. Participants upgraded normative in-group full members and derogated 
deviant in-group full members as compared to their out-group matching members. This 
phenomenon did not emerge from evaluations of members who held other statuses. 
Moreover, participants upgraded normative in-group full members relative to 
normative in-group new members and normative in-group marginal members. This 
result reinforces the assumption that full members are particularly relevant paragons 
for other members as they define the group’s normative standards. In addition, 
participants derogated deviant in-group full members relative to deviant in-group new 
members and deviant in-group marginal members. In addition, we found a significant 
correlation between in-group identification and differentiation between normative and 
deviant in-group full members. Together, these results support our reasoning about the 
increased validation impact of normative full members, and the threatening impact of 
deviant full members as regards the positiveness of the in-groups social identity. 
                                                 
14 Notice that this correlation was computed on a sample of N = 15. 
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Experiment 3 
Reaction to Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Targets’ Group 
Membership and of their Contribution to the Validation of Group Norms 
 
Overview and Hypotheses 
 
 Experiment 3 was, essentially a replication of Experiment 2, except that, in the 
present experiment, we replaced marginal members by ex-members. As in Experiment 
2, we predicted that normative in-group full members would be upgraded relative to 
normative in-group new members and ex-members, and that deviant in-group full 
members would be derogated relative to deviant new and ex-members. In addition, we 
expected normative in-group full members and deviant in-group full members to be, 
respectively, upgraded and derogated as compared to their out-group counterparts, but 
that this effect should not emerge from evaluations of new members and ex-members. 
 Another difference between the present experiment and Experiment 3 is that, 
this time, we decided to more directly measure participants’ evaluations of in-group 
and out-group as a whole, instead of asking them about their identification with these 
groups. We expected an in-group bias to emerge from these evaluations, in the form of 
more favourable in-group than out-group evaluations. More importantly, in line with 
previous research (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 1998; Marques, Abrams & 
Serôdio, 2001; Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988), we 
expected, a positive correlation to emerge between in-group bias (i.e. the positive 
difference between evaluations of in-group and out-group as a whole) and intra-group 
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differentiation (i.e. the positive difference between evaluations of normative and 
deviant in-group members) especially in the case of full members. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were 12 male and 61 female (N = 73) university students issuing 
from a private university of Porto. Their ages ranged from 19 to 47 years old (M = 
23.29; SD = 3.87). Thirty-five participants were Psychology students, and 38 were 
Management students. There were no differences in age (F5,66 < 1), course (χ2 = 1.24, 
d.f. = 5, N=73, ns) and sex (χ2 < 1, d.f. = 5, N=73) across the experimental conditions. 
Sixteen participants who did not correctly answered manipulation check questions are 
not part of this sample. 
 
Experimental Design 
The design was a 2 (Group: In-group vs. Out-group) x 3 (Status: New Member 
vs. Full Member vs. Ex-Member) x 2 (Likeability: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and 
Status were between-participants factors whereas Likeability was a within-participant 
factor. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to take part in a study concerning the educational 
system. They were informed that the Portuguese government had created a task force 
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aimed to examine and propose solutions to a number of problems currently faced by 
the Portuguese educational system. Participants were informed, both verbally and by 
written instructions, that a preliminary survey had been conducted with pupils of 
several courses, in which pupils had been asked to state their most important needs. 
They were further informed the present study aimed to validate evidence collected at 
that survey. They were thus to answer to a questionnaire about the issues raised by the 
previous sample of respondents. 
 
 TLikeability manipulationT. Participants were provided with two short reports that 
presented information about two targets. These reports were similar to those used in 
Experiment 2, with the necessary changes to make them fit the university, rather than 
the high-school level. The normative target agreed with the statement “students should 
join together and fight for their right to participate in decisions regarding the 
educational system”. In turn, the deviant target member agreed with the statement 
“students are not competent enough to decide about what is best for them”. 
 
TGroup and members’ status manipulationsT. According to Group conditions, 
target members were presented issuing either from the participants’ course (in-group 
condition) or from the other course (out-group condition). Targets’ status also varied 
according to conditions. In the new member condition, they were presented as 
“attending the course for 6 months, after having asked to be transferred from another 
course”, and as having reported “a strong motivation to attend this course”. In the full 
member condition, the targets were presented as “having attended the course for 4 
years”, and as having reported “a strong motivation to remain in the course”. In the ex-
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member condition, the targets were presented as “having just left the course after 
having asked to be transferred to another course” and as having reported that they had 
“felt strong difficulties of integration in the former course”. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 The dependent measures tapped the topics as in Experiment 2, with an 
additional set of question aimed to measure in-group bias. 
 
ETvaluation of target members T. After participants received information about the 
two targets, they evaluated each target on seven bi-polar traits by means of seven-point 
scales (1 = selfish, bad example, unethical, disrespectful, bad colleague, uninteresting, 
and disloyal; 7 = altruistic, good example, ethical, respectful, good colleague, 
interesting, and loyal). We averaged scores of these traits to a Normative Target 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.79) and a Deviant Target (Cronbach’s α = 0.87) score. 
 
TGroups’ evaluationsT. Finally, participants answered to eight questions aimed to 
tap evaluations of in-group and out-group as a whole: “How much do you consider that 
students of the (in-group/out-group) course are competent?”; “How much do you 
consider that students of the (in-group/out-group) course are fun?”, “How much do you 
consider that students of the (in-group/out-group) course are good colleagues?”, “How 
much do you consider that students of the (in-group/out-group) course are hard 
workers?” (1= nothing at all; 7= very much). We averaged these evaluations to an In-
Group Evaluation (Cronbach’s α = 0.92) and an Out-Group Evaluation score 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.94). 
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TManipulation-checksT. At the end of the experiment, all participants answered 
manipulation-checks questions, similar to those used in Experiment 2. Participants 
were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
 
Results 
 
Evaluations of Normative and Deviant Targets as a Function of their Status and 
Group Membership 
Table 6 shows the means and standard-deviations of evaluations of members 
across conditions. A Group x Status x Likeability ANOVA on these evaluations 
showed a main effect of Likeability, F1,67 = 456.20, p<.001, η2 = .872. Across 
conditions, the normative target (M = 5.50; SD = 0.62) was more positively evaluated 
than the deviant target (M = 3.43; SD = 0.73). The effects of Group, Status, and Group 
x Status were not significant (F always < 2.93, ns). Group x Likeability was 
marginally significant (F1,67 = 3.69, p=.059, η2 = .052), and Status x Likeability was 
significant (F2,67 = 7.12, p=.002, η2 = .175). More relevant in light of our hypotheses, 
is the significant Group x Likeability x Status interaction (F2,67 = 9.83, p<.001, η2 = 
.227). 
 We broke down this second-order interaction according to the Status factor. 
The Group x Likeability was significant in the full member condition (F1,69 = 14.42, 
p<.001, η2 = .166), marginally significant in the ex-member condition (F1,69 = 2.84, 
p=.097, η2 = .032), and non-significant in the new member condition (F1,69 < 1; see 
 130 
Table 6 and Figure 6. Our results also show a significant effect of Likeability (F1,69 = 
389.11, p<.001). TPF15FPT  
 
  Group 
  In-Group Out-Group 
Status  M SD M SD 
New Member      
Normative Member  5.56 0.55 5.66 0.62 
Deviant Member  3.44 0.82 3.85 0.43 
Full Member      
Normative Member  6.14 0.42 5.32 0.54 
Deviant Member  2.83 0.82 3.48 0.81 
Ex-Member      
Normative Member  4.86 0.57 5.44 0.34 
Deviant Member  3.51 0.57 3.40 0.62 
Table 6. Evaluation of Normative and Deviant Members by Status and Group (Experiment3) 
 
Consistently with results of Experiment 2 and with previous research on the 
black sheep effect, we found that participants evaluated the normative in-group full 
member (M = 6.14; SD = 0.42) more positively than the normative out-group full 
member (M = 5.32; SD = 0.54; F1,69 = 11.34, p = .001, η2 = .132) and, 
                                                 
15 The remaining effects were not significant (Group in the new member condition: F1,69 = 1.90, ns; 
Group in the full member condition: F1,69 < 1; Group in the ex-member condition: F1,69 = 1.48, ns). 
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simultaneously, that they evaluated the deviant in-group full member (M = 2.83; SD = 
0.82) more negatively than the deviant out-group full member (M = 3.48; SD = 0.81; 
F1,69 = 4.30, p=.042, η2 = .059; see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Evaluation of normative and deviant members as a function of Group and Status 
(Experiment 3). 
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and the other, aimed to compare evaluations of deviant in-group new members, 
marginal members, and ex-members. The ANOVA on evaluations of normative in-
group members yielded a significant effect (F2,68 = 17.10, p <.001, η2 = .325). The 
ANOVA on evaluations of deviant in-group members yielded a marginally significant 
effect (F2,68 = 2.96, p = .058, η2 = .077). 
 These ANOVAs indicate that participants evaluated in-group normative ex-
members less positively (M = 4.86; SD = 0.57) than normative new members (M = 
5.56; SD = 0.55, t22 = 3.08, p=.005) and than normative full members (M = 6.14; SD = 
0.42, t20 = 6.04, p<.001). Also in line with predictions, the normative in-group full 
member was more positively evaluated than the normative in-group new member (t22 
= 2.88, p = .009).  
 Concomitantly, with respect to deviant members, participants derogated the full 
member (M = 2.83; SD = 0.82) as compared to the ex-member (M = 3.51; SD = 0.57; 
t20 = 2.24, p=.036), and, marginally, the new member (M = 3.44; SD = 0.82; t22 = 
1.81, p=.08). There were no differences between evaluations of deviant new members 
and of deviant ex-members (t22 < 1). These data replicate results found in the previous 
experiment. 
 In brief, consistent with our predictions, among normative in-group targets, the 
full member was the most positively evaluated, and the ex-member was the less 
positively evaluated of all. Among deviant in-group targets, the full member is the 
most derogated and the new member and the ex-member are equally less derogated. In 
the whole, these results are consistent with results of Experiment 2, and suggest that 
full members, normative or deviant, are those, which have more strongly impact on 
participants’ motivation to validate their beliefs on a positive social identity. 
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T Reactions to defectors.T We predicted that normative in-group ex-members 
would be judged more negatively than normative out-group ex-members, whereas no 
difference should emerge between evaluations of deviant in-group and out-group ex-
members. Although the Group x Likeability interaction found in the ex-member 
condition was only marginally significant, we tested the differences in evaluations 
between normative ex-members of both groups. 
We found a significant difference between evaluations of the normative in-
group ex-member (M = 4.86; SD = 0.57) and the normative out-group ex-member (M = 
5.44; SD = 0.34; F1,69 = 5.37, p=.023, η2 = .062). However, there were no significant 
differences between deviant ex-members (F1,69 < 1). Thus, the present results lend 
acceptable support to our hypothesis. They suggest that participants’ viewed the 
normative in-group ex-member as a potential threat to the in-group’s image. Notice, 
however, that this target was still positively judged, a result that also supports the 
impact of the likeability manipulation on participants’ judgments. 
 
In-Group Bias and Intra-Group Differentiation 
We constructed an In-Group Bias score by subtracting the In-Group Evaluation 
score from the Out-Group Evaluation score, so that a positive value indicates in-group 
bias. We first submitted the in-group bias score to a Group x Status ANOVA. We 
found no significant effects either of Group (F1,66 = 2.68, p = .106), or of Status and 
Group x Status (both F2,66 < 1). Overall participants showed an in-group bias in their 
evaluations of in-group and out-group as a whole (M = 1.06, SD = 1.05; this score was 
significantly different from 0, t71 = 8.55, p < .001). 
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Similarly to what we did in Experiment 2, we computed the product-moment 
correlation between the intra-group differentiation score (difference between 
evaluation of the normative member and the deviant member) and the in-group bias 
score across Group and Status conditions. A positive correlation would indicate that 
the more participants bias their evaluations towards a favourable view of the in-group 
the more they would upgrade the normative target and derogate the deviant target. 
Table 7 shows the obtained correlations. 
 
 In-Group Condition Out-Group Condition 
New Member .33, ns, (N = 13) .17, ns, (N = 13) 
Full Member .41, ns, (N = 11) -.06, ns, (N = 13) 
Ex-Member -.22, ns, (N = 11) -.19, ns, (N = 12) 
Total .16, ns, (N = 35) .03, ns, (N = 38) 
Table 7. Product-Moment Correlations between In-Group Bias and Intra-Group Differentiation 
across Experimental Conditions, and In-Group and Out-Group Conditions. 
 
Although the correlations were not significant, which may be due to the 
relatively small samples, they go in a direction consistent with our reasoning. As can 
be seen in Table 7, in general, the correlations found for new member targets and full 
member targets are stronger in the in-group than in the out-group condition. This 
indicates that the more participants differentiated between normative and deviant in-
group targets in the new member and the full member conditions, the more they were 
biased towards the in-group. Although these results do not grant any definitive 
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conclusions, they seem to encourage the idea that derogation of these in-group targets 
indeed, may sustain positive in-group differentiation. 
To summarize, the present experiment yields three important results. First, the 
present results provide further support to the black sheep effect. However, they 
contribute to deepen our understanding of this effect. Indeed, they show that the black 
sheep effect is largely dependent on the more central (as opposed to more peripheral) 
status of in-group normative and deviant members. Indeed, the black sheep effect 
emerged exclusively from evaluations of full members. In our view, this result 
establishes the relevance of a theoretical integration of the group socialization model, 
which accounts for the importance of members’ status within their groups, and the 
subjective group dynamics model, which accounts for the impact of group standards 
on the evaluation of these members. 
Second, and in accordance with the above idea, participants upgraded 
normative in-group full members and derogated deviant in-group full members as 
compared, respectively, to normative in-group new members and ex-members, and, to 
deviant in-group new members and ex-members. This result thus further supports the 
idea that in-group full members have an increased impact on individuals’ subjective 
validation of their beliefs on a positive in-group identity. 
Finally, the results indicate that defectors (i.e. ex-members) may be differently 
appraised depending on their normative status and group membership. At face value, 
one might suppose that individuals particularly dislike in-group defectors who, in 
addition, infringe other relevant group norms. However, our findings suggest that, 
although group loyalty is, undoubtedly, a relevant prescriptive norm, the reactions 
triggered by defection depend on the defectors’ potential contribution to the positive 
identity of the group. Defectors seem to be judged according to the extent to which 
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they may help validating the group’s identity. In this vein, those members whom, by 
defecting, deprive the group of potential positive contributions to identity (i.e. 
normative ex-members) generate even less favourable evaluations than those whom, 
by defecting, rid the group’s representation from negative instances. 
 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
What have we found in Experiments 2 and 3? Our results consistently showed 
that individuals’ judgments of normative and deviant in-group members are more 
extreme when these members occupy a central status in the group than when occupy a 
less central position. Full members are expected to provide a frame of reference to 
other members regarding the group’s values and goals. As Levine and Moreland (e.g. 
1998) suggest these members should boast the commitment of group members towards 
the group and towards each other. For the same reason the group should expect the 
highest commitment from these members. As a result, those full members who comply 
with this expectation are praised above all other members. Our findings support this 
idea. They also show that the downside of this process is that full members who adopt 
a clearly deviant stance in regard of valued prescriptive norms should generate strong 
negative reactions. In this vein, we believe the present findings can contribute to 
expand the two models from which our studies were inspired: the group socialization 
model and the subjective group dynamics model. They show that evaluations of group 
members strongly depend on these members’ intra-group status. This result seems to 
be a relevant development for the subjective group dynamics model. But our findings 
also suggest that members’ intra-group status does not warrant by itself the acceptance 
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of a deviant point of view by other members. As a case in point, our findings may 
illustrate an important process through which full members may start a role transition 
process that leads them to a more marginal status. Our result may thus contribute to a 
relevant insight to the group socialization model. 
 Throughout the present chapter, and preceding chapters, we repeatedly 
assumed that deviant in-group full members pose a relevant threat to the group. 
However, we did not directly observe this phenomenon (but cf. Serôdio, 2006). In the 
next chapter we report one experiment that, while attempting to replicate the preceding 
results, also attempts to directly test the idea that reactions to deviant in-group full 
members actually depend on their perceived threat to the group. 
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CHAPTER V 
EFFECT OF TARGETS’ SOCIALIZATION STATUS ON PERCEPTIONS OF 
THREAT AND STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH IN-GROUP DEVIANCE 
 
In the present chapter, we report one experiment (Experiment 4) that was aimed 
to test the general idea that reactions to deviance by in-group members depends on the 
extent to which these members are perceived as threat to the group’s image. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, we showed that individuals react more positively and more 
negatively, to normative and deviant in-group full members than to other normative 
and deviant in-group members or to out-group members. Based on the group 
socialization model’s assumptions (Levine & Moreland, 1994), we proposed that this 
was due to the group’s increased reliance on full members as keepers of the group’s 
core beliefs and courses of action. Full members should thus elicit confidence in other 
group members regarding the group’s potential and, ultimately, positive social identity. 
As a result, these members should elicit more favourable evaluations than other 
members who hold less relevant intra-group statuses. 
 
The Threatening Character of Deviant In-Group Full Members 
The above assumption corresponds to the well-balanced situation in which full 
members meet, or even, outperform group expectations and behave in accordance with 
values that are commonly shared among group members. However, one may think of 
situations in which full members behave in a way inconsistent with the group’s 
expectations and, more specifically, with commonly held values that are viewed by 
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other members as supports for the group’s positive distinctiveness. Due to their 
representativeness in the group, in these situations, full members can be perceived as 
more threatening to the group’s positive identity than other members with similar 
behaviour or characteristics. As a result, these members will be judged more 
negatively than other members who display similar behaviour or characteristics but 
whose status is less central to the group. 
The present experiment was aimed at examining this general idea. We predict 
that normative in–group full members will generate stronger feelings of confidence 
than normative new members or normative marginal members. Conversely, deviant 
in–group full members will generate stronger feelings of threat than deviant new 
members or deviant marginal members. We further expect these feelings to mediate 
evaluations of these members. 
 
Strategies to Deal with Deviants 
The second idea underlying the present experiment draws directly from the 
group socialization model (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). This model proposes that 
groups will adopt different socialization strategies towards their members depending 
on these members status. Such strategies may correspond to direct pressure, which, in 
the case of psychological groups should emerge in the form of hostile attitudes and 
negative evaluations (cf. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques & Serôdio, 2000). 
But other strategies may be available to group members. For example, according to the 
group socialization model, new members should have a limited grasp of group norms 
but their motivation to accept full members’ influence will facilitate their learning and 
assimilation of these norms. Therefore, it seems unlikely that new members who 
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behave in counter-normative ways be targeted in terms of strongly hostile reactions. 
Rather, such members will be treated by full members according to group inclusive 
strategies aimed to teach them the group’s normative expectations (Levine, Moreland 
& Hausmann, 2005). In turn, full members are supposed to have a good grasp of group 
norms (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). As a result of the above process, full members 
that deviated from group norms should be perceived on the basis of an attributional 
reasoning that tends to interpret their deviance either in terms of contempt, or in terms 
of an underlying intention to disrespect the group’s standards (cf. Marques, Abrams, 
Páez & Hogg, 2001). In this case, other group members might feel hostility towards 
these members, thus engaging in punitive action towards them (Levine & Moreland, 
1994; cf. also Erikson, 1966). This action might include prestige withdrawal or 
exclusion from the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). 
In the present experiment, we have attempted to examine the type of strategies that 
group members may adopt towards deviant members with different intra-group status. 
 
Overview and Hypotheses 
 
Our procedure in the present experiment is similar to the procedure used in 
experiments 2 and 3. In this experiment, high-school pupils judged in-group or out-
group new members, full members, or marginal members issuing from either their in-
group or the out-group, one of which adopted a likeable opinion, and the other, an 
unlikeable opinion. The dependent measures tapped in-group and out-group 
identification, evaluations of normative and deviant member, perception of the extent 
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to which the deviant member threatened their group’s image, and proposed strategy to 
deal with deviant member. 
Our hypotheses are derived from the reasoning that we presented at the 
beginning of this chapter. As regards judgments of target members, we expect to find 
the same pattern of results as in the preceding experiments. More precisely, we expect 
a black sheep effect and a positive correlation between intra-group differentiation and 
social identification to emerge from participants’ evaluations of target full members, 
but not of new members and marginal members. 
As regards perceived threat, we expect Tparticipants to perceive higher threat 
Tfrom deviant in-group full members than from any other deviant members. More 
importantly, we perceived threat to mediate the association between identification with 
the in-group and evaluation of deviant in-group full members. 
As regards strategies advocated to deal with deviants, we expect participants to 
advocate punishment strategies regarding in-group full members, and teaching 
strategies regarding new members. Marginal members should not elicit any of these 
strategies, because they are experimentally constructed in a way close to the ex-
member status. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Eighty-seven high school pupils from two schools of Porto constitute our 
sample. There are 34 male participants and 53 female participants. Age ranged from 14 
to 19 years old (M = 15.97; SD = 1.03). There are no differences in age (F5,79 < 1) 
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and sex (χ2 = 5.26, d.f. = 5, N = 87, ns) across the experimental conditions. Three 
participants who did not correctly answered manipulation check questions and thirteen 
participants that were attaining that school for only six months, are not part of this 
sample.  
 
Experimental Design 
The design was a 2 (Group: In-group vs. Out-group) x 3 (Status: New Member 
vs. Full Member vs. Marginal Member) x 2 (Likeability: Normative vs. Deviant). 
Group and Status were between-participants factors, whereas Likeability was a within-
participant factor. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 3. As part of the cover-story, 
we informed participants that the forthcoming debates between pupils of the two (in-
group and out-group) schools would be conducted among a limited number of selected 
pupils and that the participants’ function was to help us choose the pupils that should 
represent each school. Thus, each participant should evaluate two (target) pupils that, 
supposedly, had already participated in the previous phase of the investigation and 
were candidates for participation in the debates. This was intended to allow us observe 
the kind of strategies participants advocated towards deviant targets. 
The manipulations of Group, Status, and Likeability were identical to those in 
Experiment 2, except that we added for the present targets’ manipulation their 
supposed motivation to be representative pupils of their school. Whereas new and full 
member targets were highly motivated, marginal member targets were not. 
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Dependent Measures 
Dependent measures were similar ton those employed in Experiment 2. Items 
used to measure social identification were averaged to an In-Group Identification 
(Cronbach α = 0.78) and an Out-Group Identification score (Cronbach α = 0.84), and 
evaluations of target members were averaged to a Likeable Member (Cronbach’s α = 
0.80) and to an Unlikable Member T( TCronbach’s α = 0.83) score. 
Dependent measures additional to those we employed in the preceding studies 
were (1) the perception of threat by deviant targets and (2) the participants’ advocated 
reaction to deviance strategies. 
 
TPerception of Threat by Deviant Member towards the Group.T After evaluating 
the target members, participants answered the following questions about the deviant 
member: “This pupil would represent a threat if they are included in the team that is 
going to represent their school”; “This pupil badly influences the public image of their 
school”; “This pupil is a threat to the positive image of the school” (1 = I totally 
disagree; 7 = I totally agree). We averaged the answers to the three questions to a 
Perceived Threat score (Cronbach’s α = 0.77). 
 
TReaction to Deviance StrategiesT. Finally, participants stated their willingness to 
engage in reaction towards the deviant member on six items representative of 
strategies inspired in Forsyth (1990) that might be used to deal with the deviant 
member. These strategies were: (1) Discussion: “To discuss the issue with the pupil, 
using rational arguments” (2) Instruction: “To inform the pupil about the group’s 
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opinion”; (3) Persistence: “To persist and convince the pupil to change opinion”; (4) 
Threat: “To show the pupil the negative effects of maintaining the opinion”; (5) 
Depreciation: “To ascribe less responsibility-demanding tasks to the pupil”; and (6) 
Demand: “To demand the pupil’s support to the group opinion”. Answers were given 
on 7-point scales (1 = I totally disagree; 7 = I totally agree). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Social Identification 
A Group x Status ANOVA on the in-group identification and out-group 
identification scores yielded only a significant effect of identification. Participants 
identified more with the in-group (M = 5.24; SD = 0.86) than with the out-group (M = 
3.95; SD = 1.04), F1,81 = 134.24, p<.001, η2 = 0.624TPF16FPT.  
 
Evaluation of Target Members 
A Group x Status x Likeability ANOVA on the evaluations of likeable and 
unlikeable targets yielded no significant effects of Group (F1, 81 = 2.72, ns) and 
Group x Status (F2,81 < 1). Status (F2,81 = 9.67, p<.001, η2 = 0.187) was significant, 
and showed that participants evaluated marginal members more negatively targets (M 
= 4.04; DP = 0.54) than new members (M = 4.55; DP = 0.46; t56 = 3.90, p<.001) and 
full members (M = 4.41; DP = 0.38; t55 = 3.06, p=.003). There were no differences 
                                                 
16 The remaining results were the following: Group (F1,81 < 1); Status (F2,81 < 1); Group x Status 
(F2,81 < 1); Group on social identification with the in-group and with the out-group (F1,81 < 1); Status 
on social identification with the in-group and with the out-group (F2,81 = 2.33, ns); Group x Status 
social identification with the in-group and with the out-group (F2,81 = 1.37, ns). 
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between the evaluations of new members (M = 4.55; DP = 0.46) and full members (M 
= 4.41; DP = 0.38, t57 = 1.24, ns). In addition, the likeable target was more positively 
evaluated (M = 5.36; SD = 0.75) than the unlikeable target (M = 3.31, SD = 0.86), as 
indicated by the significant effect of Likeability, F(1,81) = 295.73, p<.001, η2 = 0.785. 
Results also showed a significant Status x Likeability interaction, F(2,81) = 
3.60, p = .032, η2 = 0.082. Status significantly affected evaluations of normative 
targets (F2,84 = 9.80, p < .001, η2 = 0.189). The normative marginal target (M = 4.90, 
SD = 0.77) was less positively evaluated than other normative targets (new member: M 
= 5.54, SD = 0.53, t56 = 3.71, p<.001; full member: M = 5.64, SD = 0.73, t55 = 3.71, 
p<.001), and there were no differences between evaluations of the normative new 
member and the normative full member (t57 < 1). Status did not affect evaluations of 
deviant targets (Overall Mean = 3.31, SD = 0.86; F2,84 = 1.96, ns). Group x 
Likeability was not significant (F1,81 = 2.76, ns). 
More importantly, the analysis showed a significant Group x Status x 
Likeability effect (F2,81 = 9.76, p<.001, η2 = 0.194), see Table 8. 
We predicted a black sheep effect to emerge from evaluations of the full 
member targets, more than other targets. To test this prediction, we broke down the full 
interaction according to the Status factor. We found a significant Group x Likability 
interaction in the full member condition (F1,83 = 16.73, p<.001, η2=.162; effect of 
Group: F1,83 <1). As predicted, in this condition, evaluations of the normative in-
group target were significantly more positive than evaluations of the normative out-
group target, F(1,83) = 8.96, p=.004, η2=.092. Simultaneously, the evaluation of the 
in-group deviant target were significantly more negative than evaluations of the 
deviant out-group target, F(1,83) = 9.79, p=.002, η2=.104 (see Table 8 and Figure 7).  
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  Group 
  In-Group Out-Group 
Status  M SD M SD 
New Member      
Normative Member  5.52 0.58 5.55 0.50 
Deviant Member  3.42 0.71 3.69 0.99 
Full Member      
Normative Member  6.05 0.70 5.25 0.53 
Deviant Member  2.69 0.73 3.66 0.79 
Marginal Member      
Normative Member  4.54 0.74 5.21 0.67 
Deviant Member  3.25 0.89 3.11 0.69 
 Table 8. Evaluation of Normative and Deviant Members by Status and Group (Experiment4) 
 
The Group x Likeability interaction was not significant in the new member 
condition (F1,83 < 1; effect of Group: F1,83 <1), but it was marginally significant in 
the marginal member condition (F1,83 = 3.13, p=.08, η2=.030; effect of Group: F1,83 
= 1.29, ns). In this latter condition, participants evaluated normative marginal members 
of the in-group less positively than normative marginal members of the out-group, 
F1,83 = 5.08, p=.027, η2=.052. However, no differences emerged from evaluations of 
deviant targets, F1,83 < 1; see Table 8 and Figure 7). 
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A related prediction was that the normative in-group full member and the 
deviant in-group full member would be, respectively, more positively, and more 
negatively evaluated than other in-group targets. However, this should not happen with 
out-group targets. To test this prediction, we broke down the three-way interaction 
according to the Group factor. We obtained a significant Status x Likeability 
interaction in the in-group condition, F2,82 = 11.91, p<.001, η2=.222 (effect of Status 
within the in-group condition: F2,82 = 5.63, p=.005, η2=.111). This interaction was 
not significant in the out-group condition, F2,82 < 1 (effect of Status within the out-
group condition: F2,82 = 3.93, p=.023, η2=.078). 
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Figure 7. Evaluation of normative and deviant members as a function of group and socialization 
(Experiment4). 
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normative full member were significantly more positive than evaluations of the 
normative new member, and these latter evaluations were significantly more positive 
than evaluations of the normative marginal member (t always > 2.67, p always <.013 
between conditionsTPF17FPT; see Table 8 and Figure 7).  
We also found a significant effect of Status in evaluations of deviant targets 
within the in-group (F2,82 = 2.98, p=.056, η2=.064). The deviant full member was less 
positively evaluated than the deviant new member was (t26 = 2.18, p=.038), and than 
the deviant marginal member (t25 = 1.79, p=.085). There were no differences between 
evaluations of deviant new and marginal members (t25 < 1). 
In brief, the present results support our predictions regarding the black sheep 
effect. This effect emerged in the full member condition but not in the other status 
conditions. Moreover, participants significantly upgraded the normative in-group full 
member and derogated the deviant in-group full member as compared, respectively, to 
the other in-group normative and in-group deviant targets. 
 
Correlation between In-Group Identification and Intra-Group Differentiation 
As in Experiment 2, we expected in-group identification to be positively 
correlated with intra-group differentiation, especially in the in-group full member 
condition. To check for this prediction, we correlated the in-group identification score 
with the intra-group differentiation score in each condition. In partial consistency with 
our hypothesis, the correlation between in-group identification and intra-group 
differentiation was marginally significant in the in-group full member condition (r = 
.52, p=.058), see Table 9.  
                                                 
17 Difference between evaluations of normative new members and normative full members (t26 = 2.18, 
p=.038); normative new members and normative marginal members (t25 = 3.86, p=.001); normative full 
members and normative marginal members (t25 = 5.48, p<.001) 
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 In-Group Condition Out-Group Condition 
 r In-Group 
Identification – 
Intra-Group 
Differentiation 
r Out-Group 
Identification – 
Intra-Group 
Differentiation 
r In-Group 
Identification – 
Intra-Group 
Differentiation 
r Out-Group 
Identification – 
Intra-Group 
Differentiation 
New .05, ns 
(N = 14) 
.54, p=.048 
(N = 14) 
.16, ns 
(N = 16) 
.26, ns 
(N = 16) 
Full .52, p=.058 
(N = 14) 
.00, ns 
(N = 14) 
.02, ns 
(N = 15) 
-.54, p=.039 
(N = 15) 
Marginal .10, ns 
(N = 13) 
-.37, ns 
(N = 13) 
.29, ns 
(N = 15) 
.06, ns 
(N = 15) 
Total .25, ns 
(N = 41) 
.06, ns 
(N = 41) 
.08, ns 
(N = 46) 
-.05, ns 
(N = 46) 
Table 9. Product-Moment Correlations between In-Group Identification or Out-Group 
Identification and Intra-Group Differentiation across Experimental Conditions, and In-Group and Out-
Group Conditions (Experiment 4). 
 
The more participants identified with the in-group, the more they upgraded the 
normative in-group full member while derogating the deviant in-group full member. 
No other meaningful correlations emerged from the in-group condition. Interestingly, 
and consistent with findings in Experiment 2, we found a negative correlation (r = -
.54, p=.039) between out-group identification and differentiation between normative 
and deviant out-group full member targets. The more participants identified with the 
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out-group, the less they differentiated between these two targets. We have no 
aprioristic explanation for this latter correlation. However, the opposite correlation 
patterns in the in-group and the out-group condition suggest that participants followed 
different criteria in judging in-group and out-group full member targets. Contrary to 
what happens with judgments of out-group full members, differentiation between 
deviant in-group full members may be a function of the degree to which participants 
identify with the in-group. 
 
Perceived Threat by Deviant Targets 
We predicted that deviant in-group full member target would evoke stronger 
perceptions of threat than every other target. To test this hypothesis, we ran a Group x 
Status ANOVA on perceptions of threat. The results are consistent with other research 
(cf. Serôdio, 2006), but are only partially consistent with our hypothesis. Indeed, we 
found a significant effect of Group (F1,81 = 5.14, p=.026, η2 =0.250), but no 
significant effects of Status (F2,81 < 1) or Group x Status (F2,81 = 1.62, ns). The 
Group effect indicates that deviant in-group members (M = 4.98, SD = 1.38) were 
perceived as more threatening to the group than deviant out-group members (M = 4.30, 
SD = 1.41).  
A more important prediction was that the perception of threat should operate as 
a mediator between in-group identification and evaluation of deviant in-group full 
member targets. We found a significant correlation between in-group identification and 
the evaluation of the deviant full member of the in-group (r = -.52, p= .057). The 
correlations between out-group identification and derogation of deviant targets were 
not significant (r always < |.18|, ns), except in the out-group full member condition (r 
= .54, p=.039). 
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More importantly, we found a significant correlation between perceived threat 
and evaluations of the deviant target in the in-group full-member condition, (r = -.57, p 
= .032; in remaining conditions, r always < .35, ns). Thus, in the in-group full member 
condition, the more participants perceived the deviant target as a threat, the less 
favourably they evaluated this target. 
 
 
Figure 8. Mediation in the In-group Full Member Condition 
 
The above results allow us to analyse the predicted mediation. Although the 
results were marginally significant, they show a pattern consistent with our 
predictions. We observed that, only for the in-group full members condition (R = .60 
(RP2P = .36); F2,11 = 3.09, p=.086)TPF18FPT, the more participants identified with the in-group 
the more they perceive these targets as a threat to their group (r = 0.68, p=.008). When 
we entered perceived threat in the regression equation, the association between 
                                                 
18 Results obtained in the remaining conditions were not significant: in-group new member condition: R 
= .24 (R2 = .06), F2,11 < 1; in-group marginal member condition: R = .37 (R2 = .14), F2,10 < 1; out-
group new member condition: R = .36 (R2 = .11), F2,13 < 1; out-group full member condition: R = .19 
(R2 = .04), F2,12 < 1; out-group marginal member condition: R = .36 (R2 = .13), F2,12 <1. 
r = -.52, p = .057 
(β = -.24) 
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r = .68, p = .008  
R = .60 (RP2P = .36); F (2,11) = 3.09, p = .086 
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identification with in-group and evaluation of the deviant member was decreased by 
nearly half of its strength (53.85%), see Figure 8. Thus, derogation of deviant in-group 
full member targets is a function of in-group identification as mediated by the 
perceived threat of these targets to the group. 
 
Reaction Strategies 
 We conducted a principal factor components analysis with varimax rotation on 
the six items aimed to check for participants’ advocated strategies towards the deviant 
target. 
 
Itens Factor 1 Factor 2 
Discussing using rational arguments .83 -.16 
Informing group’s opinion .61 .46 
Persisting and convincing to change opinion .66 .20 
Showing negative effects of maintaining deviant 
opinion 
.18 .56 
Ascribing tasks demanding less responsibility .25 .69 
Demanding support for group opinion -.23 .66 
Table 10. Item-Factor Correlations after Varimax Rotation (Experiment 4) 
 
 The analysis extracted three factors that account for 52.26% of the total 
variance. The first factor explains 27.34% of the variance and the second factor 
explains 24.92% of the variance.  
 153 
 These factors seem consistent with the type of strategies we have proposed to 
analyse. Specifically, the first factor seems to correspond to teaching strategies, 
whereas the second factor seems to correspond to punishment strategies. We thus used 
Factor 1 and Factor 2 as Teaching and Punishment scores (see Table 10). 
 
  Group 
  In-Group Out-Group 
New Member     
Teaching Strategies  -.67, .009, (N=14) -.18, ns, (N=16) 
Punishment Strategies  -.27, ns, (N=14) -.20, ns, (N=16) 
Full Member    
Teaching Strategies  -.16, ns, (N=14) -.49, .074, (N=15) 
Punishment Strategies  -.50, .080, (N=14) -.14, ns, (N=15) 
Marginal Member    
Teaching Strategies  .09, ns, (N=13) -.36, ns, (N=15) 
Punishment Strategies  .03, ns, (N=13) -.25, ns, (N=15) 
 Table 11. Product-Moment Correlation between Evaluation of Deviant Target and Teaching 
and Punishment Strategies across Conditions (Experiment4) 
 
 We correlated the teaching and punishment scores with evaluations of the 
deviant target in each experimental condition (see Table 11). 
These correlations indicate that participants associated teaching strategies to the 
evaluation of deviant new members of the in-group (r = -.67, p=.009) and, to a lesser 
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extent, to deviant full members of the out-group (r = -.49, p=.074). Punishment 
strategies were associated only to evaluations of deviant full members of the in-group 
(r = -.50, p=.08), see Table 11. In the out-group, the pattern is less consistent, as shown 
by the generally weaker correlations. 
These results are consistent with our predictions: the more negative is the 
evaluation of deviant new members of the in-group, the more group members are 
willing to engage in socialization (teaching) strategies. The more group members 
consider a full member’s behaviour as deviant (negative), the more they are willing to 
engage in punishment strategies. However, in line with our reasoning, teaching applies 
more to new members, whereas punishment applies more to full members. 
 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The present results are consistent with those obtained in the preceding two 
experiments. The black sheep effect emerged only from evaluations of full member 
targets. Normative in-group full members were more appreciated than any other 
member. Deviant in-group full members were more derogated than any other member.  
In addition, this strong upgrading of normative in-group full members and 
derogation of deviant in-group full members is associated with social identification. 
The more participants identified with the in-group, the more strongly they 
differentiated between these members. Although this result is not conclusive, the 
evidence also suggests that the effect of in-group identification on the derogation of 
deviant in-group full members may be mediated by the extent to which these members 
are perceived as a threat to the in-group. 
 155 
Finally, we observed that, whereas deviant in-group new members generally 
evoke socialization strategies that are aimed at informing these members about the 
group’s norm, deviant full members mainly evoke punishment strategies. 
In the whole, these results support our general assumptions. Consistent with the 
results of the preceding experiments, the most representative members of the group are 
those that evoke more extreme reactions near other group members 
 Our results are consistent with the subjective group dynamics approach 
(Marques & Páez, 1994; Abrams et al, 1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001; 
Serôdio, in preparation). Indeed, deviance adopted by a member that is expected to 
represent and validate the group standards, was perceived as a threat to the individuals' 
beliefs on a positive social identity. Consequently, group members were willing to 
engage in punitive strategies towards these members. These results are consistent with 
the idea that through derogating and punishing the deviant in-group member, 
individuals are subjectively legitimizing the value of the violated norm and, hence, 
their beliefs on a positive social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, 
Páez & Hogg, 2001). 
Our results also seem consistent with the group socialization model (e.g. 
Moreland & Levine, 1994). Indeed, and based on Levine and colleagues (2005) 
assumptions, because new members lack some important information about the group, 
they are supposed to evoke inclusive strategies from other group members, in order to 
learn group norms. The willingness to apply teaching strategies to deviant new 
members is consistent with this idea (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005).  
 In contrast, since full members have already assimilated group norms, the 
strategies that deviant in-group full members obtained should not have the same 
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aiming as those directed to deviant new members. Group members showed intention to 
engage in punishment strategies toward deviant in-group full members. This punitive 
character of these strategies (namely the suppression of some responsibilities in respect 
to group tasks) is in line with the goals of a re-socialization phase (e.g. Moreland & 
Levine, 1982) and to the idea (that we approached in the conclusion of the previous 
chapter) of an initialization of a role transition process from full to marginal member 
status. 
Also relevant to the subjective group dynamics model (Marques, Abrams, Páez 
& Hogg, 2001) and to the group socialization model as well (e.g. Zdaniuk & Levine, 
2001), members that state an intention to transgress group loyalty norm but that 
contribute to the legitimization of the group standards, were slightly derogated (more 
precisely, they were less positively appraised that all other normative members). This 
idea suggests that these members are considered as potential positive contributors to 
the validation of the in-group standards, but are personally stating that the group is not 
able to keep them as members. Therefore, these members may be perceived as future 
contributors to a negative public image of the group.  
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CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEVIANCE IN GROUPS AND IN SOCIETY 
 
In this thesis, we attempted a theoretical and empirical articulation between 
Levine and colleagues’ group socialization model (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994) and 
Marques and colleagues’ subjective group dynamics model (e.g. Marques, Páez & 
Abrams, 1998). The former model is directly inspired on the tradition of study of 
groups as social units composed by restricted numbers of individuals who interact with 
each other, and who share similar beliefs and goals. The latter model is ingrained in the 
tradition of study of large social categories, as collective or individual representations 
of the characteristics that define a large number of individuals that share the same 
identity. Although, from this idea, one might infer that the two models are directed at 
different psychological and social realities, we hope to have demonstrated that this is 
not true. On the one hand, the group socialization model can extend its analysis to the 
kind of reality that corresponds to processes associated to representations of social 
categories, and the subjective group dynamics model can extend its analysis to 
processes associated to social interaction in face-to-face groups. On the other hand, the 
integration of the two models can provide a better understanding of these processes. 
Based on these two models, we argued that individuals strive to achieve and to 
maintain a positive in-group identity, but that this identity is, to a large extent, 
dependent on intra-group differentiations. These intra-group differentiations are of two 
kinds. One such kind of intra-group differentiation deals with individuals’ status in the 
group. This applies both to the status of those that judge and to the status of the targets 
of judgment. The other kind of intra-group differentiation deals with the prescriptive 
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aspects of behaviour of group members. We argued that intra-group status is associated 
with the levels of knowledge of group standards and of commitment to the group that 
members have and expect from others. This knowledge and expectations should 
determine the impact of behaviour or characteristics of group members on the 
sustenance of a positive social identity. Specifically deviant (i.e. undesirable) 
behaviour adopted by members who are expected to show stronger commitment to, 
and are viewed as more representative of, the group should be interpreted as a threat to 
social identity, and, as such, should evoke punitive reactions from other members. 
We attempted to demonstrate these ideas in four experiments. In Experiment 1, 
we showed that likeable in-group members and unlikeable in-group members were 
significantly upgraded and derogated, respectively, as compared to similar out-group 
members, but that this was not the case when participants did not know what the 
group’s position was in light of the dimension of likeability. In Experiment 2, we 
found that likeable in-group members and unlikeable in-group members were 
significantly upgraded and derogated, respectively, as compared to similar out-group 
members, but that this was the case only when these members were viewed as 
occupying a full member status in the groups. In addition, these members were 
upgraded or derogated, respectively, as compared to their in-group counterparts that 
occupied new member and marginal member status. We also find that this process is 
directly correlated with the extent to which perceivers identify with the in-group. In 
Experiment 3, we found similar results. In addition, we found that normative ex-
members of the in-group were judged less favourably than all other normative 
individuals, even those who belong to the out-group. Finally, in Experiment 4, we 
observed that derogation of deviant in-group full members actually ensues from the 
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perception of their threatening character to the individuals’ social identity and actually 
correspond to a punishment, as opposed to informational strategy. 
Overall, these results are consistent with the assumptions of the subjective 
group dynamics model (e.g. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) and the group 
socialization model (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). Namely, our results seem 
consistent with the idea that because full member are the closest members to the 
group’s prototype (Levine & Moreland, 1994), they also are those members that most 
contribute to the clarity of inter-group differentiation (Turner et al, 1987), to the 
validation of normative system (Festinger, 1950; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Marques, 
Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001), and to the attainment of group goals (Festinger, 1950; 
Levine & Moreland, 1994). Consequently, we can say that in-group full members play 
a special role in establishing the perceived legitimacy of a positive social identity, or, 
conversely, in threatening such legitimacy (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).  
The general pattern of results supports claims by Marques and colleagues (e.g. 
Marques et al., 1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001) according to which self-
categorization processes do not simply involve the cognitive construction of inter-
group settings in terms of clear-cut inter-group differences. Indeed, such inter-group 
settings may, simultaneously involve inter-group distinctiveness and prescriptive 
differentiation between in-group members according to their contribution to such 
distinctiveness. Actually, in Experiment 3, we found indirect support to the idea that 
differentiation between likable and unlikable in-group full members may sustain 
positive in-group differentiation, as shown by the positive correlation of differentiation 
between these members and in-group bias. Unfortunately, our data did not allow a 
direct test of this conjecture. However, the data are in line with this idea and with 
previous research on subjective group dynamics (Marques et al., 1998). 
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Our results also support Levine and colleagues’ contention (e.g. Levine & 
Moreland, 1994) that full members’ behaviour is more significant to other members 
because the latter view the former as the foundation of the group’s image and goals. 
This may explain why, contrary to full members, new members, marginal members, 
and ex-members do not trigger such hostile reactions. On the contrary, the latter 
members, namely new members, trigger informational, more than punishment 
strategies. This is in line with the group socialization model’s assumption that 
individuals will attempt to increase commitment of in-group members that hold 
peripheral statuses within the group (specifically, new members and marginal 
members) (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). Concomitantly, the fact that 
normative in-group marginal members and normative in-group ex-members were less 
positively evaluated than normative in-group full members may reflect participants’ 
motivation to restate their commitment to the norm of loyalty toward the group. This 
idea is consistent with Zdaniuk and Levine's (2001) assumptions about the prescriptive 
character of loyalty to the group (cf. also Levine & Thompson, 1996). 
In brief, if the subjective group dynamics model has neglected the impact of 
intra-group status on the consequences of group members’ adoption of a prescriptive 
focus in the judgment of deviants, the socialization model has neglected the larger 
inter-group context in which such prescriptive focus emerges. The evidence reported in 
this work seems to demonstrate that the two models may complement each other by 
allowing one to account simultaneously for both of these factors.T 
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Problems and Questions for Future Research 
 
TWe are well aware of the fact that our research raised more questions than it 
answered. Among such questions, three are of particular interest to us. The first 
question deals with the way in which the reactions to deviance we observed may 
Tcontribute to the socialization process proposed by Levine and colleagues’ model. 
Assuming that new members are motivated to learn group norms and to behave in 
accordance to normative expectations, we may expect these members to be focused on 
behaviour and characteristics of full members (cf. Fiske & Depret, 1986) Thus, 
punishment of deviant in-group full members should be a striking opportunity for the 
learning of group norms by new members. In this vein, whereas the emergence of 
deviance by the former members may be viewed as disruptive to the group, it may 
nevertheless contribute to the group’s cohesiveness and uniformity. This idea is in line 
with theoretical work by sociologists like Becker (1963) and Erikson (1966; cf. also 
Durkheim, 1930/1998). According to these authors, if the public punishment of deviant 
acts allows new members to perceive that this specific behaviour is not tolerated (cf. 
also Marques & Serôdio, 2000), as a result, punishment of deviants and, specifically of 
those deviants that ought to behave according to the society’s rules should be 
particularly informative. 
A second question for research deals with the distinction between inclusive and 
exclusive reactions towards deviants and their functions. Following Levine, Moreland 
and Hausmann (2005), we may suppose that derogatory reactions to in-group deviants 
are exclusive reactions. In turn, following Marques and Páez’s ideas (1994; Marques, 
Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001), punitive reactions to in-group deviants ensue from the 
fact that these deviants cannot, by definition, be expelled from the group, that is, they 
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cannot be re-constructed as out-group members (cf. also Serôdio, 2006). In addition, it 
would be interesting to know if derogation of in-group deviants actually stands for a 
downgrading process in terms of these deviants’ status in the group. As a case in point, 
we may establish a parallel between this process and Lemert’s (1964) classical 
distinction between primary and secondary forms of deviance in the realm of the 
sociology of deviance.TP PTAccording to this author, primary deviance concerns deviant 
behaviour that becomes accepted by the group. Generally, primary deviance has no 
consequences to the perpetrator’s intra-group status, because other members interpret 
this behaviour as being occasional. In turn, secondary deviance is associated with the 
perceived personal dispositions of the deviants (cf. also Orcutt, 1973). As a result, we 
may expect groups to direct inclusive strategies to deviant behaviour that is perceived 
as occasional and exclusive strategies to deviant behaviour that is perceived as 
intentional (cf. Levine, 1980). 
The third question deals with the process through which some group members 
entered a marginal status. Indeed, following the assumptions of the group socialization 
model, we can conceive of two types of marginal members. On the one hand, some 
group members may occupy a marginal status because they decreased their 
commitment to the group. On the other hand, there may be individuals whose marginal 
status was determined by the group’s lack of commitment towards them. Deviant 
behaviour adopted by each type of marginal members should evoke different reactions 
by the group. In the case in which the marginal status is due to a decrease in the level 
of commitment of the individual to the group but that this decrease was not 
accompanied by a decrease in the level of commitment of the group to the individual, 
the marginal member might still be perceived as a potential contributor to the group’s 
social identity. This would not be the case if the group’s commitment to the individual 
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decreased. As a result, we should expect the group to engage in strategies aiming to 
keep these members within the group. Specifically, the former members should trigger 
inclusive strategies aimed at reinforcing their commitment to the group. The latter type 
of member would trigger an exclusive reaction aimed at clarifying the group’s 
boundaries and, possible, positive in-group distinctiveness. 
To conclude, with this work, we hope to have contributed for the clarification 
of deviance as an important group process. We believe that, in integrating the two 
models that fostered this work, we hope to have been able to show the relevance of an 
approach to deviance that is simultaneously based on the intra-group and inter-group 
contexts in which it emerges. We see this work more as the beginning than as the end 
of a research process, and we hope to have proposed some heuristic avenues for future 
research. 
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